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Abstract 
The issue of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) has been subject to significant 
international political attention following the G20’s commitment to minimise the 
opportunities for double non-taxation or less than single-taxation of corporate 
revenue. Country-by-Country (CbC) reporting generally requires multinational 
entities to disclose certain information on their operations on an individual country 
basis. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
identifies CbC reporting as a transfer pricing risk assessment tool that may serve as a 
partial solution to addressing BEPS. However, civil society views CbC reporting as a 
transparency disclosure tool that enables the public provision of decision useful-
information concerning a company’s geo-political risk, future prospects, and 
jurisdictional tax contributions. CbC reporting will be realised upon conclusion of 
the OECD’s current work. But whose interests will the OECD’s CbC reports serve? 
The purpose of this study is to determine who should benefit from CbC reporting, 
and to develop a standardised CbC reporting model that enables their information 
needs to be met.  The development of the standardised model is informed by critical 
evaluation of the contrasting opinions of business, civil society, and academic 
communities regarding the ideal structure and scope of CbC reporting, in addition to 
examination of the varying information disclosures, structural requirements and 
implementation mechanisms between primary CbC reporting frameworks and 
models. 
 
Drawing on a stakeholder theory approach that is conceptually informed by the 
interrelated notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR), this thesis investigates 
recent pragmatic CbC reporting developments. Qualitative content analysis of CbC 
reporting proposals, associated stakeholder commentary and critiques, and elements 
of voluntary CSR frameworks aligned with CbC reporting objectives, is presented. 
Comment letters received in response to an OECD Discussion Draft on CbC 
reporting are subjected to a qualitative coding process to identify recurrent themes 
identified amongst diverse stakeholders. The real-world potential of the standardised 
model is displayed via illustrative examples using non-transparent disclosures of 
three multinational entities. 
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Based on industry specific implementation efforts and identification of the potential 
need to improve the transparency of multinational entities’ geographical disclosures, 
CbC reporting was found in this study to be an appropriate inclusion within a 
corporate reporting system. Results of the initial analysis found that the public 
dissemination of CbC information satisfies the needs of stakeholders identified 
within the theoretical framework whilst concurrently ensuring developing countries 
have an efficient means to access necessary data. To meet the information needs of 
stakeholders, as identified, the subsequent analysis found the standardised CbC 
reporting template should be structured to require disclosure of subsidiary company 
names and countries of operation, and specific financial position and performance 
data disaggregated on a country basis. 
 
This thesis is subject to limitations. Consideration of any tax policy reform options to 
address the substantive problem of BEPS is beyond the scope of this study. The 
OECD’s timeframe for the CbC reporting template extends beyond the completion of 
this thesis. A limited scope of literature and requirements were reviewed for relevant 
accounting standards and the primary analyses in chapters five and six is limited to 
an evaluation of two CbC reporting proposals. Furthermore, response letters to the 
OECD’s Discussion Draft on CbC reporting were purposively selected and therefore 
associated frequency counts do not suggest statistical significance. The scope of the 
standardised model does not extend to specific reporting requirements for the 
extractive industry or exemptions for small and medium sized multinational entities. 
 
Despite these limitations, this thesis contributes to extant literature on accounting 
standard setting, particularly in relation to segment reporting and the limited CbC 
reporting literature. This thesis applies a unique theoretical approach and exhibits 
originality in its development of a standardised model and the associated illustrative 
application. Through its examination of a contemporary and highly politicised topic, 
this thesis may increase public awareness and further inform other investigating 
academics, in addition to potentially providing insight for multinational entities to 
(re)consider their current disclosure practices.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) constitutes a serious risk to tax 
revenues, tax sovereignty and the trust in the integrity of tax systems of all 
countries that may have a negative impact on investment, services and 
competition, and thus on growth and employment globally. 
 (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2013b, p. 2) 
 
As the above statement implies, BEPS is an ongoing issue of international concern 
currently receiving substantial focus from governments, business, civil society 
groups and the public. BEPS involves the utilisation of tax planning strategies by 
multinational entities that exploit gaps and loopholes within current domestic and 
international taxation legislation to reduce or nullify corporate tax liabilities (OECD, 
2013b). These strategies primarily centre on shifting profits from high-tax 
jurisdictions to low-tax or tax-free jurisdictions through numerous methods, 
including distorting intra-firm transfer prices, corporate debt-equity structuring and 
the strategic location of assets and allocation of expenses.  
 
BEPS is a complex and multi-faceted problem perceived to be facilitated by the non-
transparent reporting practices of multinational entities as enabled by existing 
regulations. Despite the legality of tax avoidance activities, many well-known 
corporations, such as Apple, Google, Microsoft and Starbucks, have been subjected 
to substantial public dissent following associated media exposés and legislative 
hearings (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012; Wood, 2014). These 
public outcries partially stem from the view that a corporation must contribute to 
society by paying their “fair share” of taxes. Additionally, tax avoidance activities 
have been suggested to hinder the achievement of human rights and sustainable 
development goals by preventing other states from resourcing rights in equitable 
ways (Centre for Economic and Social Rights & Christian Aid, 2014).  
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Whilst amendments to substantive tax law represent part of the solution to reducing 
the opportunities for multinational entities that engage in tax avoidance activities, 
sufficient disclosure requirements that promote transparency are also necessary to 
identify and address the problem of BEPS (Ring, 2014). To counter the adverse 
impacts of BEPS, the OECD released a 15 point BEPS Action Plan in July 2013, 
which received full endorsement from the G20 during the St Petersburg summit in 
September 2013 (OECD, 2013b). The focus on the administrative issues of 
transparency and disclosure are expressed in Actions 12 and 13 of the OECD Action 
Plan. Specifically, Action 12 requires taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax 
planning arrangements, whilst Action 13 requires multinational entities’ to provide 
all relevant governments with country-by-country (CbC) information prepared in 
accordance with a common template (OECD, 2013a). 
 
However, the OECD BEPS Project work is not occurring in a vacuum as civil society 
groups continue to lobby for their long-running campaigns for transparency reporting 
frameworks that contain requirements for multinational entities to disclose financial 
data on a CbC basis. Legislative amendments have occurred in specific industry 
sectors in the United States (U.S), the European Union (EU), and other parts of the 
world. As a primary bearer of compliance costs, the business sector, individually and 
through their representatives and advisors, are attempting to influence the ongoing 
development of CbC disclosure requirements to ensure their interests are met. 
Importantly, this raises a question that remains highly debatable, being who should 
benefit from CbC disclosures? 
 
CbC reporting has been identified by the OECD as a transfer pricing risk assessment 
tool that may serve as a partial solution to addressing BEPS. However, this study 
examines whether CbC reporting has the potential to achieve the broader objectives 
promoted by civil society. In particular, civil society groups suggest that in addition 
to identifying tax contributions by jurisdiction, CbC reporting may improve the 
information available to users to make informed decisions on a company’s geo-
political risk and future prospects. 
 
The evaluation of CbC reporting within this thesis draws upon recent pragmatic 
developments in the extractive and finance industries, in addition to an analysis of 
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the primary CbC reporting proposals currently in circulation, being the Tax Justice 
Network’s (TJN) CbC model and the aforementioned OECD CbC reporting 
template. Disaggregated geographic reporting is also suggested in the field of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting, and therefore consideration is 
given to key CSR Frameworks, including the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, integrated reporting, Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Guidelines, and 
the United Nations Guidance on Corporate Responsibility Indicators. This thesis 
evaluates the variances observed amongst these CbC reporting requirements and 
proposals from a stakeholder theory perspective to determine the structural and 
implementation requirements of a theoretically ideal CbC reporting model.   
 
1.2 Motivation  
As a result of the G20’s commitment, the introduction of a CbC reporting model for 
multinational entities to report on their global operations appears to be only a matter 
of time. However, many questions remain unanswered, such as the specific 
information to be disclosed; whether that information should be disseminated to the 
public; and the extent and ideal method for accounting for associated compliance 
burdens. These questions all centre upon a determination of which information user 
groups should be recognised as legitimate stakeholders in the design and use of CbC 
reports. This study will address the uncertainties and inconsistencies concerning CbC 
reporting in order to determine the content, structure and implementation mechanism 
for a standardised CbC reporting framework. 
 
Action 13 of the BEPS Action Plan requires the OECD to develop transfer pricing 
documentation rules that “will include a requirement that multinational entities 
provide all relevant governments with needed information on their global allocation 
of the income, economic activity and taxes paid among countries according to a 
common template” (OECD, 2013a, p. 23). The OECD’s development of this 
template, hereafter referred to as a CbC reporting template, is currently ongoing with 
further developments expected in 2015 (OECD, 2014a). From an OECD perspective, 
the objective of mandated CbC reporting is to provide necessary information to tax 
administrations to conduct informed transfer pricing risk assessments and if 
necessary, thorough audits.   
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In contrast, the TJN (under the direction of Richard Murphy) has advocated a 
broader notion of CbC reporting as a method for improving financial reporting 
transparency. The TJN considers the role of CbC reporting to extend beyond 
exclusively informing tax administrations, to ensure multinational entities can be 
held accountable to their shareholders and a broader network of stakeholders in their 
host country (TJN, 2014).  To achieve this, multinational entities would be required 
to publicly disclose the names of companies operating in each country, labour 
expenses and employee numbers and financial figures (apportioned between third 
party and intra-firm), in addition to tax related information (Murphy, 2009).  
 
Furthermore, similar disclosure requirements to those contained within some CbC 
reporting proposals exist within established sustainability reporting frameworks. The 
contrasting disclosure requirements of the OECD’s CbC Template, the TJN’s CbC 
reporting model and various CSR frameworks has lead to speculation and debate as 
to which is the “ideal” template to implement forthcoming requirements. 
 
1.3 Research Aims 
The purpose of this study is to develop a standardised CbC reporting model based on 
a critical analysis of extant proposed models in addition to the associated 
commentary and criticism received from various interested parties. To date, there has 
been minimal agreement amongst proponents of CbC reporting on the optimal design 
and implementation of a CbC model. Such disagreement is likely to extend from 
varying perceptions on the objective of CbC reporting, as the OECD considers it to 
be a transfer pricing risk assessment tool aimed to assist tax administrations, whilst 
civil society suggests CbC reporting is a tool to assist the public receive transparent 
disclosures to assess corporations and hold them accountable for their global actions.  
Cost-benefit analyses within existing literature primarily view CbC reporting and any 
associated benefits from a taxation perspective and fail to adequately consider the 
additional intended benefits of CbC, such as establishing an environment of financial 
integrity and corporate accountability (for an example see Evers, Meier and Spengel, 
2014). Furthermore, due to the contemporary nature of ongoing OECD deliberations, 
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an insubstantial amount of academic research has been conducted that thoroughly 
evaluates the principal CbC reporting platforms. 
 
This thesis considers three research questions in relation to an analysis of CbC 
reporting. The first research question is posed as follows: 
 RQ1: Is CbC reporting appropriate within a corporate reporting system?  
 
Within the above research question, a corporate reporting system is broadly defined 
as the regular provision of a corporation’s financial performance and position 
information to stakeholders. To address the first research question, this thesis applies 
CSR theory to determine what information a multinational entity should disclose to 
communicate their due consideration of the economic, social and sustainability issues 
associated with their business activities. Additionally, this thesis draws upon recent 
pragmatic developments in the extractive and finance industries, in addition to an 
analysis of the primary CbC reporting proposals currently in circulation. 
Furthermore, the need to alter existing geographical disclosure requirements to 
include CbC reporting is evaluated through a review of current accounting standards 
under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and U.S Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S GAAP), in addition to a review of the 
associated academic literature. The assessment of geographical disclosures required 
under accounting standards within this thesis is supported by a suggestion of the 
OECD Task Force to consider existing publicly available corporate information as a 
potential alternative source of information (Bowler, Escribano & Pasquier, 2012). 
 
The second research question asks: 
 RQ2: How should a standardised CbC reporting model be implemented? 
 
To address this question, this study draws on stakeholder theory and its normative 
implications for multinational entities. This study examines various CSR and CbC 
reporting models against this theoretical framework to determine which stakeholders 
should have their information needs met through the provision of CbC reports and 
what distribution mechanism would enable these needs to be satisfied. 
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The third research question further asks: 
 RQ3: How should a standardised CbC reporting model be structured? 
 
To address this research question, the line items required to be disclosed by 
multinational entities in accordance with the primary CbC reporting templates (i.e. 
OECD and TJN) are evaluated to determine the extent to which the information 
needs of legitimate stakeholders are satisfied. The standardised model is then applied 
to three illustrations concerning the disclosure of financial information by Microsoft 
Corporation, Merck & Co Inc. and Statoil. 
 
1.4 Contribution 
This research contributes to the existing literature by critically analysing multiple 
CbC reporting proposals and extant frameworks against an established theoretical 
framework to develop a standardised reporting model. Distinct from prior research, 
this study examines both CbC and CSR reporting frameworks to develop a 
standardised framework that is further supported through the illustrative application 
of its potential benefits.  
 
This study may offer numerous pragmatic contributions, including further informing 
ongoing policy reform deliberations by the OECD and G20, in addition to further 
questioning the objective of financial reporting and the identification of the users it is 
intended to benefit.  
 
Importantly BEPS is a widespread and complex problem that needs to be addressed 
via multifaceted policy reforms. Non-transparent financial reports merely contribute 
to the problem by providing increased opportunities for multinational entities to 
engage in BEPS behaviour, generally without the consequence of being held 
accountable to or reprimanded by interested stakeholders. It is beyond the scope of 
this study to consider any policy reform options or disclosure initiatives beyond CbC 
reporting to address the substantive problem of BEPS. 
 
The research questions and associated analyses contained within this thesis 
contributes to addressing the disagreement observed in practice and theory, 
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concerning the following aspects of CbC reporting: (1) what specific information 
should be disclosed, (2) how the information should be delivered, (3) what kind of 
technology and reporting systems will be required for implementation by taxpayers 
and governments, (4) to whom will the information be disseminated, and (5) for what 
purpose should the information be used? Utilising a qualitative content analysis 
method, it was found from a stakeholder theory perspective that CbC information 
should be prepared for the benefit of a broad stakeholder group and made publicly 
available through financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS. 
 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter two provides an 
institutional setting encompassing an overview of the relevant current accounting 
standards, recent practical developments relating to CbC reporting, in addition to 
geographical disclosure requirements under CSR reporting. Chapter three 
commences with a review of the academic literature on geographical disaggregation 
in financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS and U.S GAAP, in addition 
to the literature on CbC reporting and other voluntary reporting frameworks. Chapter 
three concludes with the development of the theoretical framework, which 
encompasses CSR theory and the interrelated stakeholder theory. Chapter four 
discusses the research paradigm, design and methodology employed within this 
thesis. Chapter five presents the analysis on the implementation of CbC reporting. 
This is followed by the analysis of structural information requirements to be included 
within the standardised CbC reporting model, which is presented in chapter six. 
Chapter six concludes with three illustrative applications of the standardised model. 
Finally, chapter seven discusses the conclusions, limitations and contributions of this 
study. 
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Chapter 2: Institutional Setting 
2.1 Introduction 
As established in the previous chapter, the BEPS Project targets the substantive tax 
rules and laws that enable tax bases to be eroded and profits to be shifted outside of 
jurisdictions, in addition to information transparency and disclosure requirements. 
The BEPS Project recognises that substantive tax rules are only part of the solution 
to protecting tax bases, as sufficient transparency and disclosure of tax information to 
tax authorities is necessary for early tax risk detection and the effective 
administration of the tax laws (OECD, 2013a). The focus on the administrative 
issues of transparency and disclosure are expressed in Actions 12 and 13 of the 
OECD Action Plan. Specifically, Action 12 requires taxpayers to disclose their 
aggressive tax planning arrangements, whilst Action 13 requires multinational 
entities’ to provide all relevant governments with CbC information prepared in 
accordance with a common template (OECD, 2013a).  
 
Although the OECD has asserted that information provided by multinational entities 
in accordance with Action 13 is intended exclusively for tax administrations, calls 
have been made for public disclosure of the CbC template to enable citizens to assess 
their government’s management of multinational entities and to enable easy access 
for governments in poorer countries to relevant information to address BEPS (Ring, 
2014; C20 Australia, 2014). To evaluate the potential for multinational entities’ 
current geographic disclosures to both inform the public on the nature and location of 
business operations and to identify BEPS risks, this chapter commences with a 
discussion of accounting standards. 
 
This chapter discusses the evolution of the concept of CbC reporting for all industries 
from its inception in 2003 to current, and concludes with an overview of its industry-
specific applications within the extractive and finance sectors. The pragmatic 
advantages and disadvantages of the multiple existing industry specific CbC 
reporting frameworks as highlighted in this chapter contribute to an analysis of RQ1, 
which asks is CbC reporting appropriate within a corporate reporting system? The 
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findings within this chapter suggest that the accounting standards contain 
deficiencies regarding disclosure of country specific information for multinational 
entities’ global business operations. CbC reporting is a disclosure initiative suggested 
to improve the quality of geographic information provided by multinational entities, 
the idea of which pre-dates the OECD’s BEPS Project (Murphy, 2009). 
 
2.2 Existing Information Disclosure Mechanisms 
Whilst existing mechanisms for tax administrations to access taxpayer information 
(such as bilateral tax treaties; tax information exchange agreements; regional 
agreements and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information) 
have their benefits, the need for additional disclosure to tax administrators was 
identified by the OECD in the BEPS Action Plan, which stated “comprehensive and 
relevant information on tax planning strategies is often unavailable to tax 
administrations” (OECD, 2013a, p. 22). During a meeting held in 2011 amongst 
OECD Task Force members, it was suggested that existing publicly available 
corporate information might contribute to holding governments and companies to 
account, as per the objective of CbC reporting (Bowler, Escribano & Pasquier, 
2012). A subsequent OECD research report found the public availability of statutory 
accounts in all countries may assist tax administrations to assess the international tax 
risks of taxpayers that belong to multinational entities through the provision of profit 
details for each company within the group (Bowler, Escribano & Pasquier, 2012). 
Furthermore, the research report stated the public availability of statutory accounts 
would likely provide efficient access to information, thereby accelerating risk 
assessments, whilst also benefiting developing countries who may not otherwise 
have access to required information due to limited Exchange of Information 
networks (Bowler, Escribano & Pasquier, 2012). 
 
This section considers the effectiveness of current accounting standards to facilitate 
the inclusion of transparent and decision-useful geographic information by 
multinational entities within their financial statements. The International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
develop the accounting standards considered within this section. The IASB is an 
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independent standard setting body of the IFRS Foundation and is responsible for the 
development of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), which are 
required or permitted in approximately 120 countries throughout the world (IFRS 
Foundation, 2014). Following its establishment in 2001, the IASB agreed to adopt 
the International Accounting Standards (IASs) developed by its predecessor, the 
International Accounting Standards Committee.  
 
The FASB is the regional accounting standard setting body in the United States 
responsible for the development of financial accounting standards for the preparation 
of non-governmental entities’ financial statements (FASB, n.d.). Accounting 
standards developed by the FASB, known as Statements of Financial Accounting 
Standards (SFAS), were superseded in 2009 by the Accounting Standards 
Codification (ASC) (FASB, 2009). The standards developed by the IASB were 
selected for analysis in this thesis due to their widespread international adoption, as 
referred to above. Although other countries have regional accounting standard setting 
bodies, the accounting standards of the FASB in the United States were selected for 
analysis within this thesis due to the ongoing convergence efforts between the IASB 
and FASB to achieve a common set of global accounting standards (IFRS 
Foundation, n.d.). The individual accounting standards evaluated within this chapter 
include IFRS 8 Operating Segments and its equivalent in U.S GAAP, ASC 280 
Segment Reporting, in addition to IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial Statements and 
ASC 810 Consolidation, being the comparable standard under U.S GAAP. 
 
2.2.1 Consolidated Reporting 
Under both IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial Statements and ASC 810 Consolidation, 
parent entities are required to present consolidated financial statements. The basis for 
determining which subsidiaries are included in the consolidated financial statements 
is based on the concept of control, however, control is defined differently under IFRS 
10 and ASC 810. Under IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial Statements, control is 
present when an entity is exposed to or has rights to variable returns from its 
involvement with the investee entity and has the ability to affect those returns 
through its power over the investee (IFRS 10 para. 6). Two consolidation models 
exist under U.S GAAP: the variable interest model and the voting model, whereby 
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the former evaluates control based on which party has power and benefits, whilst the 
latter model evaluates control based on existing voting rights (ASC 810 para 10).  
 
Once the parent entity’s control over the entities (or entity) has been established 
(where, as stated above, control under IFRS 10 is based on an investor’s ability to 
affect the level of investee returns, whilst for ASC 810 control is based on the level 
of controlling financial interest) the financial statements are then subject to the 
consolidation process. IFRS 10 states the following process for consolidating 
financial statements: 
 like items of assets, liabilities, equity, income, expenses and cash flows of the 
parent are combined with those of its subsidiaries 
 the carrying amount of the parent’s investment in each subsidiary and the 
parent’s share of equity in each subsidiary is eliminated  
 intragroup assets and liabilities, equity, income, expenses and cash flows 
relating to intragroup transactions (profits or losses resulting from intragroup 
transactions that are recognised in assets, such as inventory and fixed assets) 
are eliminated in full. 
(IFRS 10 para B86) 
 
The above process is consistent with ASC 810, which requires “intra-entity open 
account balances, security holdings, sales and purchases, interest, dividends, and so 
forth” to be eliminated, in addition to the elimination of “any intra-entity profit or 
loss on assets remaining within the consolidated group” (ASC 810-10-45-1). 
Therefore, consolidated financial statements prepared in accordance with either IFRS 
10 or ASC 810 represent the financial position and performance of a multinational 
entity as if it were a “single economic entity” (IFRS 10 Appendix A; ASC 810-10-
45-1), although they are not taxed in this manner. Jurisdiction to tax is a matter for 
domestic law that applies the international norms of residency and source to assess 
multinational entities’ international business income (Sadiq, 2005). Subsidiaries of 
multinational entities have residency within the jurisdictions where they are 
established under domestic laws (Sadiq, 2005).  
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Therefore, although taxes are due to different jurisdictions throughout the world, the 
consolidation process renders it difficult for financial statement users to determine 
what is occurring within the corporate group for tax purposes. Specifically, the 
amount of tax owed and the amount paid within a fiscal period to tax administrators 
in each jurisdiction is generally undiscernible. Furthermore, the elimination of intra-
group transactions as part of the consolidation process prevents financial statements 
users from ascertaining the flow of funds between subsidiaries, which may be 
indicative of the long-term viability of divisions within the company (Abir, n.d). 
Segment reports provide an alternative indicator of total corporate group 
performance, whilst also providing details about the performance of individual 
segments of the group (Emmanuel & Garrod, 2002). The accounting standards under 
IFRS and U.S GAAP that prescribe the treatment of operating segment disclosures 
are discussed below. 
 
2.2.2 Segmental Reporting 
In 1976, the U.S issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 14 
Financial Reporting for Segments of a Business Enterprise (SFAS 14), which was 
replaced in 1997 by SFAS 131 Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and 
Related Information (now ASC 280) (FASB, 2008). Under this U.S standard, 
operating segments are determined based on the “management approach”, that is, 
following a company’s internal management structure, with financial information 
disclosed on the basis that it is used internally by the chief operating decision maker1 
for determining segment performance and resource allocations. 
 
As part of the convergence project between IFRS and U.S GAAP, the IASB adopted 
the management approach as implemented in ASC 280 in IFRS 8 Segment Reporting 
(IFRS Foundation, 2006). IFRS 8, which supersedes IAS 14 Reporting Financial 
Information by Segment, was issued in November 2006 and is applicable to reporting 
                                                 
 
1 IFRS 8 and ASC 280 identify the chief operating decision maker as the function of 
allocating resources and assessing the performance of operating segments, not 
necessarily a manager with a specific title (IFRS para 7; ASC 280-10-50-5; SFAS 
131.12).  
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periods beginning on or after 1 January 2009. A key difference between IAS 14 
Reporting Financial Information by Segment and ASC 280 Segment Reporting is the 
requirements for segment identification. As aforementioned, ASC 280 (and IFRS 8) 
identifies segments according to the “management approach”, whilst IAS 14 required 
segments to be recognised on the basis of differences in the risks and returns of the 
products and services offered (i.e. the “business segment approach”) or on the basis 
of the economic environments in which the entity operated (the “geographical 
segment approach”) (IFRS Foundation, 2013, p. 9).  
 
The IASB conducted a public consultation period prior to the replacement of 
reporting requirements under IAS 14 with those of IFRS 8, during which critics 
raised concerns about a potential decrease in geographic segment disclosures under 
IFRS 8 for firms’ international operations (Nichols, Street & Tarca, 2013). Under 
ASC 280, and consequently IFRS 8, firms that define operating segments on any 
other basis than geographical area (i.e. product or service divisions, regulatory 
environments) are no longer required to disclose geographical earnings (Hope, 
2008). This concern was further evidenced in the EU’s temporary annulment of its 
support for IFRS 8 in November 2007 (Hope, 2008). The objective, application and 
key disclosure requirements of IFRS 8 and ASC 280 are detailed below and 
academic studies that evaluate the accuracy of the criticisms concerning the 
usefulness of geographical disclosures made under IFRS 8 and ASC 280 are 
explored in Chapter 3. 
 
The core objective of IFRS 8 and ASC 280 is comparable, being to provide 
information to financial statement users on the different business activities in which 
an entity engages in and the different economic environments in which it operates 
(IFRS 8 para 1; ASC 280-10-10-1; SFAS 131.3). IFRS 8 and ASC 280 are applicable 
to entities whose debt or equity instruments are traded in a public market (IFRS 8 
para 2; ASC 280-10-15-3).  
 
Under both IFRS 8 and ASC 280 an operating segment is defined as a component of 
an entity that engages in business activities capable of earning revenues and 
incurring expenses, whose operating results are regularly reviewed by the chief 
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operating decision maker [IFRS 8.2; ASC Master Glossary; SFAS 131.10]. Matrix 
management structures are comparably defined under IFRS 8 and ASC 280 to 
encompass overlapping business components, for which different segment managers 
are responsible and all information is reviewed by the chief operating decision maker 
(IFRS para 10; ASC 280-10-50-5; SFAS 131.12). However, for entities with matrix 
management structures IFRS 8 requires operating segments to be determined with 
reference to the core principle (IFRS 8 para 10), whilst ASC 280 requires operating 
segments to be determined based on products and services (ASC 280-10-50-9). 
 
An entity must report financial and descriptive data about an operating segment that 
satisfies any of the following thresholds: 
 revenue (external and intersegment) is 10% or more of the total revenues 
(external and intersegment) of all operating segments, or 
 profit or loss is 10% or more of the greater of (i) the total profit of all 
operating segments that did not report a loss and (ii) the total loss of all 
operating segments that reported a loss, or 
 assets are 10% or more of the combined assets of all operating segments 
(IFRS 8.13; ASC 280-10-50-12 to 280-10-50-19; SFAS 131.18-131.24) 
 
Under IFRS 8 and ASC 280, a reportable segment may aggregate two or more 
operating segments if the segments have similar economic characteristics and exhibit 
the following similar characteristics: 
 nature of products and services 
 nature of production processes 
 type or class of consumer  
 distribution methods for products or services 
 nature of the regulatory environment (if applicable) 
(IFRS 8 para 12; ASC 280-10-50-11; SFAS 131.17) 
 
Under both standards, the factors used to identify reportable segments, including the 
basis of organisation must be disclosed (e.g. around differences in products and 
services, geographical areas, regulatory environments, or a combination, and whether 
aggregation has occurred) (IFRS 8 para 22; ASC 280-10-50-11). IFRS 8 requires 
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disclosure of a measure of profit or loss for each reportable segment in addition to 
the following data if the specified amounts are included in the measure of segment 
profit or loss or are reviewed by the chief operating decision maker: 
 revenues from external customers 
 revenues from intersegment transactions 
 interest revenue 
 interest expense 
 depreciation and amortisation 
 material items of income and expense 
 the entity’s interest in the profit or loss of associates and joint ventures 
accounted for by the equity method 
 income tax expense (income) 
 material non-cash items other than depreciation and amortisation 
 total segment assets 
(IFRS 8 para 23; ASC 280) 
 
Comparable disclosure requirements are evident in ASC 280 with the exception of 
segment liabilities, which are not required to be disclosed (ASC 280-10-50-20 to 50-
26; SFAS 131.25-.28). Notably, the above disclosure requirements were 
encompassed within IAS 14 for the primary segment, including total segment 
liabilities, regardless of whether the specified amounts were included in the measure 
of profit or loss or reported to the chief operating decision maker. For secondary 
geographical segments, entities were required to disclose the following geographic 
information under IAS 14: 
i) segment revenue from external customers for each geographic segment 
(based on customer location) with revenues of 10% or more of external 
company revenues 
ii) segment assets (by geographic location) for each segment where assets are 
10% or more of the total assets of all geographic segments 
iii) additions to long-lived assets for each segment identify in (ii) above 
 
All entities subject to IFRS 8 and ASC 280 are required to report the following 
enterprise-wide information (IFRS 8 para 33): 
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a) revenues from external customers: 
i) attributed to the entity’s country of domicile; and 
ii) attributed to all foreign countries in aggregate  
iii) attributed to an individual foreign country (where material) 
b) basis for attributing external customer revenues to individual countries 
c) non-current assets other than financial securities, deferred tax assets, post-
employment benefit assets, and rights arising under insurance contracts: 
i) located in the country of domicile 
ii) located in all foreign countries in aggregate in which the entity holds assets 
d) separate disclosure of material assets  in an individual foreign country. 
 
The above information to be disclosed on geographical areas is comparable under 
ASC 280, with the exception of disclosures regarding non-current assets. 
Specifically, ASC 280-10-50-41 (SFAS 131.38) requires geographic disclosure of 
“long-lived assets,” which implies hard assets that cannot be readily removed, 
thereby excluding intangibles. In contrast, the use of “non-current assets” in IFRS 8 
requirements includes geographic disclosure of intangibles. Notably, the 
geographical disclosures required under IFRS 8 para 33 and ASC 280-10-50-38 to 
10-50-41 are only required if they are not already provided as part of the required 
reportable segment information.  
 
In summary, consolidated financial statements prepared under IFRS 10 Consolidated 
Financial Statements and ASC 810 Consolidation treat the corporate group as a 
“single economic entity.” Consolidated financial statements are a useful tool for 
investors to assess the overall financial performance and position of a corporate 
group. However, consolidated financial statements do not reveal the economic 
impacts that a corporate group exerts on the host countries in which it operates. 
Furthermore, the lack of subsidiary information may obscure the results of 
unprofitable subsidiaries and ventures, whilst the elimination of intra-group 
transactions may prevent financial statement users from assessing the internal 
allocation of funds between subsidiaries. Segment reporting is designed to enhance 
the usefulness of consolidated financial statements through the provision of 
information on the different types of business activities the corporate group engages 
 18  Chapter 2: Institutional Setting 
in, and the economic environments in which it operates. However, IFRS 8 Operating 
Segments and ASC 280 Segment Reporting are also subject to limitations on the 
usefulness of geographic information disclosures, as summarised below. 
 
The change from IAS 14 to IFRS 8 resulted in a change in the operating approach 
utilised, specifically IAS 14 adopted the “business segment approach” or 
“geographical segment approach,” whilst IFRS 8 adopted the “management 
approach” as per ASC 280. IAS 14 required entities to determine whether its risks 
and rewards were predominantly based on differences in the products or services 
produced or differences in the geographical regions where it operated, with the 
dominant factor being used for primary segment reporting (IAS 14 para 26-27).  
 
The move from IAS 14 to IFRS 8 represents a loss in geographic information to the 
extent that if an entity does not define its operating segments on a geographic basis, 
total assets, total liabilities, interest revenue, interest expense, depreciation, 
amortisation, equity method investments in investees and income tax expense are not 
required to be disclosed for each reportable segment. Furthermore, the enterprise-
wide revenue disclosures under IFRS 8 and ASC 280 are limited in that total firm 
revenues are disaggregated between the corporation’s country of domicile, all foreign 
countries in aggregate and material individual countries, whereby materiality is not 
defined in either ASC 280 or IFRS 8, suggesting revenue disclosures may exhibit 
significant variance amongst firms. Firms that define operating segments on a 
geographical basis may utilise the reporting segment aggregation criteria under IFRS 
8 and ASC 280 to report the required disclosures under broad geographical 
groupings.  
 
2.3 CbC Reporting 
This section commences with a discussion of the recent key developments that have 
occurred for the concept of industry-wide CbC reporting. Subsequently, industry-
specific CbC reporting frameworks within the extractive industry are examined 
followed by frameworks within the finance sector. The industry-specific frameworks, 
which are summarised in Table 2.1 below, exhibit similar transparency objectives but 
also contain several variances in structure and purpose. The analysis within this 
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section ascertains the current status of CbC reporting to be a progressive 
transparency initiative that is being utilised around the world and across industries, 
but one that lacks consensus regarding: (1) what specific information should be 
disclosed, (2) how the information should be delivered, (3) what kind of technology 
and reporting systems will be required for implementation by taxpayers and 
governments, (4) to whom will the information be disseminated, and (5) for what 
purpose should the information be used? These questions, and others, which are 
addressed within chapters five and six, must be considered in the development of a 
standardised CbC reporting model that promotes corporate accountability and 
concurrently protects a country’s tax base from erosion and profit shifting. 
 
Table 2.1 
Industry Specific CbC Templates 
Template Year of 
Implementation 
Industry 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) 
2003 Extractive 
IMF Template for Government Revenues from 
Natural Resources 
2014 Extractive 
Dodd-Frank Act (section 1504) 2010 Extractive 
EU Accountancy & Transparency Directives 2013 Extractive 
Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act 2014 Extractive 
EU Capital Requirements Directive IV 2013 Finance 
 
 
2.3.1 All Industries 
Richard Murphy, Chartered Accountant and co-founder of the TJN, first proposed 
the idea of CbC reporting in 2003 (Murphy, 2012a). In the years since, the TJN has 
become a specialist in CbC reporting matters and has successfully transposed the 
issue onto the campaign agendas of many other organisations and groups, including 
Christian Aid, Action Aid, Oxfam and Eurodad. The form of CbC reporting as 
originally proposed by the TJN, and supported by civil society groups is deemed to 
be a “comprehensive” or “maximalist” approach to CbC reporting due to its detailed 
reporting requirements. This approach to CbC reporting requires a multinational 
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entity to publicly disclose the name of each subsidiary company, financial 
performance figures (apportioned between third party and intra-firm), certain 
financial position figures (such as fixed assets), and detailed tax charges (including 
actual tax paid and deferred tax liabilities), all on an individual country basis 
(Murphy, 2009). Under a comprehensive view, CbC reporting is designed to enable 
informed economic decision-making on the part of the numerous information users 
who engage with a multinational entity within its course of trade, whilst concurrently 
ensuring a multinational entity can be held accountable to those impacted by its 
business operations (Murphy, 2012a).  
 
To address the “issue of transparency in the disclosure of multinational 
corporations,” the European Commission made the following declaration of intent to 
the European Parliament on 22 September 2010: 
 
to prepare a Communication evaluating the feasibility of requesting certain 
issuers of shares whose securities are admitted to trading in a regulated 
market and which prepare consolidated accounts, to disclose in the annual 
financial report, key financial information regarding their activities in third 
countries. 
(European Commission, 2010b, p.1) 
 
The European Commission conducted a public consultation from 26 October 2010 to 
22 December 2010 to gather stakeholder’s opinions on CbC reporting for large 
companies operating in third countries (European Commissiona, 2010). The 
consultation paper posed seven questions and considered “general” CbC reporting 
requirements, being those stated in Murphy’s 2009 report and applicable to 
multinational entities operating in all industries, and “specific” CbC reporting 
obligations applicable solely to companies in the extractive industry (European 
Commission, 2010a). The European Commission recognised the primary goals of 
general CbC reporting to be assisting investors evaluate the various national business 
activities undertaken by multinational entities and to enhance the transparency of 
capital flows to improve the enforcement of tax rules (European Commission, 
2010a). The primary goal of specific CbC reporting identified by the European 
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Commission is enhanced transparency regarding payments made to governments in 
third countries by multinational entities operating in the extractive industry 
(European Commission, 2010a).  
 
The results of the 73 displayed diversity concerning the administrative costs 
estimated for “general” CbC reporting, stating further clarity was required in the 
specification of disclosure requirements (European Commission, 2011). The 
advisory group highlighted similar concerns for CbC reporting in the extractive 
industry, however, the Commission noted a generally positive and constructive view 
was expressed in relation to specific extractive industry CbC reporting, with some 
respondents suggesting it would assist domestic accountability and governance in 
countries rich in non-renewable resources (European Commission, 2011). Following 
from this process, the EU implemented a partial version of CbC reporting for the 
extractive industry, which is discussed in section 2.3.2 below. Although the EU fell 
short of implementing an industry wide CbC reporting regime in this instance, 
substantial interest has been maintained on other fronts. 
 
Stephen Timms, the UK’s Financial Secretary to the Treasury, announced a 
comprehensive CbC reporting proposal at a Berlin international meeting, held 22 – 
23 June 2009, of finance ministers gathered to assess the OECD’s progress on 
standards for transparency and exchange of taxation information (Lesage & Kacar, 
2013). This statement was shortly followed by that of President Nicolas Sarkozy and 
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who issued a declaration on global 
governance following their meeting in Evian-les-Bains on 6 July 2009 prior to the G-
8 summit to be held in L’Aquila, Italy (Permanent Mission of France to the United 
Nations, 2009). In particular, the declaration states “we also call on the OECD to 
look at country by country reporting and the benefits of this for tax transparency and 
reducing tax avoidance” (Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, 2009) 
 
Reference is made to the above request in the issues paper published by the OECD 
secretariat in January 2010, which outlines the objectives of comprehensive CbC 
reporting, the associated arguments for and against its implementation and an 
overview of CbC reporting within the extractive industry via the EITI (OECD, 
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2010a). The issues paper suggests the matter of CbC reporting could be addressed 
via the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises or the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance (OECD, 2010a). 
 
The above issues paper was utilised in a Joint Meeting hosted by the OECD between 
the Committee on Fiscal Affairs and the Development Assistance Committee on 27 
January 2010 (OECD, 2010b). To achieve the goals stated at this Joint Meeting, the 
OECD’s Informal Task Force on Tax and Development was formed. Task Force 
members, including OECD and developing countries, organisations and civil society 
groups, are responsible for advising the OECD committees on delivering a 
programme to enable fair and efficient tax collections by developing countries 
(OECD, 2013c). At the first annual Task Force meeting in May 2010, an ad hoc sub-
group was established to analyse CbC reporting and to develop a scoping paper for 
presentation at the next meeting (OECD, 2010c). The report was discussed at a 
meeting of the sub-group in December 2010, submitted to the Task Force for its 
April 2011 meeting and published in July 2011 (OECD, 2013c).  
 
CbC reporting has remained on the agenda of the Task Force, appearing in the 
minutes of annual meetings, in addition to the agenda of the OECD Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs. The Committee on Fiscal Affairs, through its subsidiary bodies, is 
undertaking the current technical work in relation to BEPS. In February 2013, the 
OECD published its report, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, which was 
soon followed by the publication of the BEPS Action Plan in July 2013 that was 
commissioned by the G20 Finance Ministers (OECD, 2013a). The template under 
development for Action 13 is a form of CbC reporting, although it is not specifically 
referred to as such in the Action Plan. On 30 January 2014, the OECD released a 
Discussion Draft, which recommended the introduction of a two-tiered reporting 
regime consisting of a master file (relevant to the global operations of the MNE 
group) and a local file (referring to the local material operations of the taxpayer), 
whereby the CbC template was included within the master file (OECD, 2014c).  
 
On 16 September 2014 the OECD released its report on Action 13, which contained 
the revised standards and model CbC reporting template to replace the entirety of 
Chapter V of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines (OECD, 2014a). In contrast to the 
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initial template released on 30 January 2014, the OECD’s recent report reduced the 
amount of information to be disclosed and provided flexible options for how 
multinational entities could provide that information, in response to substantial 
consultation efforts. The updated template requires disclosure on the allocation of 
income, taxes and business activities by tax jurisdiction and constituent entities on an 
individual, tax jurisdictional basis (OECD, 2014a) Specific information disclosure 
requirements for the updated OECD template are explored in further detail in 
chapters five and six. 
 
The CbC reporting proposal under development by the OECD is applicable to all 
industries, however, it is not considered to be a comprehensive version of CbC 
reporting as information is intended to be disclosed directly to tax administrations 
and not the public. This does not suggest that a fully comprehensive version of CbC 
reporting will never be developed and implemented. In fact, in addition to civil 
society groups, political members have shown their support for the implementation 
of a comprehensive CbC reporting requirement. 
 
In March 2011 Caroline Lucas MP, leader of the UK Green Party, introduced the 
Tax and Financial Transparency Bill into the House of Commons, which under 
clause 3, would require that all companies incorporated in or operating in the UK to 
“publish in its annual financial statements prepared in accordance with the 
requirements of the Companies Act 2006 an analysis of the consolidated turnover and 
profit made by it in each jurisdiction in which it has a permanent establishment for 
taxation purposes… and the resulting taxation liability due and payment made by 
that company and its group (if applicable) in each such jurisdiction, without 
exception being made on the grounds of immateriality.” Although the Bill does not 
exhibit all of the reporting requirements to be considered a maximalist version of 
CbC reporting, it notably represented a substantial step forward due to its application 
to companies operating in all industries and was consequently supported (and 
partially developed) by Richard Murphy, the founder of CbC reporting (Murphy, 
2011). The Tax and Financial Transparency Bill failed to progress through 
Parliament (UK Parliament, n.d), however it was soon followed by a similar Bill. 
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Murphy also contributed to the development of the UK Corporate and Individual Tax 
and Financial Transparency Bill, which was introduced by Michael Meacher MP to 
the House of Commons in June 2013 (Murphy, 2013). The disclosure requirements 
placed on large companies under the first clause of the Bill included: 
 the registered name;  
 jurisdiction of incorporation; 
 company number; 
 jurisdictions in which it trades; 
 the trading name it uses in each jurisdiction if different from its registered 
name; 
 the precise nature of its trade, sufficiently described to ensure its activities can 
be accurately identified; 
 the percentage of the related undertaking controlled by the company 
 a statement of the turnover, net profit before tax, current taxation liability 
owing, number of employees and their total employment cost and the net 
assets of the related entity for the period for which the company is reporting 
whether such data be audited or otherwise. 
 (UK Parliament, 2013) 
 
The disclosure requirements contained within the above Bill, which was not passed 
by parliament, represent a full version of CbC reporting.  
 
In summary, implementing CbC reporting requirements for multinational entities in 
all industries remains a concept under consideration across the globe. Public 
consultation efforts in the EU that evaluated the implementation of industry-wide and 
industry-specific CbC reporting resulted in the formulation of CbC reporting 
requirements for large companies in the extractive industry, which are explored in 
section 2.3.2 below. Political recognition of the transparency and BEPS related 
benefits of a comprehensive CbC reporting framework has been evidenced in 
legislative proposals and most significantly, in the ongoing work of the OECD. 
Action 13 of the OECD’s BEPS Action Plan requires the development of a CbC 
reporting template applicable to multinational entities operating in all industries. The 
OECD’s CbC reporting template contains variances in the information to be reported 
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and the recipients of the information in comparison to a comprehensive version of 
CbC reporting. These variances are primarily attributable to the OECD recognising a 
more limited CbC reporting objective in comparison to a comprehensive approach, 
being the improvement of transfer pricing documentation for the benefit of tax 
administrations to conduct more informed risk assessments and audits. Irrespective 
of the more limited scope of CbC reporting under the OECD reporting model, the 
commitment expressed by the G20 and OECD countries via the BEPS Project 
signifies widespread recognition of the need for CbC reporting and its eventual 
implementation, albeit as transfer pricing documentation, in the near future.  
 
 
2.3.2 Extractive Industry 
This section highlights the importance of financial transparency in the extractive 
industry and explores how CbC reporting requirements specifically applicable to 
extractive companies have been introduced around the globe. Substantial focus has 
been placed on improving financial transparency within the extractive industry due to 
increased levels of poverty, corruption, social unrest and economic decline often 
caused by the exploitation of a country’s abundant supply of natural resources, such 
as oil, gas and minerals. This phenomenon is often referred to as the “resource curse” 
or the “paradox of plenty” (International Monetary Fund, 2007, p. 2). As highlighted 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), fiscal transparency plays a vital role in 
enhancing resource revenue management, which promotes the efficient use of 
community funds, reduces the risk of unsuitable macroeconomic policies and 
improves budgetary confidence by establishing credibility (IMF, 2007). 
 
Founded in 2002 by a small number of UK-based non-governmental organisations, 
the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) coalition now has more than 800 member 
organisations throughout the world, with national coalitions existing in more than 40 
countries (PWYP, 2011). The coalition’s primary objective is to require extractive 
companies to publish what they pay to governments in the form of taxes, fees, 
royalties, bonuses and other financial transactions for each country of operation, 
which may be facilitated via changes to: 
 national and international accounting standards; 
 stock exchange disclosure rules; 
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 financial institutions and export credit agencies information requirements for 
financing and insuring extraction projects. 
 (Van Oranje & Parham, 2009) 
 
The PWYP coalition had primarily campaigned “for greater transparency and 
accountability in the management of revenues from the oil, gas and mining 
industries” (Van Oranje & Parham, 2009, p. 27). During a United Nations security 
briefing Koffi Annan, Chairperson of the Africa Progress Panel, highlighted the need 
to develop global transparency rules that reduce the opportunities for tax avoidance 
and limit the use of shell companies and tax havens, all of which currently contribute 
to secretive and exploitative deals in the extractive industry (UN, 2013). The 
importance of establishing transparency for extractive revenues was highlighted by 
Annan in his statement that “Africa loses money every year through a tax avoidance 
technique known as trade mispricing than it receives in international development 
assistance” (UN, 2013).  
 
To better address the “resource curse” and to encompass the expansion efforts of 
coalition members, the PWYP updated its strategic framework in 2012 to incorporate 
transparency and accountability concerns at all points along the value chain, where 
previously revenues had been emphasised (PWYP, 2012). This renewed perspective 
is distributed amongst the following three pillars: 
1. Publish What You Pay and How You Extract 
2. Publish What You Pay 
3. Publish What You Earn and How You Spend 
(PWYP, 2012) 
 
The first pillar enables citizens in resource-rich countries to make informed decisions 
concerning whether or not to extract, associated extraction rights, in addition to 
influencing and examining the terms and conditions of extraction contracts 
established between extractive companies and local governments (PWYP, 2012). 
The second pillar is the coalition’s founding objective concerning revenue 
transparency, as discussed above. Primarily through budget monitoring, the third 
pillar achieves accountability from extractive companies and governments to ensure 
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the revenues generated from natural resources benefit the local citizens (PWYP, 
2012). The coalition campaigns for these three pillars to be considered in the 
development of international regulation and legislation.  
 
PWYP has worked closely with companies, governments, investors, partner 
organisations and other civil society groups to develop and expand the Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) following its launch in 2003 (PWYP, 2012).  
The EITI is a voluntary international standard aimed at improving the transparency 
and accountability of the extractive industry by requiring public disclosure of 
revenues and material payments to governments (EITI, 2013). To achieve 
accountability, the EITI process requires reconciliation by an independent party of 
the funds paid by companies to the funds received by the respective government 
(EITI, 2013). The following revenue streams are recommended to be included within 
the EITI reports of each country: 
 The host government’s production entitlement (such as profit oil) 
 National state-owned enterprise production entitlement 
 Profits taxes 
 Royalties 
 Dividends 
 Bonuses, such as signature, discovery and production bonuses 
 Licence fees, rental fees, entry fees and other considerations for licences and/ 
or concessions 
 Any other significant payments and material benefit to government 
(EITI, 2013, p. 26)  
 
As part of the 2013 EITI Global Convention Strategy Review, the EITI certification 
requirements were amended to require revenue stream payments be disclosed on a 
company-by-company basis in EITI reports, where previously countries had the 
choice to aggregate or disaggregate revenue streams from extractive companies 
(EITI, 2013). This amendment to the EITI Standard was supported on the basis of 
two key EITI Principles, being transparency by governments and extractive 
companies (Principle 5) and government accountability towards all citizens 
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(Principle 8) (Revenue Watch Institute, 2012). Disaggregated company reporting 
within EITI reports is suggested to benefit multiple stakeholders, including: 
 governments by enabling better management of their country’s natural 
resource wealth;  
 companies where increased public disclosure of contributions to public 
revenues may strengthen companies’ licence to operate; 
 citizens through the provision of additional information to facilitate public 
debate and enable informed decision-making, especially for local 
communities that are directly impacted by extractive companies operating in 
their area. 
(Revenue Watch Institute, 2012)  
 
A country must satisfy five application criteria to be recognised as an EITI 
Candidate, which is the temporary status prior to recognition as EITI Compliant, 
with the latter also requiring certain eligibility criteria to be met. EITI Compliant 
countries are required to publish timely and publicly available reports that contain 
contextual industry information (EITI, 2013). Although discretion is offered in the 
form and scope of disclosure, as a minimum the EITI report requires a summary of 
the legal framework and fiscal regime; an overview of the extractive industries and 
its contribution to the economy; production data; state participation; revenue 
allocations; and beneficial ownership and contracts if applicable (EITI, 2013). 
Currently, 29 countries are compliant with the EITI requirements with another 17 
countries listed as EITI Candidates (EITI, 2014).  
 
Further validation of the EITI’s importance is evident in the OECD’s 2011 
publication of Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals 
from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas. The guidance report is intended to 
foster transparent mineral supply chains and prevent the extraction and trade of 
minerals from becoming a source of conflict and human rights abuses (Deloitte, 
2011). An annex to the report includes a requirement that companies ensure that all 
taxes, fees and royalties associated with the extraction, trade and export of minerals 
sourced from conflict-affected and high-risk areas are paid to governments and the 
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disclosure of such payments is in agreement with the EITI principles (Deloitte, 
2011). 
 
More recently, the IMF Template for Government Revenues from Natural Resources 
was released for public comment in January 2014. The template is designed to be 
consistent with the data requirements of other initiatives, primarily the EITI. The 
IMF template is intended to facilitate the collection of data in an analytically 
appropriate and cross-country comparable format that is currently not achieved by 
the EITI as the latter enables discretionary data presentation. The IMF’s proposed 
template addresses this issue through structured reports, with revenues allocated 
amongst respective subcategories (e.g. taxes, social contributions, grants and other 
revenues) and high-level tax disclosures (IMF, 2014). The disclosure requirements 
for the IMF template are not explored in further detail due to a lack of available 
publications following the public commentary period, which concluded 30 April 
2014. 
 
In contrast to the voluntary disclosure initiatives and frameworks discussed above, 
section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank Act”) requires all U.S and foreign extractive entities that report to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to disclose all government payments on 
a CbC basis in a new annual filing to the SEC (SEC, 2012). Under section 13(q) of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, payments are defined to include taxes, royalties (including 
license fees), production entitlements, bonuses, and other material benefits 
commonly recognised as part of the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or 
minerals. The Act requires extractive companies to report any payment of U.S 
$100,000 or more made on every individual project they operate (SEC, 2012). 
Signed into U.S federal law in July 2010, the Act does not represent a comprehensive 
version of CbC reporting as it is only demands oil, gas and mining companies to 
disclose payments made to U.S and foreign governments. However, due to its 
mandatory legislative nature and the political significance attached to the U.S as a 
country, it is often viewed as one of the most substantial successes of the CbC 
reporting movement to date. In a statement closely assimilated to the values of the 
PWYP coalition, the White House said of the Dodd-Frank Act: 
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This provision is an essential new tool in promoting transparency in the oil 
and mineral sectors. This legislation will immediately shed light on billions in 
payments between multinational corporations and governments, giving 
citizens the information they need to monitor companies and to hold 
governments accountable… This provision sets a new standard for corporate 
transparency. The challenge for us now is to make this a global standard. 
       (White House, 2010) 
 
In addition to setting an example for other countries to follow in their CbC reporting 
implementation efforts, the Dodd-Frank Act is expected to substantially impact the 
extractive industry as a whole, due to 29 of the 32 largest international oil companies 
in the world, as of 2011, being registered with or required to report to the SEC 
(Jubilee Australia, 2011).  
 
In response to the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, the EU revised the 
Transparency and Accounting Directives in June 2013 to include requirements for 
large extractive (oil, gas and mining) and logging companies to disclose payments 
made to governments on a country and project basis (Council Directive 2013/34/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council. [2013] OJ L182/52). The Accounting 
Directive regulates financial information contained within the financial statements of 
all limited liability companies registered in the European Economic Area (European 
Commission, 2013). To extend the CbC disclosure requirements to entities registered 
outside the European Economic Area, revisions were also made to the Transparency 
Directive, which is applicable to all companies listed on EU regulated markets 
(European Commission, 2013).  
 
Disclosures are required within a separate report for which the presentation 
requirements will depend on implementation by each Member State (European 
Union, 2013). The report is to be published annually for government payments equal 
to or exceeding EUR 100,000 made in a financial year (European Union, 2013). The 
reporting requirements encompass “types of payments comparable to those disclosed 
by an undertaking participating in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
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(EITI)” and therefore include: production entitlements, profit taxes, royalties, 
dividends, bonuses, fees and other significant payments to governments (European 
Union, 2013, p. 24; EITI, 2013). The public disclosure of payments made to 
governments within the annual report is anticipated to occur in 2015 or 2016 
(PWYP, 2013). A maximum of 24 months has been permitted for the Directives to 
be substituted into EU Member State law, resulting in a 20 July 2015 deadline for the 
Accounting Directive and 27 November 2015 for the Transparency Directive 
(PWYP, 2013). Within three years of these implementation deadlines, the European 
Commission is to conduct a review that considers, amongst other factors, the 
effectiveness of the reporting requirements, whether they should be extended to 
additional industry sectors and whether the reports should be audited (European 
Union, 2013). 
 
In May 2010, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange announced revised listing rules for 
new applicant mineral companies to disclose material information on “compliance 
with host country laws, regulations and permits, and payments made to host country 
governments in respect of tax, royalties and other significant payments on a country 
by country basis” (The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited, 2010, s18.05(c)). As 
the application is limited to initial listing documents, in contrast to an annual 
reporting requirement, it is not analysed in further detail in chapters five and six. 
However, the amendments still indicate further progress towards enhanced 
transparency and accountability in the extractive industry through the improvement 
of country-specific data for extractive companies. 
 
Finally, in June 2013 Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, announced a 
commitment to introducing a mandatory reporting regime applicable to Canadian 
extractive companies to improve the transparency of material payments made to 
domestic and international governments (Prime Minister of Canada, 2013). This 
pledge was followed by the introduction of the Extractive Sector Transparency 
Measures Act, which became law on 16 December 2014 after receiving royal assent 
by Canada’s governor general (Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2014). The 
Act requires disclosure of payments made by extractive companies to governments in 
the form of taxes, royalties, fees, production entitlements, bonuses, dividends, 
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infrastructure improvement payments and any other prescribed category of payment 
(Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act, 2014, s. 2). The reporting 
requirements under the Act are applicable to companies listed on a stock exchange in 
Canada and entities that are located or conduct business in Canada that meet at least 
two of the following conditions: 
 owns $20 million or more in assets; 
 has generated $40 million or more in revenue; 
 employs an average of 250 or more employees 
(Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act, 2014, s. 8) 
 
In addition to their industry-specific nature, the various CbC reporting requirements 
evaluated within this chapter share an overarching objective, being to enhance the 
transparency of payments made by extractive companies to governments to ensure 
that the appropriate amount has been remitted, and that governments can be held 
accountable for the efficient allocation of revenues for the benefit of citizens. The 
achievement of this objective is primarily centred on requiring multinational entities 
to disclose how much they have paid to the respective government of a country, in 
the form of taxes, royalties, bonuses, etc. The CbC frameworks evaluated within this 
section also contain variances such as the scope of extractive companies to which the 
requirements apply and the mandatory and voluntary nature of specific frameworks. 
The addition of CbC reporting requirements within the extractive industry represents 
substantial progress towards enhanced transparency and accountability within an 
industry that faces unique challenges as a result of the resource curse, whilst further 
reinforcing the value of CbC reporting. However, the industry specific nature of the 
frameworks coupled with their structural variances indicate that further work is 
required to develop a comprehensive CbC reporting regime that applies equally to 
corporations within all industries thereby preventing unfair competitive advantages, 
whilst addressing BEPS through increased financial transparency. 
 
In summary, this section has highlighted the beneficial impact that enhanced 
financial transparency and accountability may have on countries suffering from the 
“resource curse.” This chapter section commenced with a discussion of the campaign 
efforts and objectives of the PWYP coalition. Subsequently, the EITI reporting 
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framework was evaluated and the IMF Template for Government Revenues from 
Natural Resources was briefly introduced. Finally, this section concluded with an 
overview of the revised Hong Kong listing rules and legislative changes that have 
occurred within the U.S via the Dodd-Frank Act, the EU via amendments to the 
Accounting and Transparency Directives, and in Canada as part of the Extractive 
Sector Transparency Measures Act.  
 
 
2.3.3 Finance Sector 
In addition to the extractive industry, the financial sector has experienced the 
introduction of CbC reporting requirements, which are discussed within this section. 
The global financial crisis caused many financial institutions around the world to rely 
on government support to remain operational and thereby exposed vulnerabilities in 
the regulation and supervision of the financial sector. To prevent a reoccurrence and 
to regain the public’s trust in financial institutions, policy reforms have been 
introduced. Some of these reforms utilise a CbC reporting approach to ensure banks 
are required to publicly disclose their use of secrecy jurisdictions and the financial 
contribution they make towards the countries in which they operate. 
 
The EU has undertaken policy reform via the EU Capital Requirements Directive IV 
(CRD IV) CbC Framework, contained in the Financial Services and Markets Act 
(2000). Article 89 of CRD IV requires credit institutions and investment firms to 
report on a CbC basis by an annex to the annual financial statements or consolidated 
financial statements of a multinational entity (European Commission, 2014a). In 
particular the following items are required to be disclosed on a CbC basis (European 
Commission, 2014a): 
a) business name(s), nature of activities and geographical location of the institution, 
subsidiaries and branches 
b) turnover 
c) average number of full-time employees 
d) profit (loss) before tax 
e) income tax 
f) public subsidies received 
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Data under a), b) and c) were required to be publicly disclosed by institutions from 1 
July 2014 (European Commission, 2014b). The information in d), e) and f) was 
subject to an initial reporting phase whereby 14 of the most important European 
financial institutions reported the data confidentially to the Commission to enable an 
assessment of “the potential negative economic consequences of the public 
disclosure of such information, including the impact on competitiveness, investment 
and credit availability and the stability of the financial system,” (European 
Commission, 2014b).  
 
Following a public consultation, a round table and the completion of an externally 
contracted study that included a stakeholder survey and econometric analysis, the 
Commission’s review was published on 30 October 2014 (European Commission, 
2014b). The Commission’s assessment of CbC reporting identified that stakeholders 
expect CbC reporting to positively impact transparency, accountability of, and public 
confidence in the European financial sector through a reduction in information 
asymmetries enabling more informed decision making and increasing stakeholders’ 
ability to hold financial institutions accountable (European Commission, 2014b). 
Stakeholders opposed to CbC reporting generally referred to a risk of the public 
misinterpreting data and to an increased administrative compliance burden (European 
Commission, 2014b). The results of the econometric analysis suggest the improved 
disclosure quality as a result of CbC reporting may reduce the cost of equity capital 
and may also reduce the ability of reporting institutions to engage in earnings 
management, which may result in greater competitiveness and improved financial 
stability (European Commission, 2014b). 
 
Based on the views expressed by stakeholders and the results of the econometric 
study, as summarised above, the Commission determined the public disclosure of 
CbC information under Article 89 is not expected to have any significant negative 
economic impacts on competitiveness, investment, credit availability, or the stability 
of the financial system (European Commission, 2014b) Consequently, the full set of 
reporting obligations under Article 89 of CRD IV  (including information included in 
d), e) and f) above) should apply to institutions from 1 January 2015 onwards 
(European Commission, 2014b). 
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EU directives, including CRD IV, are binding on the Member States but must first be 
transposed into domestic law by the Member States. The deadline for transposing 
CRD IV, including the CbC reporting requirements, into domestic law in each 
Member State was 31 December 2013. Despite this transposition deadline and the 
first year reporting deadline of 1 July 2014, only thirteen Member States had fully 
implemented Article 89 as at 30 June 2014, with an additional four Member States 
implementing the requirements for either credit institutions or investment firms 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014a). A study conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
for the European Commission’s aforementioned report on the economic impact of 
CbC reporting, found the majority of implementing Member States provided 
insufficient guidance as to how the CDR IV regulations should be applied by 
institutions, resulting in uncertainty and inconsistent interpretation by institutions 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014a). The primary areas of uncertainty and inconsistent 
interpretation by Member States were identified as the following: 
 Uncertainty regarding which entities within a group are within the scope of 
Article 89 
 Inconsistency between terms used within CRD IV and financial accounting 
terms 
 The use of different consolidation methods 
 Different interpretations by Member States on the measure of tax on profit or 
loss (i.e. accounting or cash measure) 
 Insufficient guidance on the treatment of amounts where the taxing 
jurisdiction and location where the economic activity occurs are different 
 Insufficient legislation to prevent double reporting by subsidiaries where the 
parent company has reported in a different Member State 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014a)  
 
The objective of Article 89 of the EU CRD IV directive is to improve transparency, 
which “is essential for regaining the trust of citizens of the Union in the financial 
sector” (European Commission, 2014). However, as revealed by the study conducted 
by PricewaterhouseCoopers on behalf of the European Commission, insufficient 
guidance and inconsistent implementation by Member States prevents reporting 
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institutions from interpreting and applying the requirements in a consistent manner, 
thereby hindering the achievement of increased transparency. Although the 
introduction of CbC reporting requirements for the finance sector may be beneficial, 
the previously identified inconsistencies suggest that a further refined approach may 
be required.  
 
2.4 Voluntary Transparency Standards 
This section provides an overview of the key voluntary reporting standards that are 
not specifically identified as forms of CbC reporting, but nonetheless, contain 
requirements for reporting entities to disclose geographically disaggregated 
information on their business operations and any associated impacts on the local 
communities. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are the first 
voluntary standards considered within this chapter segment, followed by a discussion 
on Integrated Reporting. This section concludes with a discussion of the 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (GRI). These reporting frameworks and 
guidelines all recognise the need for multinational entities to disclose more 
transparent, country specific information to meet various stakeholder needs. Despite 
their voluntary nature, they represent an important contribution and insight to CbC 
reporting due to their current practical application.  
 
 
2.4.1 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are a set of voluntary principles 
and standards for responsible business conduct consistent with relevant legislation 
and internationally recognised standards, which are addressed by governments to 
multinational entities operating in or from adhering countries (OECD, 2011b). The 
Guidelines aim to promote beneficial contributions by multinational entities to global 
economic, environmental and social progress, and are implemented by agencies 
established by adhering governments, known as National Contact Points (OECD, 
2011b). In May 2010, the Guidelines were updated to reflect changes in the practices 
and structures of multinational entities and in the international investment landscape 
(OECD, 2011b). Forty-two adhering governments adopted the updated Guidelines on 
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25 May 2011 (OECD, 2011b), and those applicable to CbC reporting are explored in 
further detail below. 
 
The OECD Guidelines detail General Policies of which multinational entities should 
consider, notably, enterprises should: 
 Contribute to economic, environmental and social improvement with an aim 
of achieving sustainable development; 
 Encourage local capacity building via close cooperation with the local 
community, including business interest, as well as enhancing the entity’s 
domestic and foreign business activities, in line with sound commercial 
practices; 
 Support and uphold sound corporate governance principles and implement 
good corporate governance practices through the organisation. As part of 
their corporate governance, enterprises should recognise the rights of 
stakeholders as established by law or via mutual agreements and should 




Enterprises are also encouraged to engage in or support private or multi-stakeholder 
initiatives and social dialogue on responsible supply chain management, whilst 
ensuring these initiatives consider their social and economic impacts on developing 
countries and their communities (OECD, 2011b). The Guidelines suggest timely and 
accurate disclosure of entity-wide information on all material matters regarding 
business activities, organisational structure, financial position and performance, 
ownership and governance practices, segregated along business lines or geographical 
areas (OECD, 2011b). Enterprises should be transparent in their business operations 
and responsive to the public’s demand for information, which could be achieved via 
providing easy and economical public access to published information (OECD, 
2011b). Notable minimum disclosure requirements of multinational entities 
suggested within the Guidelines include (OECD, 2011b, p. 27): 
 financial and operating performance  
 related party transactions 
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 foreseeable risk factors 
 issues regarding workers and other stakeholders 
 
Specific Guidelines on Employment and Industrial Relations contained within 
chapter five of the Guidelines state multinational entities should provide information 
to employees and their representatives to obtain a true and fair view of the entity’s 
performance and information should also be provided to employees’ representatives 
to facilitate meaningful negotiations on employment conditions (OECD, 2011b). In 
this context performance is suggested to encompass the organisational structure; its 
economic and financial position and prospects and any future significant changes to 
operations, with due consideration for business confidentiality (OECD, 2011b). 
 
Chapter eight of the Guidelines considers Consumer Interests, and notably states that 
multinational entities should support efforts to promote consumer education in areas 
that relate to their business activities to ideally improve a consumer’s ability to 
“better understand the economic, environmental and social impact of their decisions” 
(OECD, 2011b, p. 51). 
 
Within the Guideline’s Taxation chapter (chapter 11), it is stated that enterprises 
should adhere to the letter and the spirit of taxation laws and the regulations of their 
host countries, with compliance encompassing the provision of timely and relevant 
information to the appropriate authorities to enable the correct assessment of taxation 
liabilities (OECD, 2011b). Furthermore, multinational entities should conform to the 
arm’s length principle, which is the internationally accepted standard for adjusting 
the profits between associated enterprises. It is further suggested that transactions be 
structured in a manner consistent to the economic reality, thereby resulting in 




2.4.2 Integrated Reporting 
The International Integrated Reporting Council defines integrated reports as “a 
concise communication about how an organisation’s strategy, governance, 
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performance and prospects, in the context of its external environment, lead to the 
creation of value over the short, medium and long term” (2013, p. 8). The principles-
based Framework developed by the reporting council identifies the key purpose of 
integrated reports as being to explain to providers of financial capital how the 
organisation generates value over time. The Framework, which does not prescribe 
key performance indicators, measurement methods or disclosure of specific matters, 
requires considerable discretion on the part of those responsible for its preparation, 
primarily in determining materiality. Integrated reports, in accordance with the 
Framework, may be a standalone report or a distinguishable part of another report 
(such as the financial statements) and aim to provide information concerning: 
 the external environment that impacts an organisation; 
 the resources and relationships utilised and impacted by the organisation, 
referred to as capitals within the Framework: financial, manufactured, 
intellectual, human, social and relationship, and natural; 
 how the organisation interacts with the above elements to generate value. 
(International Integrated Reporting Council, 2013, p. 4) 
 
The reporting council’s framework encourages multinational entities to provide 
information that may enhance corporate accountability and transparency. However, 
the principle-based nature of the Framework greatly contrasts to the majority of 
structured CbC reporting proposals. Additionally, the objectives of integrated 
reporting primarily focus on transparency via a forward looking approach, whilst 
CbC reporting provides a historical view of transactions and events that have already 
occurred, disaggregated on a per country basis. Despite these variances, recent 
developments have occurred between the reporting council and IFRS Foundation. 
 
In February 2013, a Memorandum of Understanding between the reporting council 
and the IFRS Foundation was released. The purpose of the Memorandum of 
Understanding is to define the basis and general principles for ongoing cooperation 
and alignment between the Parties to achieve the following mutual interests: 
 Efforts to support the global harmonisation and transparency of corporate 
reporting frameworks, standards and requirements in ways that foster 
 40  Chapter 2: Institutional Setting 
consistency and comparability, resulting in enhanced efficiency and 
effectiveness in corporate reporting practices; 
 The development of each Parties’ reporting frameworks, guidelines and 
standards; and 
 The related transparency and sharing of relevant information between the 
Parties. 
 
The Memorandum of Understanding, via its objective to align and harmonise 
corporate reporting, could eventually result in the inclusion of integrated reporting 
requirements within IFRS, however deliverables for this cooperative project are not 
expected until the end of 2014 and are therefore beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Regardless, the consideration of a voluntary reporting framework containing CSR 
aspects by the IASB represents a substantial move forward in the development of 
more transparent reporting requirements.  
 
 
2.4.3 GRI Guidelines 
The Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (GRI Guidelines), as developed by the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) are the most commonly used sustainability 
reporting guidelines in the world and provide guidance for corporations to convey 
information to the public about its impact, be it positive or negative, on the economy, 
society and environment (GRI, 2014). The economic element of the GRI guidelines 
considers the Aspects of economic performance; market presence; indirect economic 
impacts and procurement practices. Within these Aspects the “direct economic value 
generated and distributed” is considered in addition to the “financial assistance 
received from governments.” For a multinational entity to claim compliance with the 
GRI standards, it must disclose its direct economic value generated and distributed, 
which encompasses revenues, operating costs and wages amongst other factors, 
separately at “country, regional or market levels” and payments to governments in 
the form of organisational taxes (excluding deferred taxes) on a per country basis 
(GRI, 2014, p. 69 -70). Notably, adoption of the GRI Guidelines is voluntary, and 
disclosures are not structured and are subject to managerial discretion.  
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2.4.4 United Nations Guidance on Corporate Responsibility Indicators 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development issued Guidance on 
Corporate Responsibility Indicators in Annual Reports in 2008, which details the 
criteria utilised in the selection of core corporate responsibility indicators, segregated 
into quality characteristics, guiding principles and constraints. The guidance is in the 
form of a voluntary technical aid aimed to assist preparers of corporate reports to 
produce concise and comparable corporate responsibility indicators within their 
annual financial statements. Whilst the United Nations guidance utilises these criteria 
to formulate corporate responsibility indicators, the interrelationship between 
corporate responsibility and CbC reporting, as established within section 3.5, enables 
the majority of these criteria to be transposed into a CbC reporting context. The 
United Nations guidance is similar to CbC reporting in that whilst the guidance 
recognises the importance of environmental issues as part of corporate responsibility, 
they are specifically excluded from analysis on the basis that extensive work has 
already been completed in this field. This is similar to CbC reporting which focuses 
on the economic and social obligations multinational entities owe to a broad range of 
stakeholders.  
 
The corporate responsibility indicators developed by the United Nations recognise 
the needs of the stakeholders identified within the debate for a comprehensive form 
of CbC reporting (Murphy, 2009; Murphy, 2012a). Furthermore, the United Nation’s 
guidance on the preparation of financial reports using the selected indicators was 
developed with reference to the GRI Guidelines and IFRS (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, 2008). This approach to combine CSR and 
accounting information is in alignment with both integrated and CbC reporting, 
however, further suggests the appropriateness of structured and mandatory reporting 
of information, unlike integrated reporting.  
 
Finally, the report suggests 16 indicators that should be reported on a nationally 
consolidated basis to ensure the information can be understood in the context of a 
particular country and useful to stakeholders within that country. The notable 
indicators that closely align to disclosure requirements under CbC reporting include: 
total revenues by country, the value of imports vs. exports by country, total new 
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investments by country, total local purchasing by country, employment data by 
country, payments to governments by country and the number of convictions for 
violations of corruption related laws or regulations and amounts of fines paid/ 
payable (The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2008).  
 
The following quality characteristics are of relevance for information disclosed under 
CbC reporting: 
 Comparability: users should be able to compare indicators over time and 
across businesses to enable them to determine the impact of changes in policy 
and management. 
 Relevance and materiality: Information is relevant when it impacts the 
opinion or decision of users by enabling them to assess past, present or future 
events, or confirm or amend past assessments. The relevance of information 
is influenced by its nature and materiality, whereby the nature of the 
information alone may be adequate to establish its relevance or alternatively, 
both its nature and quantitative materiality are required. The materiality of 
information is often determined in accordance with whether its exclusion or 
misstatement could impact users’ opinions or decisions. 
 Understandability: for information to be understandable it must be presented 
in a manner consistent with the knowledge and experience of users and 
should be structured around (a) a suitable design; (b) systematic 
categorisation of topics; (c) succinct language use; and (d) clarification of 
unknown terms in the text, or the inclusion of a glossary. Relevance 
supersedes understandability requirements, however, the concepts are not 
mutually exclusive. 
 Reliability and verifiability: Reliable information is free from material error 
and bias and provides a fair, complete and balanced view of an event or 
transaction. In other words, reliability requires a truthful representation, free 
from material misstatement and bias, with complete and relevant information 
that is balanced on both the positive and negative aspects of the matter. The 
indicator should facilitate internal or external verification and should be 
comparable with underlying evidence or data. 
(The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2008, p.11-13) 
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Five principles were identified as appropriate for selecting core indicators on 
corporate responsibility reporting, the following four are of relevance to CbC 
reporting: 
 Universality to maximise comparability: In principle, indicators should be 
applicable to all enterprises in order to increase the comparability of 
disclosures, irrespective of industry, size or location. 
 Incremental approach: Indicators should primarily require disclosures on 
issues that an entity has control over and therefore already collects or has 
access to associated, relevant information. 
 Capability of consistent measurement: Indicators should be able to be 
recognised, measured and presented in a consistent manner to facilitate 
comparisons over time and between different entities. 
 National reporting and positive corporate contributions to development: In 
alignment with CbC reporting, this principle states indicators should help to 
analyse positive corporate contributions to the economic and social 
development of the country in which it operates. For this reason, indicators 
should be reported on a nationally consolidated basis, so that they are useful 
to stakeholders within a specific country, and so that the indicators can be 
understood within the context of a specific country. 
(The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2008, p.14-15) 
 
The following three constraints associated with selecting corporate responsibility 
indicators are also of relevance to CbC reporting: 
 Costs and benefits: The disclosure and collection of information should not 
impose an unreasonable burden on enterprises, particularly those in 
developing countries and small to medium sized firms. The incremental 
approach, discussed above, is suggested to address this issue by emphasising 
the importance of disclosures for which data is already collected by an entity 
or it is readily accessible, without suffering significant costs. 
 Confidentiality: Confidentiality of commercial information is of practical 
importance, however, it is noted that to address stakeholder needs materiality 
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may take precedence over commercial confidentiality, within the confines of 
legal requirements. 
 Timeliness: The timeliness (frequency) of disclosures must balance 
stakeholder needs for reliable and relevant information, as delays in reporting 
may impact the relevance of information, whilst additional time may be 
required to establish certain facts, which would influence reliability. 
(The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2008, p.15-16) 
 
In summary, the four subsections within this chapter segment described specific 
geographical disclosure requirements, in addition to qualitative characteristics, of 
voluntary disclosure frameworks. In particular, the voluntary frameworks discussed 
in this section included the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 




In conclusion, CbC reporting has made substantial progress since its inception in 
2003. Today, many variants of CbC reporting are being discussed and debated on an 
international scale. The unique attributes of the extractive industry (i.e. the resource 
curse) and the finance sector (i.e. a lack of public trust in the finance sector following 
the Global Financial Crisis) has resulted in the development of CbC reporting 
requirements to enhance the financial transparency and accountability of entities 
operating within each respective sector. The extractive industry has experienced the 
most focused attention, including: the ongoing global lobbying efforts of the PWYP 
coalition; the introduction of country-level disclosures of resource revenues under 
the EITI; the IMF Template for Government Revenues from Natural Resources; 
revised stock exchange listing rules in Hong Kong; the implementation of legislative 
changes under the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S and under the Extractive Sector 
Transparency Measures Act in Canada, in addition to the revised Accounting and 
Transparency Directives in the EU. CbC reporting requirements have been 
introduced into the finance sector via Article 89 of the EU CRD IV, as discussed 
within section 2.3.3. 
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The reporting requirements that currently exist within the extractive and finance 
sectors, as explored within this chapter, illustrate the practical significance and 
feasibility of CbC disclosures by multinational entities. However, it must be noted 
that due to their industry specific nature, they do not represent a comprehensive form 
of CbC reporting, as explored in section 2.3.1. Public awareness has increased 
following the focused attention of the G20, the ongoing work of the OECD as part of 
the BEPS project, and through lobbying efforts of civil society groups, and it is 
therefore likely that CbC reporting proposals will continue to evolve. As part of this 
evolution process, it must be considered which industries should be covered in the 
scope of CbC reporting, what information should be disclosed and to whom it should 
be disclosed? Furthermore, the information systems required to implement CbC 
reporting must also be determined.  
 
This chapter commenced with an overview of the accounting standards under IFRS 
and U.S GAAP that contribute to the lack of transparent country specific disclosures 
by multinational entities. Subsequently, comprehensive versions of CbC reporting 
were introduced, including the Tax Justice Network model and the OECD template. 
This was followed by an evaluation of industry specific CbC reporting requirements 
in the extractive and finance sectors.  The chapter concluded with a discussion of 
CbC disclosure requirements within voluntary guidelines, including the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; Integrated Reporting Guidelines; GRI 
Guidelines and the United Nations Guidance on Corporate Responsibility Indicators.
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
It has long been recognised that accounting information has the ability to influence 
the way people view and interpret the world and to influence their decision-making 
(Hines, 1998). However, accounting principles and practices have evolved over time. 
Traditional accounting was concerned with the measurement and reporting of 
economic facts by accountants who, due to their neutral roles, were responsible for 
“telling it like it is” (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2007). In contrast, critical accounting 
literature argues that accounting constructs and reflects individual, organisational and 
social reality and is determined by political processes whereby accountants 
emphasise particular issues, whilst displacing or eliminating others (Francis, 1990; 
Suzuki, 2003; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2007). Hence, accounting serves an influential 
role in society. However, society itself has the potential to influence the accounting 
practice. Society has increasingly questioned the validity of mere “bottom line” or 
profit-focused reporting in assessing the performance of a business. One aspect of 
criticism from users of financial information had been the quality and quantity of the 
geographical disclosures made by multinational entities in financial statements 
prepared under SFAS 14 and IAS 14. This chapter commences with a review of 
academic studies that have attempted to analyse the usefulness of geographical 
disclosures made under current accounting standards, being ASC 280 Segment 
Reporting and IFRS 8 Operating Segments, and their predecessors SFAS 14 and IAS 
14. Subsequently, a review of the currently limited academic literature on CbC 
reporting is presented. This is followed by a discussion of academic studies which 
evaluate voluntary reporting frameworks that are not specifically identified as a form 
of CbC reporting requirement but contain guidelines for multinational entities to 
provide CbC data. This chapter concludes with an evaluation of the theoretical 
framework employed within this thesis. 
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3.2 Segment Reporting 
Financial statement users find geographical information useful to assess firms’ 
foreign operations compared with domestic operations, as the two may involve 
differences in cultures, economic growth opportunities, competitors, government 
regulations, labour relations, taxation legislation, accepted business practices, and 
market conditions (Hope, 2008). Segmental reporting information has been 
suggested to provide users with useful information concerning different business 
lines and geographic segments to assess the performance and prospects of companies 
(European Commission, 2007).  
 
Due to the usefulness associated with geographical disclosures, substantial academic 
research has been conducted on the quantity and quality of disclosures made by 
companies under IFRS 8 Operating Segments and ASC 280 Segment Reporting, 
being the current accounting standards, in IFRS and U.S GAAP respectfully, to 
regulate geographical financial statement disclosures. The accuracy of the criticisms 
relating to geographic disclosures prepared in accordance with ASC 280 is 
considered in the academic studies presented in section 3.2.1 below and is followed 
by a review of academic studies relating to geographic disclosures made under IFRS 
8. 
 
3.2.1 ASC 280 
This section reviews the academic studies that evaluate geographical disclosures 
made by companies in accordance with ASC 280 (previously SFAS 131) and its 
predecessor, SFAS 14. Statements of Financial Accounting Standards were 
superseded in 2009 by FASB Accounting Standards Codification, resulting in SFAS 
131 being relocated to FASB Codification Topic ASC 280. Therefore, the academic 
studies discussed within this chapter section conducted or examining reporting 
periods prior to 2009 refer to segment reporting requirements under SFAS 131, 
whilst studies with a post-2009 period of analysis will make reference to ASC 280. 
 
Under SFAS 14, companies were required to disclose information by line of business 
and geographic area, with the definition of the latter broadly encompassing groups of 
countries. In contrast, SFAS 131 requires enterprise-wide disclosures for (1) 
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individually material countries, (2) the country of domicile, and (3) all foreign 
countries in aggregate. The FASB believed that the change in geographical 
information requirements under ASC 280 would provide information that is more 
useful in assessing the impact of concentrations of risk, in contrast to the broad 
geographic disclosures often reported under SFAS 14 requirements (FASB, 2008, 
para. 105). SFAS 14 established a 10% materiality threshold for determining 
instances when geographic segments must be reported separately. In comparison, 
ASC 280 requires separate enterprise-wide disclosure for material countries, 
however, the standard provides for managerial discretion in the determination of 
materiality. The academic studies included within this section evaluate the impact the 
differences in geographic disclosure requirements under SFAS 131 and SFAS 14 
have on the disclosure practices of reporting companies.   
 
 
Nichols, Street and Gray (2000) examine the 1997 and 1998 annual reports of 158 
U.S companies to determine the extent to which SFAS 131 (now ASC 280) resulted 
in more disaggregated geographic disclosures in comparison to its predecessor, 
SFAS 14.  The authors found the majority of geographic disclosures under SFAS 131 
were contained within the context of enterprise-wide information, with only 22% of 
the sample companies disclosing reportable segments based on geographical area or 
a combination of geographical area and line of business. An increase was evident in 
the number of companies reporting country-specific segments, from 4% under SFAS 
14 to 28% under SFAS 131. However, high-level aggregations remained present 
under SFAS 131, with segments often identified on a continental or multi-continental 
basis, as facilitated by the management approach. The number of companies utilising 
a “U.S/ Other” classification increased from 20% to 33%. SFAS 131 resulted in a 
loss of geographical information about income in line with its removal of 
profitability disclosure requirements for entities reporting on a basis other than 
geographical area, with the study finding geographic segment earnings declined from 
85% in 1997 under SFAS 14 to 15% in 1998 under SFAS 131. 
 
Hermann and Thomas (2000) find similar results to Nichols et al (2000), in their 
analysis of segment reporting under SFAS 131 and SFAS 14 for 100 U.S. 
companies. Of the 100 companies, 12 defined their operating segments according to 
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geographical area, whilst 17 companies used a combination of business line and 
geographical area. Of the seventy-four firms from the sample that provided 
enterprise-wide geographic disclosures, 33 companies used finer geographical 
classifications, 28 disclosed the same country groupings before and after SFAS 131 
and 13 companies utilised broader geographic groupings. These broader geographic 
groupings, which had been a point of criticism for disclosures made under SFAS 14 
include Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia and the Western Hemisphere, amongst 
others. Once again, the instance of geographic earnings disclosure declined following 
reporting requirement changes under SFAS 131. The author questions the usefulness 
of combining operations from multiple continents into a single geographic segment 
and further states that the identification of country level segments is more 
informative due to economic factors varying across countries, such as GNP growth, 
inflation, foreign currency rates etc.  
 
Doupnik and Seese (2001) evaluate the materiality and fineness of enterprise-wide 
geographic area disclosures of 236 Fortune 500 companies. The authors first 
investigate the materiality cut-off points utilised by companies in determining 
whether they must disclose revenues and long-lived assets on an individual country 
basis. A considerable amount of diversity was evidenced in the quantitative 
materiality thresholds applied by companies. Of the 44% of sampled companies that 
disclosed on an individual country basis, approximately 72% (83 out of 115) reported 
a country with less than 10% of total revenues, whilst a further 20 companies 
employed a materiality threshold of less than 2% of total revenues. The authors 
suggest companies may utilise low materiality thresholds to signal potential 
diversification benefits and/ or reduced international risk for trade occurring in low 
risk countries. Notably, it is not possible to determine the materiality cut-off points 
for companies that only reported total foreign revenue (i.e. no disaggregation), 
however, this group had the smallest mean foreign revenue, and may therefore not 
have had material foreign revenues in individual countries. The authors also apply a 
fineness (F) score, which weights different levels of geographic aggregation (0 for 
“other”/ “rest of the world” aggregations and up to 3 for specifically defined country 
disclosures). The fineness score of 40% of the sample increased, whilst the fineness 
score deteriorated for 28% of companies. 
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Hope and Thomas (2008) apply an agency cost hypothesis to companies’ decision on 
whether to disclose geographic earnings in their annual reports. In a comparison of 
firm performance for a group of disclosers and non-disclosers of geographic earnings 
in the SFAS 14 and SFAS 131 periods, the authors find the latter group exhibited an 
increase in foreign sales growth and a significant decrease in foreign profit margin. 
The authors associate the non-disclosure of geographic information as decreasing 
shareholder’s ability to monitor managers, which encourages managers to expand the 
company’s international operations (i.e. “empire building”), despite such actions 
resulting in lower firm performance. Controlling for domestic performance, Hope 
and Thomas (2008) also find the value of non-disclosing firms to be significantly 
lower than those that chose to disclose four years after the adoption of SFAS 131. 
 
Hope, Ma and Thomas (2013) examine the relationship between tax avoidance by 
multinational entities and non-disclosure of geographic earnings by utilising two 
regulatory events: the implementation of SFAS 131 and Schedule M-3. Following 
the change to voluntary disclosure of geographic earnings under SFAS 131 in 
December 1998, Schedule M-3 was introduced in the annual tax filings of 
multinational entities, which required enhanced tax information disclosures, 
particularly details relating to the profitability of foreign entities omitted from 
taxable net income. For the 16 years under analysis, Hope et al (2013) examines the 
same firms, finding the firms that chose to stop disclosing geographical earnings in 
the post-SFAS 131 period had lower effective tax rates than firms that continued to 
disclose in their segment reports, voluntarily. This difference in effective tax rates 
was found to diminish following the implementation of Schedule M-3. The authors 
suggest that firms, in an attempt to mask tax avoidance behaviour, are more likely to 
provide lower quality tax disclosures when disclosure is optional.  
 
A recent study by Akamah, Hope and Thomas (2014) examines the relationship 
between the use of tax havens by U.S multinational entities and the extent to which 
they aggregate their geographical disclosures as enabled by materiality reporting 
guidelines under ASC 280 (previously SFAS 131). The authors suggest multinational 
entities take advantage of these “vague” materiality guidelines, with few U.S. firms 
reporting information on a country-by-country basis within Exhibit 21 in the Form 
10-K. The authors examine Exhibit 21 data and hand-coded geographic disclosure 
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data over a suitable timeframe, 1998 – 2010. The results of the study suggest that 
entities with a higher presence in tax havens are more likely to aggregate their 
disclosure of geographic operations. The relationship between tax haven use and 
aggregated geographical disclosures was found to be greater for larger firms, firms 
operating in the natural resource industry and in the retail industry, and firms with 
low levels of competition. The authors state their findings “lend support to the 
suggestion of policy makers and civil-society organizations around the world that 
country-by-country reporting would be more likely to highlight tax avoidance,” as 
the flexibility in disclosing material geographic operations under ASC 280 (or IFRS 
8) may result in greater tax avoidance (Akamah et al, 2014, p. 33). 
 
ASC 280 (and therefore IFRS 8) requires companies to reconcile total segment 
revenues to consolidated revenues, total segment profit/ loss to consolidated income 
before tax, and total segment assets to consolidated assets (Nichols et al, 2013). 
Hollie and Yu (2012) and Alfonso, Hollie and Yu (2012) examine the impact of 
segment reporting gaps under SFAS 131.2  
 
Hollie and Yu (2012) analyse the impact of SFAS 131’s management approach on 
shareholder’s ability to interpret the segment earnings disclosures of 649 companies 
with differences between aggregated segment earnings and operating profit after 
depreciation for the period 1998 - 2006. The authors find the market appropriately 
integrates the segment earnings difference when the gap (the difference between 
consolidated and segment reconciliations) is negative. This finding is further 
supported by similar findings by Ettredge and Wang (2013). However, Hollie and Yu 
(2012) also find the market does not fully incorporate a positive gap. The authors 
suggest the market may not appropriately interpret SFAS 131 segment earnings 
reconciliations and therefore misprices the importance of the reconciliation. 
However, the authors state it is difficult to determine if this mispricing occurs due to 
investors’ ability to interpret managerial, non-GAAP measures or ultimately due to 
the poor quality of SFAS 131 disclosures.  
 
                                                 
 
2 Both studies evaluate reporting periods prior to the Codification 
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In their analysis of SFAS 131 earnings reconciliations to consolidated earnings, 
Alfonso et al (2012) find agency costs to be a significant determinant of whether 
managers’ report aggregated segment earnings during the period 1999 – 2006 that 
vary from consolidated earnings. The authors conclude that the use of the 
management approach in SFAS 131 is sensitive to preparers’ reporting incentives. 
 
In summary, academic research generally finds the differences in geographical 
disclosure requirements under SFAS 131 and SFAS 14 to have resulted in some 
improvements in companies’ disclosures, such as an increase in the mean number of 
geographic segments reported and the number of companies providing country 
specific information. However, many companies continue to aggregate countries into 
broad geographical groupings as a result of the managerial discretion afforded in 
determining materiality of revenues from individual countries. The literature 
suggests that the aggregation of geographic operations into broad and uninformative 
groupings is associated with a higher presence in tax havens.  
 
3.2.2 IFRS 8 
IFRS 8 Operating Segments supersedes IAS14 (Revised) Segment Reporting, and 
converges with its U.S counterpart ASC 280 (SFAS 131). As discussed within 
section 2.2.2, IFRS 8 determines segments based on internal management reporting, 
whilst IAS 14R included primary and secondary segments defined by products and 
services, and by geographical area. The financial information included within 
segment disclosures under IFRS 8 is based on information included in internal 
management reports, whilst IAS 14R included financial information as reported in 
the financial statements (i.e. prepared in accordance with IFRS). Furthermore, whilst 
IAS 14R mandated disclosure of geographical segment information (as either a 
primary or secondary segment), IFRS 8 only requires disclosure of geographical 
operating segments if it is prepared for internal management reporting purposes. 
IFRS 8 also requires enterprise-wide disclosure of external revenues and non-current 
assets by geographical location, which encompasses (1) individually material 
countries, (2) the country of domicile, and (3) all foreign countries in aggregate. 
However, as per ASC 280, the definition of material is at the discretion of 
management. This chapter section reviews academic studies that evaluate the impact 
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variances between IFRS 8 and IAS 14R have on the geographical disclosures of 
reporting entities. 
 
In an analysis of the annual reports of 150 UK companies (99 FTSE 100 and 51 
FTSE 250 companies) in the year before and the year after IFRS 8 adoption, 
Crawford, Extance, Helliar and Power (2012) find a statistically significant increase 
in the average number of geographic areas (by location of customer) post IFRS 8 
adoption. The number of geographical disclosures by location of assets also 
increased but was not statistically significant. Nine percent of companies disclosed 
tax by segment under IFRS 8 compared to two percent under IAS 14, which although 
represents an improvement, further suggests that 91% of companies are not 
disaggregating tax payments on a segmental basis. This was a major concern that had 
been communicated to the IASB by the PWYP coalition during the IFRS 8 
consultation process.  
 
In addition to the expected increase in disclosure of non-current assets, which is 
required to be disclosed under IFRS 8 if produced internally, Crawford et al (2012) 
find a significant decrease in the disclosure of capital expenditure and total carrying 
amount of assets by the geographical location of these assets. The authors suggest the 
reduced disclosure of the latter items may diminish the usefulness to investors as 
details of capital expenditure by geographical location may suggest where the 
business is expanding and where management is investing for the future. 
Additionally, the authors provide evidence of increased granularity of country-
specific disclosures (i.e. further disaggregated into individual countries) but many 
companies continue to make disclosures based on regions; continents; “conflating 
two [three or four] continents” and “rest of the world” groupings. 
 
Similarly, Weissenberger and Franzen (2012) report an increase in both the number 
of geographical segments disclosed and country-specific disclosures made by 
German listed companies. They further highlight concerns over sample companies’ 
use of broad geographic areas, such as supranational regions or continents (42% 
under IFRS 8) and the associated sales percentage for these areas. 
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Nichols, Street and Cereola (2012) examined the impact of IFRS 8 adoption on the 
reporting segments of European blue chip companies. Enterprise-wide geographic 
revenue disclosures were made by 77% of companies under IFRS 8, compared to 
75% under IAS 14. The use of broad geographical groupings of enterprise-wide 
disclosures declined from 17% to 10% of companies upon adoption of IFRS 8. 
Disclosure of country specific information increased from 13% to 18% of companies 
upon applying IFRS 8, and disclosure of a combination of country specific and 
region information increased from 25% to 29%. The authors state their findings 
“refute concerns regarding the widespread loss of geographic information under 
IFRS 8, and provide additional evidence of an improvement in the fineness of the 
geographic disclosures provided by several companies,” (Nichols et al, 2012, p. 92).  
 
Nichols et al (2012) also report that the majority of sample companies utilise non-
IFRS measures to report segment profitability, such as operating profit (57%), 
earnings before interest and tax (23%), earnings before tax (18%), and earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (16%). The usefulness of the 
management approach is suggested in the authors’ findings, whereby 91% of non-
IFRS segment profit measures disclosed in the footnotes were directly associated 
with a figure within the consolidated income statement, with a further 9% of 
companies reconciling segment measures to the consolidated income statement.  
 
In contrast to the European companies considered in the above analysis, Crawford et 
al (2012) finds only a minority of sampled FTSE 100 companies (8%) and FTSE 250 
companies (2%) in the UK utilise non-IFRS measures. Segment revenues were found 
to reconcile to consolidated revenue for 87% and 82% of the FTSE 100 and FTSE 
250 companies respectfully. 
 
Overall, research suggests that the number of geographic segments and country-level 
disclosures are increasing as a result of the implementation of IFRS 8 and ASC 280 
(SFAS 131). However, removal of the requirement to disclose geographical capital 
expenditure has resulted in a significant decrease in companies reporting this 
information post-IFRS 8. Existing research also highlights that corporations, albeit a 
decreased percentage, continue to utilise broad geographical areas for enterprise-
wide disclosures, which has been suggested throughout the literature to reduce the 
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usefulness of information for users. These broad geographic categories are permitted 
under IFRS 8 and ASC 280 (SFAS 131) due to the applicable materiality thresholds.  
 
Additionally, the use of non-IFRS and non-U.S GAAP measures had been criticised 
based on concerns investors may find the measures difficult to interpret and material 
amounts may not be assigned to operating segments, but rather allocated to “other” 
or “corporate” categories, thereby reducing the quality of segment disclosures 
(Nichols et al, 2013). In an attempt to quell these concerns both ASC 280 and IFRS 8 
require specific segment measures to be reconciled with equivalent consolidated 
measures. The usefulness and clarity of internal management segment profit 
measures exhibits mixed academic findings. 
 
Whilst, Crawford, Extance, Helliar and Power (2012) find a small increase in the 
number of companies disclosing tax payment information by segment under IFRS 8, 
the finding was representative of the minority of companies. As there is no 
enterprise-wide disclosure requirement for income tax expense under IFRS 8, 
geographical disaggregation of income tax expense is only required if the operating 
segments are defined on a geographical basis and if the specified amount of income 
tax is included in the measure of segment profit or loss or is reviewed by the chief 
operating decision maker. Additionally, as the measurement of income tax expense 
disclosed in accordance with IFRS 8 is based on internal management reporting 
measures, comparisons of tax contributions to geographical areas by different 
companies may be unreliable. 
 
The first post-implementation review conducted by the IASB as part of new due 
process requirements found that many investors who responded to the request for 
information, published in July 2012, perceive a full segment analysis prepared on a 
geographical basis as important due to the variation in worldwide economic 
conditions, whilst other investors consider that existing geographical information 
disclosures may be of little use should segments be recognised in such a way that 
fails to enable users to differentiate between different regions (IFRS Foundation, 
2013, p. 24). In response to their findings the IASB stated “feedback received did not 
identify a clear or consistent problem that we need to address and, consequently, we 
do not think this area warrants any further action at this time” (2013, p. 24).  
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Both ASC 280 and IFRS 8 are generally considered within the literature to have 
resulted in improved disclosures by companies in comparison to their predecessors 
(SFAS 14 and IAS 14). However, as illustrated by the academic studies reviewed 
within this chapter, improvements may still be made to the quality and quantity of 
geographical disclosures, which have been frequently identified as a useful source of 
information for decision-making, especially by investors. The improvements to 
geographical accounting disclosures have been suggested to take the form of 
country-by-country reporting, of which the associated literature will now be explored 
in the following section. 
 
3.3 Country-by-Country Reporting 
The influence of globalisation on the financial reporting practices of multinational 
entities has been the subject of academic enquiry for some time. However, recent 
developments concerning multinational entities, as highlighted by corporate scandals 
and political events such as the G20, have emphasised the increasingly important 
need for the location and extent of multinational entities’ global activities to be 
disclosed in a more transparent nature. Multiple academic studies have contributed to 
this field of research, primarily through tax related analyses. These studies and their 
connection to CbC reporting are explored below. 
 
A 2010 study by ActionAid International revealed approximately half of the firms in 
the FTSE 100 were found to be non-compliant with section 409 of the UK’s 
Companies Act of 2006, which requires companies filing with the Companies House 
to disclose a complete list of subsidiary names and locations in the notes to their 
accounts, irrespective of subsidiary size or materiality. Following this discovery, 
ActionAid requested the UK Companies House to more strictly enforce the 
subsidiary disclosure requirement under the UK Companies Act, and pressured firms 
to comply, resulting in compliance levels almost reaching 100% within two years.  
 
Interestingly, Dyreng, Hoopes and Wilde (2014) utilise this event as a natural 
experiment in their examination of whether the change in enforcement and 
compliance resulted in actual changes in firms’ tax haven subsidiary use and 
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corporate tax avoidance behaviours. The study finds firms that were required to make 
additional disclosures (non-compliant) avoided less tax following the change relative 
to firms that were not impacted by the change (compliant). Specifically, non-
compliant firms were found to have decreased the proportion of subsidiaries located 
in tax havens relative to compliant firms. Although this study only considers 
disclosures of subsidiaries on a geographical basis, and not financial information as 
per CbC reporting, these results indirectly lend themself to the CbC reporting debate 
by emphasising the need for enhanced geographical disclosure and the potential for 
multinational entities to alter their tax avoidance behaviour. Furthermore, this study 
highlights the influence the lobbying efforts of activist groups may have on the 
disclosure practices and tax avoidance behaviours of multinational entities. 
 
Gallhofer and Haslam (2007) utilise the review processes of IFRS 6 Exploration for 
and Evaluation of Mineral Resources and IFRS 8 Segment Reporting as case studies 
in their evaluation of the IASB’s ability to fulfil its objective of developing high 
quality accounting standards in the public interest. To explore the politics of 
accounting disaggregation, Gallhofer and Haslam (2007) apply in-depth critical 
analysis of the IASB’s character, contextual location, stated principles and reasoning 
to the practical examples of the lobbying efforts of non-government organisational 
groups for IFRS reforms to include CbC reporting in accounting for extractive 
industries and operating segments.  
 
Gallhofer and Haslam (2007) note that PWYP’s submissions (as advised by Murphy) 
to the review process conducted by the IASB for both IFRS 6 and IFRS 8, presented 
CbC reporting using the IASB’s own terms and reasoning. In relation to the review 
of segment reporting requirements PWYP stated “we believe all multinational 
companies face risks at a national level which have to be understood if appropriate 
investment decisions are to be made” (PWYP, 2005). As highlighted by Gallhofer 
and Haslam (2007), the PWYP submission utilises IASB reasoning in that 
disaggregated geographical information is presented as accounting information that 
is useful to investors that is too important to be left to voluntarism. The authors 
ultimately found the IASB is hindered in its objective of serving the public interest as 
it “does not straightforwardly apply its principles. It is unable to abstract from its 
socio-economic and political context” (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2007, p. 659). However, 
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Gallhofer and Haslam (2007) further state that the IASB has “not fully [been] 
captured” by business interests, and thereby possesses the potential to “embrace 
accounting shaped by more progressive forces” (2007, p. 656 – 657). By examining 
the key events to date for the inclusion of CbC reporting in IFRS standards this study 
provides insight as to potential obstacles for any future CbC reporting lobbying 
efforts to the IASB. 
 
Similar to the political economy perspective applied in Gallhofer and Haslam’s 2007 
study above, a current working paper by Wojcik (2012a) analyses CbC reporting 
within its economic, social and political environment, incorporating post-2006 
developments. To encompass the multiple stakeholders involved with and 
dimensions of the CbC reporting debate, the author utilises four complementary 
political economy perspectives, being a structuralist approach; a realist approach; a 
constructivist approach; and an institutionalist approach. Wojcik (2012a) suggests 
this method enables the process and direction of the CbC reporting debate to be 
mapped in addition to associated contradictions to be emphasised. One such 
contradiction is identified as the U.S. and EU enacting requirements in contrast to the 
“original intention of the creators of the idea that CBCR be applied to financial and 
extractive companies…” (Wojcik, 2012, p. 17). Although this statement is strictly 
true in that comprehensive CbC reporting is intended to be applicable to the 
extractive and finance sectors, it does not address the broader impact of recent 
developments in the EU and U.S., being that a CbC reporting requirement was not 
applied to multinational entities operating in all sectors, as suggested by 
comprehensive CbC reporting proposals. 
 
A complementary working paper by Wojcik (2012b) contrasts the EU’s CbC 
disclosure requirements against Murphy’s comprehensive form of CbC reporting to 
determine the potential policy effectiveness of each respectively. The study makes an 
interesting contribution through its use of the conceptual framework developed by 
Fung, Graham and Weil (2007) for analysing policy effectiveness of transparency 
systems. The conceptual framework by Fung et al (2007) suggests that for a 
transparency policy to be effective, the information disclosed as a result of the policy 
must influence the decision-making routines and actions of users and disclosers 
(Wojcik, 2012b). As per Murphy (2012), the author considers full CbC reporting as 
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accounting information and therefore treats it as “an extension of corporate financial 
reporting or even a potential improvement of the existing system,” (Wojcik, 2012b). 
Under the first (of four) elements of the transparency model utilised, the policy 
objectives of the two forms of CbC reporting are compared and found to be 
incongruent. Wojcik (2012b, p. 7-8) identifies the objective of full CbC reporting is 
to “create more comprehensive, complete and comparable accounting data in order to 
help effective allocation of capital,” whilst the objective of EU CbC reporting is 
deemed to be to “increase government revenues in [the] developing world,” with 
transparency and accountability mere vehicles to achieve this.  
 
Under the second limb of the comprehensive framework, Wojcik (2012b) concludes 
that the disclosure requirements under full CbC reporting are more extensive than 
EU requirements. The third element considers the users’ perception, calculation and 
actions in relation to this information, for which Wojcik (2012b) finds the potential 
value of full CbC reporting to exceed that of EU CbC reporting. This conclusion is 
founded on the disclosure of information within “simplified” financial statements 
prepared on a per country basis assimilating more closely with users existing 
routines, in addition to the greater number of users targeted by full CbC reporting 
(Wojcik, 2012b). The fourth and final element considers whether users actions in 
response to CbC reporting would effect the actions of disclosers in line with CbC 
policy objectives. On this point, Wojcik (2012b) suggests the lack of reference data 
(i.e. revenues, assets, employment figures) disclosed within EU CbC reporting does 
not assist users to assess reputational and country specific risks, whilst full CbC 
reporting would incentivise multinational entities to manage these risks, ultimately 
lowering the cost of capital for companies and enhancing capital allocation.  
 
Wojcik (2012b) presents a thorough comparative analysis, ultimately finding in 
favour of the policy effectiveness of full CbC reporting. The author determines the 
potential value of a comprehensive approach to CbC reporting to exceed that of EU 
CbC reporting. Wojcik (2012b) suggests comprehensive CbC disclosures may 
enhance risk assessment opportunities in relation to country-specific and reputational 
risks, in addition to enabling an assessment of corporate tax contributions to a 
domestic economy in comparison to employment levels and fixed assets located in a 
jurisdiction. 
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However, throughout the paper the author detracts from the importance of certain 
key elements of full CbC reporting that are likely to have sourced a substantial 
percentage of non-government organisational campaigning support, primarily that of 
transparency and accountability. This is evidenced in the above stated objective 
regarding the efficient allocation of capital and in the lines “the objectives [of full 
CbC reporting] of improving tax governance and accountability of [multinational 
corporations] are mentioned in the submission [to the European Commission in 
2010]…but after investors and capital markets and in lesser detail” (Wojcik, 2012b, 
p. 8). This opinion may have been justified in the sole context of an analysis of 
Murphy’s submission to the European Commission, which as Wojcik (2012b, p. 8) 
notes uses language that reflects the “ultimate goal of incorporating CBCR into 
IFRS.” However, Wojcik (2012b, p. 2) states that the analysis undertaken in this 
study is “with the aid of other policy documents and research.” This partially limited 
objective of full CbC reporting is in contrast with other publications by Murphy and 
supportive civil society groups. For example, a 2009 report by Murphy emphasises 
that CbC reporting is important in light of the operations of multinational entities 
because transparency, CSR, accountability, trade, people, tax, corruption, 
development, governance and location all “matter,” (Murphy, 2009, p. 12). 
 
A recent discussion paper by Fuest, Spengel, Finke, Heckemeyer and Nusser (2014) 
considers the adequacy of CbC reporting to address profit shifting and tax avoidance 
by multinational entities. Fuest et al (2014) present a comprehensive version of CbC 
reporting for analysis, including disclosures on a multinational entity’s financial 
performance, labour costs and employee numbers, asset information and current and 
deferred tax expense. The authors have only considered the tax related benefits of 
CbC reporting, potentially due to the aim of the paper being to address tax avoidance 
and profit shifting issues. The paper presents two objectives, stating they are the 
main objectives pursued by CbC reporting proponents. However, only the first 
strictly conforms to this description, being to ensure multinational entities may be 
held accountable for the amount of taxes they pay within each country they operate 
in. In contrast, the second objective within the paper is stated as holding governments 
and their tax administrations to account “for the way in which they treat 
multinational investors” (Fuest et al, 2014, p. 17-18). Although this may be a 
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potential outcome, CbC reporting has more so been promoted as holding 
governments and their tax administrations accountable for the revenues they receive 
to ensure funds are efficiently allocated for the benefit of the community, rather than 
their treatment of multinational investors.  
 
Fuest et al (2014, p. 18) state CbC reporting “was initially mainly discussed to 
increase transparency in the extractive industries,” with transparency identified as a 
potential method to address well-known corruption issues. The authors further 
question whether reducing corruption is sufficient justification to apply CbC 
reporting requirements in other industries. The first statement is misleading, whilst 
the second is an over simplification. “Initial” discussions concerning CbC reporting, 
which as discussed in the previous chapter occurred in 2003, actually detail a 
comprehensive version of CbC reporting applicable to all sectors (Murphy, 2009). 
Secondly, proponents have seldom ever presented “combating corruption,” as the 
sole or primary justification for implementing sector-wide CbC reporting disclosures.  
 
In relation to the ability CbC information disclosures to reveal instances of profit 
shifting and tax planning by multinational entities, Fuest et al (2014, p. 19) only 
suggest CbC reporting is less efficient than a “disclosure of tax avoidance schemes-
regime,” which requires disclosures by tax advisors of the tax planning structures 
sold to clients.  
 
The authors note legal considerations that have been identified throughout critiques 
and studies of CbC reporting, primarily that of data confidentiality constraints and 
the potential for corporate competition to be hindered if CbC reporting were not 
applied universally (Fuest et al, 2014). As common in the literature, the study 
considers the appropriate mechanism for disclosure of CbC information, with the 
authors concluding on a report separate to the audited financial statements. This 
opinion is not a significant departure from the norm, it in fact corresponds with Evers 
et al (2014) (discussed below) and current work by the OECD. The justification for 
this conclusion is based on “accounting standards already prescrib[ing] considerable 
reporting requirements such as segmental reporting and the tax reconciliation.” 
Although the study is prepared solely from a taxation benefits perspective, it 
represents a unique contribution to the literature in that it is one of few studies to 
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consider information disclosures applicable to a comprehensive version of CbC 
reporting. 
 
A literary contribution that is more closely aligned with the analysis undertaken in 
this thesis is a recent discussion paper by Evers, Meier and Spengel (2014). Evers et 
al (2014) conduct a cost benefit analysis of CbC reporting, ultimately concluding it is 
not a convincing measure to combat the aggressive international tax planning 
activities of multinational companies. The authors provide an outline of a relatively 
comprehensive template for CbC reporting for the purposes of their study. 
Furthermore, distinction is made between direct costs (i.e. the adjustment of current 
internal systems and processes and auditing fees) and indirect costs (i.e. competitive 
disadvantages). The analysis of expected benefits of CbC reporting were limited in 
scope to those relating to a taxation perspective.  
 
Evers et al (2014, p. 10-11) conclude that CbC disclosures are not appropriate for 
inclusion in individual or consolidated financial accounts, but should rather be 
contained in a separate template, “if at all.” Furthermore, public disclosure is 
determined to be undesirable on the basis that sensitive information could cause 
competitive disadvantages for multinational entities, in addition to the potential for 
members of the public who do not possess “profound knowledge” on international 
tax law not being able to interpret CbC disclosures (Evers et al, 2014, p. 12). It is 
also surmised by Evers et al (2014, p. 14) that CbC reporting is unlikely to reduce 
multinational entities utilising legislative loopholes and flaws as “public pressure 
resulting from CbCR would be expected in case[s] of illegal endeavours.” This 
opinion, which suggests the public will only act on news of tax evasion is 
inconsistent with the recently publicised tax avoidance practices of well-known 
multinational entities such as Apple, Starbucks and Google.  
 
As the associated costs are found to outweigh the benefits of CbC reporting, Evers et 
al (2014) recommend, as an alternative, that tax policy be reformed and enforcement 
strategies of national and international tax legislation be strengthened. Overall, the 
paper makes an important contribution to the academic field through its analysis of 
CbC reporting. Although Evers et al (2014) make a valid recommendation regarding 
the need for tax policy reforms, the validity of the conclusions made within the study 
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specifically concerning CbC reporting is questionable. This is due to the non-
consideration of the wider objectives of CbC reporting beyond tax information 
disclosure, such as accountability and financial integrity. As mentioned above, this 
limited scope is most evident in exploration of the benefits associated with CbC 
reporting, which is especially problematic due to the cost-benefit method utilised 
within the study. Furthermore, the authors’ suggestion that users of financial 
statements would need “profound knowledge” of international taxation legislation to 
interpret CbC disclosures appears unrealistic in light of the nature and content of 
disclosures required under CbC reporting proposals. Furthermore, Murphy has 
labelled similar objections that users would not be able to understand financial 
accounts prepared in accordance with a comprehensive CbC reporting approach as 
“baseless,” due to CbC reporting (as proposed by Murphy) utilising the same basic 
format as income statements prepared on a consolidated basis (Murphy, 2014, p. 3). 
 
A recent study by Ting (2014a) was facilitated by a United States congressional 
hearing, held in 2013, providing information about Apple’s international tax 
structure that was not previously readily available or easily discernable from the 
corporation’s financial statements. Ting (2014a) reveals Apple achieved non-taxation 
on U.S $44 billion through an international tax structure that consisted of the 
following components: 
 Complementary definitions of corporate tax residence in Ireland and the U.S; 
 Transfer pricing rules on intangibles; 
 Controlled Foreign Corporation regime in the U.S 
 Check-the-box regime in the U.S; and 
 Low-tax jurisdictions. 
 
In addition to a detailed analysis of Apple’s international tax structure, Ting (2014a) 
evaluates the potential reforms to the U.S tax legislation that may address the double 
non-taxation of its resident multinational entities, such as Apple. Specifically, Ting 
(2014a) discusses the deficiencies within the U.S’ check-the-box regime, controlled 
foreign corporation regime and transfer pricing rules for cost sharing arrangements. 
In relation to the potential responses source countries may implement to counteract 
the adverse impacts of BEPS, Ting (2014a) suggests two issues must be considered: 
(1) the application of the enterprise doctrine; (2) enhancing transparency to reduce 
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information asymmetries between tax administrations and taxpayers. Whilst the issue 
of the enterprise doctrine, which suggests a multinational group should be treated as 
a single economic entity to reflect modern corporate structures, is of importance, the 
latter issue is of direct relevance to this thesis.  
 
Ting (2014a, p. 67) evaluates a comprehensive form of CbC reporting and suggests if 
such disclosure requirements had already been implemented “tax authorities in the 
U.S as well as in the source countries would have been alerted to the questionable 
low effective tax rate in Ireland much earlier and may have taken appropriate action 
more promptly.” In addition to identifying potential subjects for tax audits, Ting 
(2014a) suggests CbC reporting may exhibit deterrent effects on multinational 
entities that are conscious that their detailed CbC disclosures will be evaluated by tax 
authorities. Furthermore, it is suggested these deterrent effects may be enhanced 
should CbC data be disclosed to the public, on the basis that reputational concerns 
are “effective in dampening the appetite of [multinational entities] for BEPS 
schemes” (Ting, 2014a, p. 67).  
 
The author discredits two common arguments against the implementation of CbC 
reporting requirements, i.e. user information overload and increased compliance 
costs for businesses. In relation to the former objection, Ting (2014a) suggests users 
should easily be able to interpret CbC disclosures if all essential information is 
presented, whilst in relation to the latter point, he suggests the cost to a multinational 
entity of compiling readily available CbC information would be insignificant in 
comparison to the costs of implementing the tax planning arrangements that 
contribute to BEPS. 
 
The analysis of CbC reporting presented by Ting (2014a) offers a unique 
contribution to the literature due to its contemporary nature and pragmatic 
application to Vodafone’s circumstances. In particular, Ting (2014a) discusses the 
inadequacies of the voluntary CbC disclosures provided by Vodafone following 
public criticism received in relation to the company’s failure to pay UK corporate 
taxes for an extended period. As revealed by Ting (2014a, p. 70), Vodafone 
aggregated the amount of corporate income tax paid with 60 other taxes and charges, 
resulting in a total disclosure line item titled “direct revenue contribution: taxation.” 
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Furthermore, Ting (2014a) suggests Vodafone was not transparent in its disclosure of 
a subsidiary established in Luxembourg that contributed to BEPS, as figures were 
aggregated with those of other holding companies within the group. Based on the 
CbC disclosure practices of Vodafone, Ting suggests CbC reporting should be 
structured to mandate separate disclosure of the amount of corporate tax payment in 
each country and should prohibit the aggregation of country data. 
 
 
Overall, a review of the associated literature that specifically examines CbC 
reporting highlights many incongruities, primarily concerning the objective of CbC 
reporting; its potential benefits and costs; and where CbC information should be 
disclosed. Wojcik (2012b) finds in favour of including a comprehensive form of CbC 
disclosures within the annual financial statements of multinational entities (as per 
suggestions by Murphy, 2009; 2012), whilst in contrast Fuest et al (2014) and Evers 
et al (2014) suggest CbC disclosures should be contained within a separate report, 
therefore aligning with the current work of the OECD BEPS Project. In their analysis 
of the politics of accounting disaggregation, Gallhofer and Haslam (2007) do not 
comment on the adequacy of the inclusion or exclusion of CbC reporting 
requirements within IFRS. However, the findings of Gallhofer and Haslam (2007) 
infer the potential for future IFRS standards or amendments to contain CbC reporting 
requirements on the basis that their study finds the IASB to possess the potential to 
serve civil society despite its standard setting process being partially captured by 
hegemonic forces. 
 
All of the studies evaluated within this section considered the benefits of CbC 
reporting associated with potential reductions in tax avoidance and profit shifting by 
multinational entities, with Evers et al (2014) and Fuest et al (2014) solely restricting 
their analysis to tax related benefits. Of the studies that suggest multinational entities 
may reduce their tax avoidance behaviours as a result of CbC disclosures, the 
common causes identified included reduced information asymmetries between tax 
administrations and corporate reporters, in addition to associated deterrence effects 
engendered by reputational concerns (Ting, 2014a; Wojcik, 2012b). In contrast, 
Evers et al (2014) and Fuest et al (2014) suggest alternative recommendations 
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primarily relating to tax legislation reform to address tax avoidance and profit 
shifting. 
 
Evers et al (2014, p. 12) suggest members of the public lacking “profound 
knowledge” in international tax law would not be able to interpret CbC disclosures, 
whilst Fuest et al (2014, p. 18) identify a similar concern relating to the potential for 
information to be “misused.” In contrast, Wojcik (2012b) and Ting (2014a) discredit 
these claims based on the perceived knowledge levels of users and the simplicity 
associated with the proposed content and structure of CbC disclosures. The 
inconsistent findings and recommendations of the academic studies evaluated within 
this section may be due to the varying objectives each assigned to the concept of 
CbC reporting.  
 
This thesis builds on these studies through an evaluation of the suitability of and 
implementation considerations for a comprehensive CbC reporting model. In contrast 
to the political economy perspectives (as applied in Gallhofer & Haslam, 2007; 
Wojcik, 2012a) and pragmatic cost-benefit analyses contained within extant 
literature, this thesis utilises a dual theory approach. As discussed in section 3.5 
below, CSR theory is utilised to evaluate the extent and nature of the obligations 
multinational entities owe towards stakeholders, and stakeholder theory is employed 
to identify legitimate stakeholders. Due to the current politicised and publicised 
nature of CbC reporting, this thesis utilises a variety of contemporary information 
resources, some of which encompass multiple stakeholder perspectives (such as 
OECD comment letters). In addition to the theoretical approach, this thesis offers a 
unique contribution through its development of a standardised CbC model, a process 
that has yet to be undertaken for academic research purposes. The academic studies 
on CbC reporting reviewed within this chapter focused their evaluations on models 
or requirements specifically associated with the concept of CbC reporting (for 
example, Wojcik, 2012b contrasts EU CbC reporting and the Tax Justice Network’s 
comprehensive reporting proposal). However, as explored in section 2.4, CbC 
reporting requirements are evident within other reporting standards that are not 
recognised within the boundaries of the CbC reporting concept. To also address this 
literary gap, this thesis reviews academic studies that evaluate the geographic 
 68  Chapter 3: Literature Review 
disclosure requirements contained within such standards. This evaluation is 
presented in section 3.4 below. 
 
 
3.4 Other Reporting Frameworks 
This section reviews the relevant literature concerning voluntary reporting standards 
that contain guidelines for multinational entities to disclose information on some 
form of country-by-country basis. The section includes research concerning CSR 
reporting and integrated reporting. 
 
Sustainability reporting, also referred to as CSR reporting, is viewed as fulfilling a 
role in how multinational entities account for their CSR, a concept that encompasses 
companies’ economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic responsibilities owed to 
society in general, and stakeholders in particular (Kolk, 2008). A key similarity 
between sustainability (CSR) reporting and CbC reporting is the assessment role 
facilitated by information contained within each report type, concerning a 
multinational entity’s ability to satisfy its CSR obligations.  
 
A study by Kolk (2008) on the sustainability reporting practices of the Fortune 
Global 250 as published in July 2004, revealed multinational entities are increasingly 
disclosing information on the environmental, social, and economic aspects of their 
business operations, in an attempt to increase transparency and accountability. 
However, the author further notes that these disclosures are commonly limited to 
general references that fail to detail actual structures, responsibilities, implementation 
methods and strategies, and when external verification has occurred (or not) (Kolk, 
2008). The above findings were evidenced in both separate sustainability reports and 
integrated reports (whereby environmental and social information is disclosed within 
the annual financial statements). Despite the author’s similar findings for the two 
frameworks, separate guidelines govern sustainability reports in contrast to 
integrated reports (as discussed in section 2.4).  
 
A recent study by van Staden and Wild (2013) examines the content and form of 
corporate integrated reports prepared prior to the introduction of the International 
Integrated Reporting Council’s framework to gain insight into the organisations’ 
Monique Longhorn  
 Chapter 3: Literature Review 69 
motivations for undertaking the reporting method. Van Staden and Wild (2013) 
found that early adopters were potentially motivated out of an attempt to gain or 
regain legitimacy, but failed to integrate “financial, social, [and] environmental 
information into a single report for stakeholders in a format that is concise, clearly 
expressed, consistent and comparable,” (van Staden & Wild, 2013, p. 29).  
 
Although, sustainability and integrated reporting frameworks differ from CbC 
reporting on the grounds of the principles-based, voluntary nature of the former two, 
the three reporting frameworks share the general objective of requiring entities to 
disclose financial and non-financial information to provide a transparent overview of 
the nature, sustainability and inherent risk of business operations and how the 
corporate governance and management of these operations impacts stakeholders.  
 
3.5 Theoretical Framework 
The following chapter section develops the theoretical framework that informs the 
analysis of CbC reporting within this thesis. To commence, this section presents CSR 
as a means to recognise the responsibilities of multinational entities to operate 
beyond legal requirements in order to satisfy implicit societal expectations and 
norms. Subsequently, stakeholder theory is utilised to identify the normative 
stakeholders of multinational entities. The chapter concludes with a specification of 
how the theoretical framework is operationalised within the analyses presented in 
chapters five and six. 
 
CbC reporting is often subsumed into the context of CSR. Murphy’s comprehensive 
CbC reporting initially aimed to “assist those seeking to appraise the organisation 
with regard to: its corporate social responsibility, investment risk, its contribution by 
way of value added to the society in which it operates, [and] its contribution to 
national well-being by way of tax payment within those locations,” (Murphy, 2003, 
p. 2). However, in a more recent statement Murphy suggests data required under 
CbC reporting “is not and cannot be corporate social responsibility information,” but 
rather it is accounting information that can be consistently supplied, audited and 
subjected to accounting standard processes (Murphy, 2012a, p. 49).  
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Due to the complex and contextual nature of CSR, a commonly agreed definition 
does not currently exist. However, several contributions, as explored below, have 
been made by academics, business and society to the concept of CSR since its 
emergence in the 1950’s (Kakabadse, Rozuel & Lee-Davies, 2005). 
 
CSR is part of a long-term perspective of economic gain that requires businesses to 
operate “beyond the narrow economic, technical and legal requirements of the firm” 
(Davis, 1973, p. 312). Johnson and Scholes (2002, p. 220) further elucidate the latter 
point by stating “corporate social responsibility is concerned with the ways in which 
an organisation exceeds the minimum obligations to stakeholders specified through 
regulation and corporate governance.” CSR recognises that businesses are 
responsible to operate in accordance with the implicit expectations and norms 
imposed upon them by the various stakeholders that grant the business a “licence to 
operate.” The source of this responsibility has frequently been recognised throughout 
the literature as being based on the power and influence organisations possess, which 
impacts society both directly and indirectly (Kakabadse et al, 2005). Davis (1973) 
suggests that “society grants legitimacy and power to business” under conditions 
developed by the former, and failure to satisfy these conditions potentially challenges 
the economic, social, political and going-concern status of the business. CSR is not 
an outcome or result but rather an ongoing process that is reactive to the dynamic 
social environment (Carroll, 1999). 
 
Buhmann (2013) highlights that CSR may be strategically employed by 
governments, and shaped in normative directions, to promote the implementation of 
public policy objectives and legal obligations of governments, by encouraging 
organisations to engage in CSR. National governments may choose to implement 
binding legislation that mandates defined actions or alternatively, guiding measures 
and/ or incentives for companies to self-regulate (Buhmann, 2013). To analyse the 
rationality informing governmental involvement in CSR reporting, Buhmann (2013) 
considers a legislative change introduced in December 2008 requiring mandatory 
annual CSR reporting within the management review section of the annual report, as 
a supplement to the annual report, or on the firm’s web page, for large Danish 
companies. The author suggests that by requiring transparency on the substance, 
implementation and impacts of a multinational entity’s CSR policies but not 
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mandating the actual policies, the indirect regulatory approach enables the Danish 
government to shape the CSR conduct of firms without directly conflicting with the 
idea that CSR is voluntary, thereby ultimately leaving it to stakeholders to monitor 
the degree to which the organisation fulfils its social expectations (Buhmann, 2013).  
 
However, the discretion afforded to multinational entities in deciding whether they 
implement a CSR policy under the Danish legislation may be questionable in light of 
findings presented by Gjolberg (2011) on the attitudes of multinational Nordic 
companies identified as leaders in CSR practices. Survey results indicated a 78% 
preference for binding international CSR regulation, 70% consider voluntary 
initiatives and market mechanisms as insufficient to improve corporate social and 
environmental performance and 81% do not believe that CSR can replace public 
policy (Gjolberg, 2011). The majority of respondents identified their Nordic cultural, 
institutional and regulatory background as relevant to their high CSR performance 
and associate their CSR pioneer status as a competitive advantage, as they are most 
likely already in compliance with future regulatory requirements (Gjolberg, 2011). 
 
In addition to the aforementioned analysis by Buhmann (2013) that utilises a 
legislative change to Danish disclosure requirements, the importance of corporate 
social responsibility has also been recognised within the UK Companies Act 2006. 
Section 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006 states a company director has the duty to 
promote the success of a company for the benefit of its members whilst also having 
regard to “the interests of the company’s employees; the need to foster the 
company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others; the impact of 
the company’s operations on the community and the environment; and the 
desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business 
conduct.” 
 
Stakeholder theory is closely intertwined with CSR, and like the latter, lacks 
consensus regarding a definition or scope. This interrelationship has been identified 
throughout the literature, such as by Carroll (1991, p. 43) who notes the “natural fit 
between the idea of CSR and an organisation’s stakeholders” and by Matten, Crane 
and Chapple (2003, p. 111) who recognise stakeholder theory as “a necessary 
process in the operationalisation of corporate social responsibility, as a 
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complimentary rather than conflicting body of literature.” Jones (2002) defines 
stakeholder theory in two parts; firstly, as requiring managers, in order to perform 
well, to consider a wide group of stakeholders, and secondly, that these managers 
have obligations towards stakeholders, including but not limited to shareholders. 
Donaldson and Preston (1995, p. 70-71) identify that stakeholder theory is commonly 
used for analysis purposes in three ways: 
1) Descriptive/ Empirical: “to describe, and sometimes to explain, specific 
corporate characteristics and behaviours.” 
2) Instrumental: to identify connections, or lack thereof, between stakeholder 
management and the achievement of conventional corporate goals (such as 
profitability and growth). 
3) Normative: “to interpret the function of the corporation, including the 
identification of moral or philosophical guidelines for the operation and 
management of corporations.” 
 
Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar & de Colle, (2010, p. 213) disagree with the 
above segregation, arguing that “all these forms of enquiry are forms of storytelling 
and that, conceptually, all three branches have elements of the others embedded 
within them.” Academic disagreement as to whether “normative stakeholder theory” 
actually exists, as disputed by Freeman, centres on the difference between the 
pragmatic and foundational approaches to business ethics, however it is agreed that 
stakeholder theory conveys normative implications for managers (Hasnas, 2012). 
These implications and there application to an analysis of CbC reporting are explored 
below. 
 
Stakeholder theory has often been directly contrasted against the stockholder theory 
attributed to Friedman, the latter theory suggesting that managers have a fiduciary 
duty to maximise and distribute profits for the exclusive benefit of shareholders. 
Notably, Phillips, Freeman and Wicks (2003) state that stakeholder theory is 
consistent with the notion of value maximisation, however, stakeholder and 
stockholder theories diverge when the primary beneficiary of the value, so 
maximised, is constantly and exclusively a single stakeholder, such as equity 
stockholders. Stakeholder theory is often applied to for-profit organisations in 
academic and non-academic publications, however it has been identified in the 
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literature that stakeholder theory is applicable to voluntary organisations that are 
formed to realise specified aims and objectives and attract and retain members to 
promote and advance these objectives, whilst freely allowing members to exit the 
organisation (Hasnas, 2013). These conditions are satisfied by both for-profit and 
not-for-profit organisations. Therefore, stakeholder theory is appropriate to consider 
CbC reporting by multinational entities, both for- and not-for-profit, however, this 
thesis will primarily focus on the former due to taxation considerations. 
 
Stakeholder theory requires managers to distribute the fruits of organisational 
success (and failure) among all legitimate stakeholders and to communicate with 
stakeholders on how profits should be maximised (Phillips et al, 2003). Phillips et al 
(2003, p. 487) further state “stakeholder theory is concerned with who has input in 
decision-making as well as with who benefits from the outcomes of such decisions. 
Procedure is as important…as the final distribution.” Financial outputs are not the 
sole subject of organisational distributions to shareholders as information is 
considered another fundamental good that influences stakeholder’s perceptions of 
fairness to the extent that complete information contributes to the decision-making 
process amongst stakeholders (Phillips et al, 2003). 
 
The “question of what management should do, and who should matter in their [sic] 
decision making, is a central question of stakeholder theory” and will now be 
considered in relation to the managers of multinational entities (Freeman, et al, 2010, 
p. 209). To address this question the normative stakeholders of a multinational entity 
must first be identified. Normative stakeholders are generally agreed to encompass 
capital providers, employees, customers, suppliers and local communities (Freeman 
et al, 2010).  
 
In addition to these stakeholders, regulators and taxation authorities have been 
identified as stakeholders within the CbC reporting literature (Murphy, 2009). The 
roles served by both regulators and taxation authorities conform to the definition of a 
normative stakeholder as suggested by Freeman et al. (2010, p. 209), being “any 
group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organisation’s objectives.” Legislation and standards as developed by regulators and 
taxation revenues collected by tax administrations are directly influenced by a 
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multinational entity’s ability to generate a profit (in the case of for-profit 
organisations) and the methods used to achieve and distribute this profit.  Trade 
unions, in their negotiations with management over employee’s rates of remuneration 
and fair employment practices, would also satisfy the aforementioned definition of a 
normative stakeholder (Hadden, 2013). Finally, civil society organisations have the 
ability to impact the achievement of a multinational entity’s objectives through 
publications and lobbying efforts aimed at altering or improving a particular 
corporate practice or behaviour. 
 
Following the above identification of normative stakeholders, the substantive 
normative implications of stakeholder theory, as previously identified, are applied 
directly to multinational entity’s that prepare annual accounts of their business 
operations. The first implication is that multinational entities do not hold an 
exclusive fiduciary duty to stockholders, but rather are obligated to ensure the value 
created by the entity is distributed among the identified stakeholders. It has often 
been implied, and a significant point of literary criticism, that to “balance” 
stakeholder interests prescribes that this distribution is determined by equal treatment 
of all stakeholders (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). However, Phillips et al (2003, p. 
488) suggests a meritocratic interpretation of stakeholder balance whereby benefits 
are distributed according to the relative contribution to the organisation. For 
multinational entities under consideration within this study, capital providers would 
be seen to contribute the most to an organisation due to their funding facilitating the 
creation and continuation of the business. It is suggested that employees are the 
second highest contributor through their provision of human capital, followed by 
local communities who grant a multinational entity with their licence to operate. 
Suppliers and customers are equally as important as a business would fail to generate 
revenues with a lack of goods or services to sell or customers to purchase them. 
Regulators and tax administrators contribute through the provision of regulation and 
standards to which the business activities of the multinational entity must conform.  
 
Therefore, under a stakeholder theory perspective that utilises a meritocratic 
interpretation, CbC reporting, as a distribution of information that aids in stakeholder 
decision-making, should be structured and implemented to primarily benefit 
investors but also (and to a lesser extent) employees, local communities, suppliers, 
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customers, regulators and tax administrators. It is now considered how the previously 
identified stakeholders may find CbC reporting disclosures, and financial statement 
disclosures in general, useful. 
 
Providers of capital, including investors and financial institutions via lending 
facilities, utilise CSR disclosures and financial reports to better assess firm value, 
strategy, future opportunities, risk, legal liabilities, compliance with laws and 
regulation and the stewardship role of management. Present and future employees 
are considered to be concerned with a corporation’s rates of remuneration, job 
prospects, working conditions, health and safety, industrial relations, risk 
management, career development and advancement opportunities (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, 2008). Former employees may also be 
interested in the ongoing financial performance of a corporation to ensure continued 
payment of pensions and retirement benefits (United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, 2008). Although trade unions have access to employee-related 
information for an associated corporation, they may utilise employment data 
disclosed by a corporation to benchmark against other enterprises, industries, or 
countries (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2008).   
 
Customers are concerned with product quality, potential associated health impacts, 
and the manufacturing process including information on how and where products are 
produced and under what working conditions (United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, 2008). Suppliers are concerned with the financial performance of 
a corporation to the extent the latter is able to repay outstanding credit amounts and 
continue the requisition of goods and/ or services. Suppliers may also utilise 
information concerning a corporation’s reputation to make informed decisions as to 
whom they should supply to and consequently be associated with. Local 
communities are concerned with a corporation’s impact on jobs, contributions to the 
tax base and on other local businesses (e.g. through local business connections and 
influence on local remuneration rates) in addition to local health, safety and security 
risks and how community complaints are processed (United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, 2008). Regulators utilise corporate disclosures to formulate 
social and economic policies and to identify and remedy any associated gaps within 
these policies or their enforcement. Similarly, tax administrations utilise information 
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to determine if entities have correctly calculated and reported their taxation liability. 
Civil society groups utilise financial statement and CSR information to compare or 
benchmark an organisation’s performance in a particular area, such as economic 
development, primarily focusing on policies and their implementation. 
 
In summary, this chapter segment commenced with a discussion of corporate social 
responsibility as a conceptual tool to understand the broader obligations imposed 
upon multinational entities by society. Subsequently, stakeholder theory was 
evaluated as a necessary process in the operationalisation of corporate social 
responsibility. The development of the theoretical framework within this section 
sought to establish the key analytical concepts to be utilised in the forthcoming 
analysis. An application of corporate social responsibility to the analysis of CbC 
reporting within this thesis recognises the obligations owed by multinational entities 
to society, whereby society encompasses stakeholders that extend beyond merely tax 
administrations.  Stakeholder theory is applied to identify the normative stakeholders 
of multinational entities and is operationalised and applied to the concept of CbC 
reporting through an evaluation of the information needs of each respective 




In conclusion, this chapter reviewed the literature concerning geographical segment 
reporting under ASC 280 Segment Reporting and IFRS 8 Operating Segments, which 
highlighted a continued use of broad geographical areas for enterprise-wide 
disclosures prepared by corporations, albeit a decreased percentage. These broad 
geographical groupings, facilitated by materiality thresholds contained within ASC 
280 and IFRS 8, have been suggested throughout the literature to reduce the 
usefulness of information for users. Following identification of the need to further 
address geographical disaggregated accounting disclosures, a review was conducted 
of academic studies that evaluate CbC reporting, one of many suggestions to enhance 
the transparency of multinational entities global operations. 
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Academic studies that examine CbC reporting generally identified differing 
objectives of disclosing CbC information, which may contribute to the inconsistent 
findings observed. In particular, the studies evaluated exhibited a lack of consensus 
concerning the potential benefits and associated costs of implementing and applying 
CbC reporting requirements, in addition to the ideal location for any such CbC 
disclosures to be made. Whilst there was general agreement on the potential for CbC 
information to enhance financial transparency, the literature lacked agreement as to 
whether it could serve as a useful and efficient tool to identify profit-shifting 
activities by multinational entities, with some studies suggesting alternative 
recommendations primarily relating to tax legislation reform. Furthermore, whilst 
some studies referred to the benefits of public disclosure others argued for 
confidential disclosures to tax administrations. Whilst the studies commonly 
highlighted concerns for “information overload” and potential misuse of information, 
these concerns were disregarded by some authors on the basis of the perceived 
knowledge levels of users and the simplicity the authors associate with the proposed 
content and structure of CbC disclosures.  
 
The review of studies concerning CbC reporting was followed by an analysis of 
academic studies that consider the effectiveness of disclosure standards that provide 
guidelines on the voluntary provision of information concerning a multinational 
entity’s global operations. Whilst these voluntary standards result in the provision of 
information beyond that required from financial accounting standards, the literature 
found resultant disclosures lacked structure and decision-useful content.  
 
Finally, this chapter concluded with the development of the theoretical framework, 
which required an evaluation of CSR and stakeholder theory and their application to 
an analysis of CbC reporting. 
 
Upon concluding this chapter, it is evident that the pragmatic and academic sources 
drawn upon thus far have addressed the first research question (RQ1) considered 
within this thesis, being is CbC reporting appropriate within a corporate reporting 
system? The pragmatic adoption of industry-specific CbC reporting frameworks in 
the extractive and finance sectors, as explored in chapter two, is indicative of the 
importance and feasibility of introducing further CbC requirements. The need to 
 78  Chapter 3: Literature Review 
consider an industry-wide application of CbC reporting has become unavoidable due 
to the current CbC template under development by the OECD being applicable to 
multinational entities operating in all sectors. Although extant academic research on 
CbC reporting is limited, there appears to be consensus regarding the decision useful 
nature of geographic disclosures by multinational entities and the potential for 
enhanced financial transparency benefits resulting from CbC disclosures. Therefore, 
the answer to RQ1 is found to be in the affirmative, CbC reporting is appropriate to 
include within a corporate reporting system. However, the issues of implementation 
and structuring, as encompassed within RQ2 and RQ3 respectively, must still be 
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Chapter Four: Research Paradigm, Methodology and Design 
4.1 Introduction  
Through an exploration of the epistemological and ontological assumptions, this 
chapter discusses the constructivist research paradigm employed within this thesis 
and concurrently considers the alternative paradigms, being Positivism and Realism, 
and the associated justification for their exclusion. The epistemological and 
ontological assumptions applicable to a constructivist perspective are then translated 
into a qualitative methodology. This chapter concludes with a detailed discussion of 
content analysis as a research method and how it has been applied within this study. 
 
4.2 Research Paradigm  
Bogdan and Biklan (1982, p. 30) define a research paradigm as “a loose collection of 
logically held together assumptions, concepts, and propositions that orientates 
thinking and research.” Ontology addresses how we perceive the form and nature of 
reality and epistemology is how we come to know that reality. This thesis operates 
within a naturalist/ contructivist view, which epistemologically prescribes that 
knowledge, being time and context dependent, is founded through the meanings 
attached to the phenomena examined and the researcher and subjects interact in such 
a way that “findings” are the literal creation of the inquiry process (Krauss, 2005; Al 
Zeera, 2001). A constructivist ontology postulates that there are multiple realities 
constructed by human beings through their direct experiences with a phenomenon of 
interest, and their perception of these experiences dictates how meaning and 
ultimately knowledge is constructed (Krauss, 2005).  
 
In contrast, under the positivist paradigm knowledge is limited to facts that can be 
objectively observed and quantitatively measured concerning a single apprehensible 
reality (Krauss, 2005). Positivism is applicable to the social world to the extent that 
“there is a method for studying the social world that is value free, and that 
explanations of a causal nature can be provided” (Mertens, 2005). CbC reporting 
aims to address concepts such as tax avoidance, which possess multiple “realities” 
due to differing personal views, legislative interpretations and societal attitudes. Due 
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to this ontological perspective and an inability to provide value free, causal 
explanations, a positivist paradigm is not appropriate for this thesis. Critical realism 
considers multiple perceptions about a single, mind-independent reality that is not 
wholly, discoverable or knowable. Although the realism paradigm accounts for the 
multiple perceptions numerous stakeholders may possess concerning CbC reporting 
and its influence on corporate behaviour, the assumption that one reality exists 
separate to these human perceptions is not supported as this thesis adheres to the 
ontological assumption that reality is socially constructed and consequently varies 
over time as social values change.  
 
 
4.3 Research Methodology and Design 
Overall this thesis adheres to a qualitative methodology, and specifically one that is 
hermeneutical and dialectical. Hermeneutics refers to the “analysis of texts that 
stresses how prior understandings and prejudices shape the interpretive process” 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 27), whilst within a constructivist philosophical view, 
dialectic refers to the comparison of numerous constructions via “iteration, analysis, 
critique, reiteration, reanalysis, and so on that leads eventually to a joint (among 
inquirer and respondents) construction of a case (i.e. findings or outcomes)” 
(Schwandt, 1998, p. 243).  
 
This study utilises a qualitative content analysis method, which has been defined by 
Hsieh & Shannon (2005, p. 1278) as “a research method for the subjective 
interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process 
of coding and identifying themes or patterns.” This data analysis method is aligned 
with the chosen research paradigm, as evidenced by Bisman and Highfield (2013, p. 
6) who state “constructivist research focuses on the meanings embedded in textual 
and verbal accounts and generally involves the analysis of archival materials [and] 
documentary sources.”   
 
Data collection consisted of purposively selected texts to inform the research 
questions under investigation. These texts have been summarised in Table 4.1 below.  
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Table 4.1 
Documentary Data Required for Analysis 
Type Form Source 
Extant CbC reporting 
frameworks and proposals  
Published organisational 
and governmental reports, 
Legislation 
Civil society groups; 
intergovernmental groups: 
e.g. TJN, OECD 
Governments: e.g. U.S,  
EU Member States 
Extant reporting 





Organisations e.g. GRI; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Commentary and critiques Comment letters; 
academic papers; media 
articles 





As per Labuschagne (2003), document analysis was used as the data collection 
method and through content analysis; this raw data was condensed into major themes 
and categories. Documents are primarily used in research as a complimentary data 
source, however Bowen (2009) identifies that often documents may be the only 
available data source in hermeneutic enquiries, as was the case for this thesis. 
Documentary data collection was appropriate for this study as in addition to 
providing background and context on the issue of CbC reporting, it provided a means 
of tracking changes and developments in reporting framework proposals and 
published opinions and responses from a range of sources, as evidenced within Table 
4.1 above. Furthermore, due to the very public nature of the CbC reporting issue, as 
engendered by ongoing OECD/ G20 deliberations and media publications, a 
substantial quantity of related documents were publicly available and easily 
accessible via the Internet. As noted by Bowen (2005) documents are not specifically 
created for a research purpose and therefore contain insufficient detail to answer 
research questions. This issue has been addressed within this study by collecting 
numerous documents from a wide variety of sources and analysing this data using 
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systematic and transparent procedures for qualitative content analysis, as detailed 
below. 
 
First, publications on CbC reporting were collected from the websites of respective 
non-government organisational groups, such as TJN and PWYP, to gain a general 
understanding of the topic from its inception. Second, specific reporting frameworks 
containing CbC reporting or elements thereof were gathered from organisational and 
governmental websites. Third, critiques and commentary associated with these 
specific frameworks and proposals were collected from the websites of those who 
published the frameworks (such as comment letters received in direct response to the 
OECD discussion draft), from Internet search engines such as Google Scholar, and 
from academic journals. 
 
To address RQ1 many publications concerning CbC reporting were subject to an 
initial analysis that primarily aimed to describe and evaluate the reporting 
requirements currently required or proposed. The analyses for RQ2 and RQ3 utilised 
commentary letters that were coded in accordance with the content analysis method 
to highlight perceived advantages, disadvantages, strengths and weaknesses of CbC 
reporting designs.   
 
As more than 150 comment letters were received by the OECD, a selection process 
was applied to determine the comment letters to be coded for the analysis within this 
thesis. First, All comment letters were read in the order presented in the four volumes 
published on the OECD website in alphabetical order on 3 March 2014, with any that 
did not directly or primarily refer to CbC reporting being excluded from further 
analysis. Second, letters were coded to the point where new ideas or concepts were 
not being expressed and the perspectives of all commenting stakeholder groups had 
been accounted for i.e. business; civil society; accounting and advisory firms; 
industry representatives; and academic. However, it should be noted that limited 
academic responses were evident within the population of comment letters. This 
process resulted in a final sample of 38 comment letters. Third, a qualitative content 
analysis method was applied to the sample of individual comment letters, as 
described in further detail below.  
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In alignment with an inductive qualitative content analysis method, this thesis aimed 
to “systematically describe the meaning” of CbC reporting by extracting categories 
from the data concerning perceived strengths and weaknesses of the OECD’s 
template and the general concept of CbC reporting (Schreier, 2012). An inductive 
approach to category development is recommended when there is insufficient or 
fragmented prior knowledge concerning the topic of investigation (Elo & Kyngas, 
2008). Cho and Lee (2014, p. 15) recommend that an inductive content analysis 
approach should adhere to the following process: 
 Selecting the unit of analysis 
 Open coding 
 Creating categories 
 Data coding 
 Revising categories 
 
To encompass implementation and structural issues of CbC reporting examined by 
RQ2 and RQ3, entire comment letters were selected (as per the data collection 
procedure detailed above) as the unit of analysis. 
 
Both qualitative content analysis and grounded theory methods incorporate open 
coding, which is the “initial step of theoretical analysis that pertains to the initial 
discovery of categories and their properties” (Glaser, 1992, p. 39). Open coding was 
conducted within this thesis by reading each selected letter line by line and assigning 
conceptual labels to portions of text within the letters. Magnitude coding was 
concurrently applied as a refinement of the open codes through the addition of 
descriptive sub-codes, in order to indicate the frequency, direction, presence and/ or 
evaluative content (Saldana, 2009).  
 
Open codes with “similar meaning and connotations” were then grouped into 
categories (Weber, 1990, p. 37). Categories were further revised into broader, higher 
order categories that were mutually exclusive and exhaustive (Crowley & Delfico, 
1996). Two themes were identified from the broad categories, whereby the concept 
of a theme was interpreted as a recurring commonality identified within or across the 
categories (Polit & Hungler, 1999). 
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Table 4.2 below summarises the open codes and higher order categories identified 
during the inductive qualitative content analysis process, in addition to the two key 
themes, which were found to be as follows: 
 Theme 1: What purpose should CbC reporting serve and what disclosures are 
required to achieve this? 
 Theme 2: What implementation requirements should be introduced? 
 
Theme 1 links the categories that encompass coded statements that question or 
suggest the stated objective of the OECD’s CbC reporting template (Objective), 
specific comments on line item disclosures, such as assets or employee information 
(Information Disclosure Requirements), and suggestions concerning the presentation, 
source and comparability of data (Structure). Theme 2 identifies the implementation 
issues identified by respondents concerning fair and equitable treatment of 
corporations and countries (Competitive Harm), suggestions concerning 
dissemination options (Implementation) and associated resources taxpayers may 
need to expend to implement requirements (Compliance Burdens). Therefore, theme 
2 assimilates with the analysis for RQ2 and theme 1 assimilates with the analysis 
conducted for RQ3. 
 
The magnitude codes applied during the open coding process were utilised to 
determine the frequency and evaluative content of respondent suggestions for 
implementation and structural issues, where appropriate. Frequency counts were not 
conducted for structural line item disclosures as responses exhibited substantial 
variance and the suggestion of a disclosure item was deemed more relevant for 
evaluation purposes than respondent consensus or non-consensus.  
 
As per the suggestion of Namey, Guest, Thairu and Johnson (2007), frequencies 
were determined on the basis of the number of individual respondents in the sample 
who express the same idea. The number of individual participants is suggested to be 
a better indicator of overall thematic importance in contrast to the total number of 
times an idea or concept is expressed and coded, as frequencies may be distorted 
should an individual respondent express an idea multiple times (Namey et al, 2007). 
The allocation of individual respondents from the sample to higher order categories, 
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as determined by the coding process, is summarised in Appendix A, whilst frequency 
counts and associated percentages are included within the analysis in chapter five. 
 
Table 4.3 displays representative quotations of the open coding process applied to the 
comment letters received by the OECD in order to enhance the credibility of results 
(Cho & Lee, 2014). 
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Table 4.2 
Codes, Categories and Themes using an Inductive Approach to Content Analysis 
Themes What purpose should CbC reporting serve and what 
disclosures are required to achieve this? 
What implementation requirements should be introduced? 
Categories Information Disclosure 
Requirements 
Objective Structure Competitive Harm Implementation Compliance 
Burden 
Open Codes Assets Broad Comparability Confidentiality of 
Commercially 
Sensitive Information 
Dissemination Taxpayer costs 
Employee Information 
Usefulness 




Tiers  Language  
Intragroup Transactions    Lodgement Date  
Tax      
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Table 4.3  
Open Coded Quotes from Content Analysis 
Open Coding Labels Example Quotes 
Assets  “…including tangible assets other than cash on their own could result in artificial 
distortions…” – Deloitte Transfer Pricing Unit, Vol. 2, p. 29 
Broad  “…ultimate goal of such reporting is to improve tax governance, accountability and 
transparency for both companies and governments in developed and developing countries.” 
– Oxfam, Vol. 3, p. 92 
Comparability  “It is important to reiterate that the intention of CbCR is not to allow for comparison across 




 “the information required to be reported in the template is competitively sensitive 
information about a company’s entire global profile” – TD Banking Group, vol. 4, p. 69 
 “we do not believe that any of the information being considered and proposed for inclusion 
in the CbC report is sensitive enough to justify being treated as confidential…”- Christian 
Aid, vol. 1, p. 259 
Data Source  “It is vitally important that businesses be given the choice of building the Template “bottom 
up” from individual statutory entity accounts, or “top down” from consolidated numbers…” 
– British Sky Broadcasting Group, Vol. 1, p. 197 
 “…if a bottom up approach to the supply of country-by-country reporting data were to be 
adopted, the country-by-country reporting information to be supplied  to any local tax 
jurisdiction would be the same as the information they should have already received from 
the entities reporting their tax affairs…” – BEPS Monitoring Group, Vol. 1, p. 167 
Developing Countries  “Materiality needs to take into account the global size of the operations. We do, however, 
appreciate that there may be some leeway for developing countries…” – Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, Vol. 2, p. 298 
Dissemination  “The country-by-country reporting template should be required to be delivered only to the 
parent company’s home country and should be shared with other countries under tax 
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information exchange relationships” – Ernst & Young, Vol. 2, p. 77 
 “A further reason for making the report public is it would resolve concerns about how to 
ensure access by authorities to the CbC report. Relying on information exchange appears a 
flawed plan…” - Christian Aid, Vol. 1, p. 259 
Employee  “We recognise that data on the number of employees may be seen as useful information for 
risk assessment purposes and that employee expense will be generally indicative of 
value…” – PricewaterhouseCoopers Global, Vol. 3, p. 137 
Exemption  “…airline and shipping activities do not constitute "BEPS activity" and should therefore be 
exempt from the country-by-country reporting requirement” – International Air Transport 
Association, Vol. 2, p. 175 
 “Permitting materiality thresholds will undermine the objective of developing a true picture 
of corporate activities, and prevent accurate reconciliation when necessary. As a result, we 
oppose the introduction of materiality thresholds.” – Global Financial Integrity, Vol. 2, p. 
136 
General  “the proposed new documentation requirement should provide taxpayer sufficient flexibility 
(in particular relation to the key questions raised, e.g. top down or bottom up approach, 
reporting by country or entity, etc.) and respect reasonable materiality thresholds.” – AWV 
Working Group, Vol. 1, p. 72 
Information Usefulness  “…such extensive requirements will lead to an unmanageable volume of information that is 
not easily available…” – The 100 Group, vol. 1, p. 226 
 “Providing greater levels of information could also increase the risk that tax authorities 
misunderstand what is supplied and potentially seek tax in situations which lead to double 
taxation” – Deloitte Transfer Pricing Unit, Vol. 2, p. 18 
Intragroup Transactions  “The reporting of royalties, interest, and services fees, among others, would be quite 
constructive, as it is at times difficult to positively identify certain transactions between 
associated enterprises. If the most frequent types of transactions are listed separately, that 
would greatly contribute to clarity and transparency.” – RSM International, Vol. 3, p. 219 
Language  “Local tax authorities should be required to have the “burden of proof” of why certain 
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documents are essential to the determination of the local entity tax burden prior to 
requesting the translation of the documents…” – Canadian Bankers Association, Vol. 1, p. 
218 
Lodgement date  “We agree that the completion date for the CBCR template should be one year following the 
year end date of the parent company.” - The 100 Group, Vol. 1, p. 230 
Tax  “We do not see that splitting the income tax paid between the country of organisation and 
other countries adds to the risk assessment and suggest that a single figure of tax due is 
reported.” – International Underwriting Association of London, Vol. 2, p. 396 
Taxpayer Costs  “it is likely that the cost of compiling the country-by-country information – which is most 
likely readily available to the MNEs would be a small fraction of the tax planning costs” – 
Ting, A., Vol. 1, p. 67 
 “BSkyB could (in principle) produce a report containing all this information, but to do so 
would require significant further resources in the form of headcount and/ or new systems…” 
– British Sky Broadcasting Group PLC, Vol. 1, p. 197 
Taxpayer Effort  “local companies should not be required to provide any information that they cannot obtain 
through reasonable effort.” – BaseFirma, vol. 1, p. 80 
Tiers  “We believe that the CbC reporting should be prepared as a stand-alone document and not 
be combined with the master file and/or local file.” – Business and Industry Advisory 
Committee to the OECD, Vol. 1, p. 100 
Transfer Pricing Risk Assessment  “The scope of the country-by-country reporting template should be narrowed and modified 
to focus on its intended objective of transfer pricing risk assessment. The template should 
not be used as information gathering instrument for other BEPS action points.” – Ernst & 
Young, Vol. 2, p. 77 
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Chapter 5: Analysis of Implementation 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter commences with a summary of the reporting frameworks discussed 
within the study thus far and any associated justification for a framework’s exclusion 
from further analysis. Detailed consideration is then given to how CbC reports 
should be implemented from a government level perspective. Specifically, the 
proposed implementation method for the TJN CbC model is evaluated in section 
5.4.1, followed by an evaluation of the proposed OECD model in section 5.4.2. The 
results of the critical analysis presented within this chapter find that the completion 
of CbC reports by multinational entities should ideally be administered as part of an 
amended segment reporting accounting standard, specifically IFRS 8 and it’s U.S. 
counterpart ASC 280, as a result of convergence efforts. These findings are based on 
stakeholder theory and pragmatic considerations. 
 
5.2 Comparison and Scope Delimitation 
 
Table 5.1 Part A below represents a summary of the reporting templates introduced 
in chapter two that specifically require CbC information disclosures. Similarly, Table 
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Table 5.1 
Summary of Reporting Frameworks 
Part A: Specific CbC Reporting Templates 
Template Sector Dissemination Compulsory/ Voluntary Template Location External Assurance 






are publicly disclosed. 
Compulsory IFRS 8 Segment 
Reporting  
As part of audited 
financial statements in 
countries where 




OECD (2014) All 
industry 
sectors. 
Available to tax 
administrators only – 
dissemination method 
TBC 
Voluntary Guidelines not 
intended to be legally 
binding. 
Chapter V of the 
Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines 




















companies and then 





Annual report (Form 
SD) with an interactive 
Compulsory for all U.S. 
and foreign companies that 
Section 1504 of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall 
Information not 
required to be audited. 
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SEC (2012) data format is publicly 
filed. The report is 
separate to the 
Exchange Act annual 
report. SEC must make 
a compilation of the 
information available 
online. 
commercially develop oil, 
natural gas, or minerals, 
that are required to file 
annual reports with the 
SEC, irrespective of the 
size of the company or its 
operations.  
 









A separate annual 
report is to be made 
publicly available. 
Compulsory for all limited 
liability companies 
registered in the European 
Economic Area and all 
companies listed on EU 
regulated markets. 
Chapter 10 of the 
Accounting Directive 
and Article 6 of the 
Transparency 
Directive 
As part of the review 
to be completed by 21st 
July 2018, the 
Commission will 
determine, amongst 
other factors, whether 
the report should be 
audited. 
 




Publicly available as an 







institutions & investment 





Financial Services and 
Markets Act (2000) 
Information is subject 
to audit in accordance 
with Directive 
2006/43/EC. 
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PricewaterhouseCoopers 





Information may be 
publicly disclosed via 
financial statements, 
corporate responsibility 
or other reports, PR 
and marketing 




Data is not required to 
be audited. 
 
Part B: Voluntary templates with CbC qualities 
Template Sector Dissemination Compulsory/ Voluntary Template Location External Assurance 






which are made 
publicly available.  
Voluntary & partial 
application available (must 
state where in the report 




Recommended but not 
required to report “in 
accordance” with the 
guidelines 
Integrated Reports  All 
industries 
Reports may be a 
standalone document 
or distinguishable part 





To be confirmed: 
comments on 
assurance requested in 
discussion paper, with 
comments due by 1 
December 2014. 






Aid assists preparers 
produce corporate 
responsibility indi-
cators within annual 
financial statements. 
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The CSR reporting frameworks listed in Part B of Table 5.1 above, being the G4 
Guidelines and Integrated Reporting enable stakeholders to monitor a multinational 
entity’s social, economic, and environmental performance in a similar manner to 
CbC reporting’s assessment function. Whilst both CSR and CbC reporting (the latter 
including both maximalist and minimalist versions) require multinational entities to 
disclose information that would enable stakeholders to determine the extent to which 
CSR obligations have been satisfied, the objectives of CbC reporting, primarily the 
maximalist version, are wider in scope. Furthermore, CbC reporting is generally not 
considered to account for a multinational entity’s environmental impacts, as per 
many forms of CSR reports. Whilst Buhmann’s (2013) findings presented in chapter 
three found evidence of governments strategically utilising CSR to promote the 
implementation of public policy objectives, the unstructured and voluntary nature of 
the G4 Guidelines and integrated reporting are not considered appropriate platforms 
to achieve the objectives of CbC reporting.  
 
Additionally, the Total Tax Contribution framework suggested by 
PricewaterhouseCooper’s (n.d.) as being “for communicating the company’s tax 
position in its full context,” has been excluded from further detailed analysis for 
multiple reasons. First, the voluntary Total Tax Contribution framework may be 
prepared on a group basis rather than on an individual country-basis 
(PricewaterhouseCooper, 2014b). Second, limited distinction is made between the 
payment of individually specific taxes, thereby reducing the usefulness of the 
information to users (PricewaterhouseCooper, 2014b). Third, accounting reference 
data is not required (such as profits), thus significantly limiting the credibility of any 
disclosures made under the Total Tax Contribution framework 
(PricewaterhouseCooper, 2014b). 
 
5.3 Mandatory or Voluntary 
To achieve public policy objectives, such as decreasing BEPS and ensuring fair 
employment practices, CbC reporting should theoretically be implemented as a form 
of mandatory law or regulation. As a specific example, mandatory CbC reporting 
may be an ideal method for company directors in the UK to communicate their 
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adherence to their legislative duty to consider the interests of a broad stakeholder 
group in promoting the success of their company. By defining the content of CbC 
reporting and mandating the frequency and location of disclosure by multinational 
entities, comparable reports are likely to be produced that enable societal actors to 
assess and react to a multinational entity’s conduct. A voluntary CbC reporting 
framework may potentially result in poor multinational entity participation levels, in 
addition to general and uninformative disclosures resulting in decreased levels of 
information comparability on an internal (i.e. comparisons from year to year) and 
external basis (comparisons of different multinational entities). This assumption is 
supported by the aforementioned research findings of Kolk (2008), van Staden and 
Wild (2013) and Ting (2014a). Although the results of Kolk (2008) and van Staden 
and Wild (2013) are in relation to CSR and Integrated Reports, their findings suggest 
that when discretion is offered to multinational entities in regards to the content and 
format of information to be disclosed as part of a reporting framework, the resultant 
disclosures may lack clarity, consistency and comparability. Ting (2014a) 
highlighted similar findings within a CbC reporting context for Vodaphone’s 
inadequate voluntary CbC reporting disclosures, which included taxation amounts 
aggregated into uninformative and non-transparent groupings. 
 
To prevent this adverse impact on information usefulness, it is suggested within this 
thesis that it be mandatory for multinational entities to report in accordance with the 
standardised CbC reporting template as developed within this study. 
 
5.4 Descriptive Comparison of Location and Dissemination Requirements 
5.4.1 TJN CbC Reporting 
Murphy’s version of CbC reporting would “ideally [be] required by an International 
Financial Reporting Standard, but failing that by international regulation” (Murphy, 
2012b, para. 7). Therefore, CbC reporting disclosures would form part of the annual 
audited financial report and are stated to not be applicable for interim statements 
(Murphy, 2009). In an attempt to expand the geographical disclosure requirements of 
the segment reporting standard applicable at the time, being IAS 14, Global Witness, 
with the assistance of Richard Murphy, submitted a report to the IASB in 2005. 
Although the IASB’s conditional (at the time) decision to adopt reporting 
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requirements similar to those under SFAS 131 is noted, Global Witness (2005, p. 1) 
suggests a broad group of stakeholder needs could be met through an extension of 
existing segment or other reporting on the following: 
 employment issues 
 material subsidiaries 
 interest paid 
 gross and net assets 
 deferred tax liabilities. 
 
Additionally, the report suggests new or extended segment disclosure to be required 
concerning the following: 
 turnover; 
 third-party expenses; 
 pre-tax profit; 
 tax expense; 
 tax actually paid; 
 tax liabilities. 
(Global Witness, 2005, p. 1) 
 
The extension of segment reporting is premised on the suggestion that the above 
information is already reflected in best practice, however, current accounting 
standards regulate regional rather than national geographic disclosures (Global 
Witness, 2005). The Global Witness report identifies three groups that use the 
financial accounts prepared by a multinational entity in accordance with IFRS. The 
first group, professional providers of capital, whom provide equity share capital 
and/or loans, are seen as distinct from other users of financial statements due to their 
tendency to have direct access to management of the corporations in which they 
invest and thereby an ability to directly request information (Global Witness, 2005). 
The second group consists of capital providers who make their own, independent 
investment decisions, whilst the third group is much broader, and consists of all other 
stakeholders of the company (Global Witness, 2005). Global Witness (2005) 
expressed their belief that CbC reporting should be contained within an IFRS on 
segment reporting as it would, in their opinion, create a more level playing field 
 98 Chapter 5: Analysis of Implementation 
between the aforementioned three user groups, which may be of specific benefit to 
stakeholders in developing countries. 
 
In addition to the stakeholder perspective suggested by Global Witness, Murphy’s 
key argument for the inclusion of CbC reporting within IFRS is based on CbC 
reporting data being accounting information, and specifically not CSR information 
(Murphy, 2012a). During a 2012 speech on CbC reporting Murphy stated “this is not 
about voluntary disclosure. It has to be mandatory, nothing less will do. And that 
means country-by-country reporting is not about corporate social responsibility…” 
(Murphy, 2012b, para. 21).  
 
In summary, the TJN CbC reporting model, as developed by Murphy, is proposed to 
be implemented as part of the existing accounting standard, IFRS 8 Operating 
Segments due to the associated potential to disseminate information to a broad group 
of stakeholders.  
 
5.4.2 OECD CbC Template 
This chapter section evaluates the information dissemination mechanisms and 
intended recipients related to the OECD CbC Template, which is based on the most 
recent publication available, being the 2014 Deliverable report released on 16 
September 2014. Although agreed upon, the CbC template has not been formally 
finalised and may be impacted by decisions made as part of the 2015 deliverables 
(OECD, 2014a). 
 
The OECD’s revision of Chapter V of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which 
includes the addition of a CbC report, is aimed to provide tax administrations with 
more focused and useful information to undertake transfer pricing risk assessments 
and audits (OECD, 2014a). The development of a CbC reporting framework is 
limited to a tax administration perspective as “the overarching consideration in 
developing such rules is to balance the usefulness of data to tax administrations for 
risk assessment and other purposes with any increased compliance burdens placed on 
taxpayers” (OECD, 2014c, p. 2). User groups other than tax administrations are not 
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considered in the OECD’s discussion draft or 2014 deliverable publications, with the 
CbC report only to be made available to tax administrations. 
 
Notably, the OECD/ G20 project currently has not reached consensus regarding the 
dissemination process for the CbC report (and the master file) and subsequently the 
mechanisms for making information available to tax administrations in each country 
(OECD, 2014a).  
 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter section and displayed in Table 5.1 above, the 
TJN’s CbC reporting is intended to be made available to the public via a 
multinational entity’s financial statements, whilst the OECD’s proposal requires 
direct disclosure to tax administrators only.  
 
5.5 Critical Analysis of Public vs. Confidential Disclosure 
This section critically examines the competing arguments for publicly available CbC 
disclosures vs. confidential disclosure to tax administrations. References to 
percentages of comment letter responses that express a particular idea have been 
summarised in Table 5.2 below. 
 
Table 5.2 
Findings for Coded Responses to OECD Discussion Draft 






Dissemination Headquarter  20 52.63% 66.67% 
Local affiliates 4 10.53% 13.33% 
Unspecified 6 15.79% 30.00% 
Tax Administrations 30 78.95  
Public 6 15.79%  
Total in sample that 
refer to dissemination  
36 94.74%  
No specific comment 2 5.26%  
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Confidentiality Commercially 
Sensitive 
26 68.42%  
Not commercially 
sensitive 
5 13.16%  
Total in sample that 
refer to confidentiality  
31 81.58%  
No specific comment 7 18.42%  
Objective of 
CbC reporting 
Broad objective (i.e. 
transparency and 
accountability) 
10 26.32%  
Specified 7 18.42% 70.00% 
Unspecified 3 7.89% 30.00% 
Transfer Pricing Risk 
Assessment 









3 7.89% 12.50% 
Total in sample that 
refer to objective(s) 
34 89.47%  
 No comment 4 10.53%  
 
 
As displayed in Table 5.2 above, approximately 79% of respondents were in favour 
of disseminating the CbC reports directly to tax administrations, with two thirds of 
those respondents requesting that it be filed in the parent company’s home country 
and shared with local tax authorities through tax treaty provisions and information 
exchange agreements. Such requests were principally founded on concerns for the 
protection of confidential information. The observed majority consensus amongst 
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multinational entities, accountancy and advisory firms and several industry 
representatives is illustrated in the following comment letter excerpts: 
 
Global companies should deliver the CBCR to the headquarter country tax 
authorities and if necessary shared with other countries under a treaty 
information exchange provision. It is fundamental that the information shared 
with the tax authorities is subject to the confidentiality protections of the 
parent jurisdiction due to the sensitivity of such information. 
(BASF The Chemical Company, multinational entity, vol. 1, p. 223) 
 
Our preferred option is filing of the CBCR template in the parent company’s 
jurisdiction and sharing under treaty information exchange provisions. We 
have concerns about confidentiality if the template is filed locally by all 
member entities. 
(The 100 Group, industry representative, vol. 1, p. 237) 
 
The Master File and CBC report should be filed with the [multinational 
entity’s] parent’s home tax administration, to be shared with other 
jurisdictions (when requested) only under existing bilateral tax treaty 
provisions or Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) to guarantee 
confidentiality.  
(Ibec, industry representative, vol. 2, p. 279) 
 
Information should be filed only with the parent company’s home tax 
authority and shared on request under treaty information exchange 
provisions, or, in the absence of an applicable treaty, under strong 
confidentiality provisions. 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers Global, accountancy & advisory firm, vol. 3, p. 138) 
 
The above comments were in contrast to the original recommendation contained 
within the OECD Discussion Draft, being that multinational entities should complete 
the master file (and therefore CbC reporting template) under the direction of the 
parent company and then it be shared by local affiliates directly with the taxation 
authorities of individual countries, with treaty exchange of information mechanisms 
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only utilised upon lack of prompt compliance by local affiliates (OECD, 2014c). The 
comment letters showed limited support for this approach (approximately 13% of the 
responses suggesting disclosures to tax administrations), however recognition of its 
associated merits was evidenced in the following statements: 
 
In the first instance transfer pricing documentation should be sought from the 
local taxpayer by tax authorities. Information sharing provisions tend to be 
lengthier and should be used only when necessary. 
(BDO, accountancy & advisory firm, vol. 1, p. 94) 
 
We strongly support the current draft’s proposal for authorities to be able to 
obtain the master file and CbC Report directly from local affiliates. This 
reflects the reality of multinational enterprises under common and often 
central control; the legitimate expectations and benefits of desirable 
cooperative compliance, in which transparency is provided in exchange for 
certainty; and the significant practical obstacles often faced by tax authorities 
in non-headquarter countries from accessing information about transactions 
with related parties outside their jurisdiction. 
(BEPS Monitoring Group, civil society group, vol. 1, p. 172) 
 
Despite the variance in opinions concerning how information should be shared 
between tax administrators in different countries, approximately 79% of sampled 
respondents recommended that CbC information be disclosed solely to tax 
administrators and not the general public. This may partially be due to the Discussion 
Draft not considering general public disclosure of the CbC report as a potential 
option, but rather specifying that the release of multinational entities’ trade secrets, 
scientific secrets, or other forms of confidential information must be strictly avoided 
(OECD, 2014c). Several respondents indicated their specific opposition to making 
CbC reports available to the public, such as the following:  
 
The information will find its way to the public where it will be subject to 
misinterpretation and abuse for public campaigns.  
(International Chamber of Commerce, professional membership, vol. 2, p. 306) 
 
Monique Longhorn  
Chapter 5: Analysis of Implementation 103 
There should be no question of this kind of reporting [CbC] entering the 
public domain… 
(BDO, accountancy & advisory firm, vol. 1, p. 94) 
 
Taxpayers need complete certainty and confidence that there will be no 
public disclosure of such information. 
(Rio Tinto, multinational entity, vol. 3, p. 182) 
 
Irrespective of the variance evident in the respondent quotations included within this 
chapter thus far, they all share a higher-order category, being “control.” That is, 
given the opportunity, multinational entities, their industry representatives and their 
advisory firms, generally want to control what information is disclosed and who has 
access to it. To determine the appropriate level of control that should be exerted over 
the dissemination of CbC data, this section evaluates the following distribution 
options (as identified in comment letters) against the theoretical framework presented 
in chapter three and in light of relevant practical considerations: 
 Disclosure to tax administrator(s) in the parent company’s home country, 
with information provided to local tax authorities via tax treaties and 
information sharing provisions; 
 Preparation of the CbC report by the parent company and direct sharing by 
local affiliates with the tax administrator in their jurisdiction; 
 General public disclosure of CbC reports. 
 
Analysis of the comment letters revealed that respondents associated disclosure to 
multiple local tax administrators, in contrast to filing with the parent country, with an 
increased compliance effort, an enhanced potential for breaches of confidentiality 
and more efficient access for tax administrators to information. Momentarily setting 
aside consideration of compliance efforts, the concerns for information 
confidentiality are first evaluated. As visible in Table 5.2 above, of the 31 comment 
letters that specifically discussed the confidentiality of CbC data (and not merely in 
relation to the Master File), 26 respondents (approximately 68%) identified data to be 
disclosed within the CbC template as being commercially sensitive data that must be 
disclosed and used in accordance with strict confidentiality constraints. Whilst many 
sampled respondents referenced the commercially sensitive nature of CbC data as 
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justification for mandating non-public disclosure, very few examined responses 
specifically identified which disclosure requirements did or did not fall within this 
category, excluding the Business and Industry Advisory Committee, the 100 Group, 
and select others, whom noted total employee expense and numbers, royalties and 
service fees. In contrast, approximately 13% of respondents entirely dismissed 
claims of CbC data requiring confidentiality constraints: 
 
We do not believe any of the information being considered and proposed for 
inclusion in the CbC report is sensitive enough to justify being treated as 
confidential… 
(Christian Aid, civil society group, vol. 1, p. 259) 
 
We understand the need of enterprises to keep certain types of information 
confidential to ensure their ability to operate in a competitive market, we do 
not find that any of the information mentioned in the Discussion Draft on 
Transfer Pricing Documentation and CbC Reporting falls within this category 
of information. 
(Eurodad, civil society group, vol. 2, p. 74) 
 
Therefore, one may view the confidentiality concerns expressed by respondents as 
existing along a continuum, whereby on one end CbC data required for the OECD 
template is all of a sensitive nature thereby requiring strict confidentiality, whilst at 
the other end, none of it is. As noted in the UN Guidance on Corporate 
Responsibility Indicators (2008), confidentiality is of pragmatic significance, 
however to address stakeholder needs materiality may take precedence over concerns 
for commercial confidentiality. A point of significant variance between the OECD’s 
and the TJN’s respective CbC reporting templates is those recognised as legitimate 
stakeholders and consequently, whose needs should be satisfied through the 
completion and provision of a CbC report.  
 
From a stakeholder theory perspective, CbC reports represent information capable of 
influencing the decision making process of stakeholders. Public disclosure of CbC 
reports, as required under the TJN’s proposal would benefit the normative 
stakeholders as identified in chapter three and summarised below: 
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 Capital providers, including investors and financial institutions; 
 Employees 
 Customers & suppliers 
 Local communities 
 Regulators & taxation administrations 
 Trade unions 
 Civil society organisations 
 
Publishing CbC data to the public is generally expected to benefit the above 
stakeholders through the provision of relevant information beyond what is currently 
available for evaluation and general risk assessment purposes. Direct disclosure to 
tax administrators seemingly ignores the legitimate claims to information of the 
above stakeholder groups, with the exception of tax administrations, and therefore 
fails to balance stakeholder interests as prescribed under stakeholder theory. A 
meritocratic stakeholder theory approach to CbC reporting would suggest public 
disclosure of CbC data that is structured to primarily benefit investors, and 
additionally (but to a lesser extent) employees, local communities, suppliers, 
customers, regulators and tax administrators. 
 
The UN Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing (2013, p. 3) states “most non-OECD 
countries do not have the extensive treaty networks that OECD countries have, and 
will often have to rely upon taxpayers providing information for this reason.” 
Therefore, the public disclosure of CbC reports would assist to overcome practical 
inefficiencies experienced by developing countries in sourcing information through 
information exchange provisions and treaties, as further suggested in the below 
statements: 
 
Many developing countries are not currently party to information exchange 
agreements. While it is to be hoped that this will change it is the current 
reality and so many developing countries would be left with no effective 
recourse to the information in the short to medium term. 
(Christian Aid, civil society group, vol. 1, p. 260) 
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If transnational companies only report their activities to their national tax 
authorities, developing countries will have to rely on international tax 
cooperation, which is still limited and heavy for their administrations, to 
detect BEPS. International cooperation through automatic information 
exchange risks not working for them as they’ll most likely be excluded from 
this system at the beginning. It will therefore increase inequalities between 
countries and facilitate aggressive tax practices at the expense of the poorest 
states. 
(Oxfam, civil society group, vol. 3, p. 93) 
 
The suggestion that tax administrations must request information through 
information exchange provisions may not only disadvantage developing countries 
due to non-membership status, as discussed above, but also tax administrations in 
general, as it requires tax administrations to request information which is intended to 
assess risk and inform further requests for information. Christian Aid, below, 
highlights this counter-intuitive notion: 
 
To make it subject to information on request would appear to be counter to 
the purpose of the report. Requests for information are generally only made 
once risk has been identified. To make a risk identification tool subject to the 
request procedure would therefore appear the wrong way round and introduce 
an unnecessary administrative burden. 
(vol. 1, p. 259)  
 
Publicly available CbC reports may discourage multinational entities from engaging 
in activities that result in BEPS by increasing the transparency regarding their 
operations, enabling information users to hold corporations accountable for their 
actions. These transparency and accountability functions were originally suggested 
by Murphy (2009; 2012) as a key objective for CbC reports, and have been further 
recognised in approximately 26% of total comment letters included in the sample 
(see Table 5.2 above), such as Oxfam’s response, stated below: 
 
Negative corporate behaviours eroding tax bases will change only if 
companies know that the public and other watchdog actors like 
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parliamentarians, academics, and the media are monitoring their activities and 
whether they pay their taxes or not.  
(vol. 3, p. 93) 
 
The following statement made by the Director of the OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy 
and Administration offers an interesting perspective as to the availability and 
dissemination of CbC reports (emphasis added): 
 
A number of observers, the NGOs in particular, say it should be transparent 
to the whole world. What we can achieve is getting this information to the tax 
administrations. There is nothing stricter than secrecy for tax 
administrations…As long as the information would remain within the tax 
administrations, I am confident that we can reach consensus to streamline the 
information. 
(House of Lords, 2013, p. 29) 
 
Institutional theory offers an alternative perspective to evaluate the issue of recipients 
of CbC reports, as the limitations placed on what the OECD can achieve regarding 
the policy guidelines that it develops may be traced to the organisation’s structure 
and its decision making process, which will now be briefly explored. 
 
The OECD is an intergovernmental organisation with 34 member countries 
responsible for creating and promoting international policy and knowledge networks 
that enhance economic growth and financial stability (OECD, 2014d). The OECD 
Council, consisting of one representative per member country, has the overall 
decision-making power, which is determined on a consensus basis (OECD, 2014d). 
The relations and activities undertaken between member countries and between 
member countries and the staff of the OECD, the Secretariat, are conducted through 
the OECD Committees (OECD, 2014d). For committees below the level of the 
Council and its standing committee, decisions are made in accordance with Article 6 
of the Convention, which mandates “mutual agreement” (Carroll & Kellow, 2011, p. 
23). However, this does not require a unanimous vote by all members but rather by 
voting members, thereby enabling other members to abstain (Carroll & Kellow, 
2011). This need for consensus for decisions regarding CbC reporting is evident in 
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many OECD publications, the most recent example being the current indecision 
regarding the most ideal dissemination method for the OECD’s CbC reports.  
 
Despite its lack of formal powers, “OECD processes contribute to the construction of 
a common western liberal identity with clear political consequences, particularly in 
encouraging the adoption of policies that reflect a distinct ideological perspective and 
the interests of distinct groups in society” (Porter & Webb, 2007, p. 2). The OECD’s 
processes (i.e. development and promotion of best practices and model solutions) 
may therefore be deemed to be an example of normative isomorphic pressure exerted 
on member states (Pierre, 2013). However, as these “best practice” models are 
determined on a consensus basis in a highly political context, the OECD’s power is 
limited to what its members believe to be in their interests.  
 
The OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs is the steering body for the BEPS Project, 
which currently unites 44 countries to undertake work on the project on an “equal 
footing,” including all OECD member countries and eight BEPS Associates (non-
member and accession countries: Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, India, 
Indonesia, Latvia, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa) (OECD, 2014b, p. 4). Of 
these participating countries, the United States contributes almost 22% of the 
OECD’s operating budget, which for 2014 is EUR 357 million, and is therefore the 
largest contributing member country, followed by Japan (OECD, 2014d). To achieve 
consensus, Carroll and Kellow (2011, p. 23) identify the general decision making 
processes enacted by the OECD’s Committees as occurring in three stages, “which 
constitute the very core of OECD politics.” The first pre-committee meeting stage 
involves discussions between members and national level agencies to determine the 
preferred decision, and is followed by the second stage of delegates consulting the 
OECD on the preferred decision and identifying the associated opinions of other 
members, including the major groupings and influential members, being the United 
States, Japan, Germany, the UK and France (Carroll & Kellow, 2011). The third 
stage is the production of an “acceptable compromise,” and potentially an initial 
programme design, that aims to form a decision that will achieve the stated 
objectives via a “negotiation and bargaining process” (Carroll & Kellow, 2011, p. 
24). 
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The United States, as the largest contributor to the OECD’s budget, exerts significant 
influence in the Committee’s decision making processes. A recent study revealed 
that despite the widely publicised political intent of the Government of the United 
States to combat corporate tax avoidance, as further reinforced through their BEPS 
project membership, “many U.S politicians are willing to openly and publicly 
support their [multinational entities] in the avoidance of not only foreign income tax, 
but also U.S income tax” (Ting, 2014b). The interests of multinational businesses are 
further incorporated into the OECD’s policy design process through the provision for 
participation by peak business and labour interests, such as Business and Industry 
Advisory Committee and the Trade Union Advisory Committee, both of which 
submitted comments during the Discussion Draft period.  
 
In summary, this section evaluated the themes relating to dissemination options for 
CbC data as observed in the coded comment letters. From this analysis, it was 
revealed that the majority of respondents were in favour of direct disclosure to tax 
administrations in the headquartered country, in contrast to the local country filing 
option as originally suggested by the OECD. This respondent group generally 
requested information to be shared via tax treaties and exchange agreements. 
Respondent letters in favour of public disclosure appeared to be in the minority, 
however, a consensus was evident amongst such respondents regarding the non-
confidential nature of CbC data. 
 
Subsequently, a stakeholder theory perspective was applied to the dissemination 
issue, with public disclosure of CbC reports determined to satisfy the normative 
stakeholders identified within the theoretical framework in chapter three. 
Furthermore, public disclosure was suggested to overcome the difficulties 
experienced by developing countries in sourcing information via exchange 
provisions, which was an issue identified in the coded comment letters and in the UN 
Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing (2008).  
 
Finally, due to the significant focus this thesis applies to the OECD CbC template, 
the OECD’s policy development process was examined from an institutional 
perspective. The consensus-based nature of the OECD’s decision-making process, 
which is set within a highly political context, suggests the OECD’s power is limited 
 110 Chapter 5: Analysis of Implementation 
to the interests promoted by its member countries. Therefore, the OECD’s current 
recommendation that the CbC template be provided to tax administrations and not 
the general public may be more representative of the interests of societal groups 
rather than best practice. 
 
The analysis conducted within this chapter partially addresses RQ2, which 
considered how a standardised CbC reporting model should be implemented. 
Specifically, it is found that public disclosure of CbC reports is the most appropriate 
dissemination method. Although the analysis within this chapter revealed that direct 
disclosure by local affiliates would be more efficient for tax administrations 
(especially those in developing countries) in comparison to only reporting to the head 
quartered national tax authority, these alternate dissemination methods fail to 
recognise and address the needs of other stakeholders.  
 
The findings within this section are based on the notion that public disclosure of the 
CbC report would absolve the issues associated with sharing information between tax 
administrators whilst concurrently ensuring the needs of a broader stakeholder group 
are satisfied. As different stakeholders (e.g. tax administrators and investors) can use 
the same CbC data to meet their varying evaluation and assessment needs, 
multinational entities would not be required to adjust the report or submit multiple 
filings. Ernst & Young (vol. 2, p. 83) stated that “it would be unreasonably 
burdensome for [multinational entity] groups to be required to deliver a template to 
each country where the group has entities. Such an approach could require the 
taxpayer to fill out multiple different versions of the template if countries implement 
their own versions of the template.” This enhanced compliance burden for 
multinational entities could be realised if the CbC template remains as an amendment 
to transfer pricing documentation requirements, as OECD member countries and 
potentially non-member developing countries are encouraged to utilise the template 
as guidance to review and amend their country’s laws and regulations, therefore 
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5.6 Critical Analysis of Location of Reporting Requirements 
 
The analysis within the above section found that, from a stakeholder theory 
perspective and in consideration of pragmatic issues faced by developing countries, 
CbC reports should be made available to the public, and not merely restricted to use 
by tax administrations. To complement this finding, this section evaluates the most 
ideal information distribution mechanism to achieve public disclosure of CbC 
information by multinational entities. As direct disclosure to tax administrators is not 
a feasible option from a stakeholder theory perspective, it is not considered in any 
further detail. This section explores two alternative dissemination methods that 
provide public access to CbC reports: new international regulations contained within 
Articles 7 and 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, and the primary proposal 
under consideration by civil society groups, being an amendment to the international 
accounting standard on segment reporting (i.e. IFRS 8 Operating Segments). 
 
The Model Tax Convention provides a basis for international treaties to determine 
taxations rights for income and capital across countries, whilst avoiding double 
taxation. Article 7 states the profits of a multinational entity of a contracting state are 
taxable only within that specific state unless the corporation is operating in other 
states with permanent establishments (OECD, 2011a). Where the latter occurs, the 
profits attributable to each state with a permanent establishment are determined 
based on an independent, separate entity approach (OECD, 2011a). Where profits 
have been attributed to a permanent establishment and taxes charged accordingly, the 
other states(s) are expected to eliminate double taxation of these profits to the 
necessary extent (OECD, 2011a). Consultation between the relevant authorities in 
each state should occur where necessary to determine this profit adjustment. Article 9 
of the Model Tax Convention determines the taxing rights for associated enterprises, 
similarly taking an independent entity approach to profit allocations between 
countries (OECD, 2011a). The inclusion of CbC reporting requirements within 
articles 7 and 9 of the Model Tax Convention would enable a broader risk 
assessment function to be utilised in comparison to locating such requirements within 
chapter 5 of the Transfer Pricing Documentation guidance. CbC reporting 
requirements within the Model Tax Convention would assist the determination of 
profit allocations and associated taxation rights amongst countries. The objectives of 
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the Model Tax Convention and CbC reporting are congruent from a taxation 
perspective as both aim to ensure taxes are paid where the economic activity occurs. 
However, as the previous analysis of associated literature and past events revealed, 
comprehensive CbC reporting does not place sole emphasis on taxation in 
determining its potential benefits, but instead promotes a broader objective of the 
development of an environment of financial transparency and integrity.  
 
The Model Tax Convention has the potential to influence the reporting requirements 
of many member countries and non-member countries that utilise it as guidance. 
However, the Model Tax Convention is a basis for international treaties that 
generally govern information exchange provisions between tax administrators and 
may therefore be an insufficient means to implement mandatory public disclosure of 
CbC reports. Furthermore, there is potential for countries to require varying forms of 
CbC reports due to different interpretations of the Convention’s guidelines, which 
may result in increased compliance costs for multinational entities and substantially 
decreased comparability between the reports prepared by different multinational 
entities. The Model Tax Convention is therefore not deemed to be an ideal location 
to include CbC reporting requirements. 
 
However, CbC reporting data is still beneficial from a transfer pricing perspective. 
To secure the appropriate tax base in each jurisdiction and to avoid double taxation, 
OECD member states continue to endorse the arm’s length principle as contained in 
Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. The arm’s length principle governs 
the evaluation of transfer prices amongst associated enterprises by adjusting profits 
by reference to the conditions that would have been obtained between independent 
enterprises in comparable transactions under comparable circumstances (i.e. in 
“comparable uncontrolled transactions”) (OECD, 2010d). Transfer prices are the 
prices at which physical goods, intangible property and/ or services are transferred 
between associated enterprises (OECD, 2010d). The separate entity approach, which 
treats members of a multinational group as if they were independent entities, focuses 
on the nature of intragroup transactions and how they compare to conditions 
obtainable in comparable uncontrolled transactions. The OECD states this 
comparability analysis “is at the heart of the application of the arm’s length 
principle” (OECD, 2010d, p. 33).  
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However, the difficulty in sourcing the appropriate data for comparable uncontrolled 
transactions has been highlighted by Murphy (2012a) who suggests that information 
on local companies is rarely publicly available, and any information in exception to 
this is likely from the subsidiaries of multinational entities. This would imply that the 
subsidiary information is controlled data as it has been subjected to the same rules on 
arm’s length transfer pricing as the parent company that is seeking to use it to 
establish an independent, arm’s length price. This problem is further conflated when 
revenue source cannot be distinguished between third-party and intra-firm, as is the 
current situation for the majority of financial statements prepared under IFRS 
(Murphy, 2012a). Although CbC reporting is not suggested to overcome inherit 
deficiencies in the OECD’s arm’s length pricing principle, it is suggested to improve 
the reliability of data used for transfer pricing comparables via disclosures of 
purchases and sales distinguished according to third party and intragroup (Murphy, 
2012a). Further consideration is now provided concerning the alternative option for 
locating CbC reporting requirements, being an amendment of IFRS 8 Segment 
Reporting. 
 
A review of the literature concerning IFRS 8 Operating Segments and the standard it 
is based upon, ASC 280 Segment Reporting, revealed corporations continue to 
aggregate entity-wide disclosures into broad geographical groupings as facilitated by 
materiality guidelines present in both standards. Although it was generally found that 
both IFRS 8 and ASC 280 resulted in increased disclosure of geographic segments 
and country-level disclosures in comparison to their respective predecessors, the 
ability afforded to multinational entities to aggregate geographic disclosures, which 
studies demonstrate multinational entities do in fact utilise, reduces the usefulness of 
information for multiple stakeholder groups. The replacement of the geographic 
disclosure requirements within IFRS 8 with a CbC reporting requirement may 
remedy these broad geographic groupings due to the nature (and namesake) of CbC 
reporting mandating disclosure for the consolidated operations of a multinational 
entity’s subsidiaries on an individual country basis. However, the inclusion of CbC 
reporting requirements within IFRS 8 has been refuted by the IASB in the past, as 
evaluated from a political economy perspective by Gallhofer and Haslam (2007) and 
Wojcik (2012a), and discussed in further detail below.  
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In 2006, the IASB held a public consultation period for the development of IFRS 8, 
which provided the occasion for civil society to lobby for the provision of a CbC 
reporting requirement within the international accounting standards. Founding 
members of the PWYP coalition in conjunction with Richard Murphy of the TJN 
submitted a proposal based on a comprehensive version of CbC reporting (Global 
Witness, 2005). The IASB revealed, via a press release, that CbC disclosure 
requirements within IFRS 8 would not be suitable on the basis that “the IFRS was 
developed as a short-term convergence project” and further stated that CbC reporting 
would be addressed by other international bodies (IFRS Foundation, 2006a). 
 
The IASB stance on the non-inclusion of CbC reporting data within IFRS, and 
consequently the financial statements of multinational entities, may be traced to their 
conceptual framework, which states: 
 
The objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide financial 
information about the reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential 
investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions about providing 
resources to the entity  
(IASB, 2010, para. OB1) 
 
Other parties, such as regulators and members of the public other than 
investors, lenders and other creditors, may also find general purpose financial 
reports useful. However, those reports are not primarily directed to these 
other groups. 
(IASB, 2010, para. OB10) 
 
The above statements illustrate that the IASB believes the primary users of 
multinational entities’ financial statements are those engaged in financial markets 
and further implies the interests of the general public (i.e. customers; employees and 
suppliers that are not engaged in the financial market) and regulating bodies 
(including tax and other regulatory authorities) are not of relevant concern in the 
development and use of IFRS. The IASB’s opinion aligns with that of certain 
regulatory bodies, such as the French and British official accounting setters, with the 
Monique Longhorn  
Chapter 5: Analysis of Implementation 115 
latter expressing their support of a maximalist CbC reporting regime but one that is 
implemented externally to IFRS and financial statements (Lesage & Kacar, 2013). 
Interestingly, a disparity exists between the IASB and its parent body, the IFRS 
Foundation (prior to 2010 known as the Accounting Standards Committee 
Foundation). This discrepancy is evident in the user group defined within the first 
objective of the IFRS Foundation constitution (emphasis added): 
 
“to develop, in the public interest, a single set of high quality, 
understandable, enforceable and globally accepted financial reporting 
standards based upon clearly articulated principles. These standards should 
require high quality, transparent and comparable information in financial 
statements and other financial reporting to help investors, other participants 
in the world’s capital markets and other users of financial information make 
economic decisions.” 
(IFRS Foundation, 2013a, p. 5) 
 
As the above statement illustrates, the objectives of the IFRS Foundation cater to a 
broader range of financial statement users in comparison to the IASB’s focus on 
users engaged in the capital market. Similar to the IFRS Foundation, a broad scope 
of users of financial statements were also recognised as early as 1975 in the UK’s 
Accounting Standards Steering Committee’s Corporate Report, which encompassed 
the following users: 
 The equity investor group 
 The loan creditor group 
 The analyst-advisor group (in reference to the above two groups) 
 The business contact group 
 Employees 
 The government 
 The public 
 
Therefore, whilst the IASB recognises that regulators and members of the public may 
find the financial statements of multinational entities’ useful, it is suggested that 
financial statements are not designed nor specifically intended for their benefit but 
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rather for the benefit and use of capital providers and consequently disclosures 
should be limited to those perceived to be relevant to this latter group. The IASB’s 
decision to exclude CbC data from IFRS 8 suggests they either consider it to not be 
of use to providers of capital potentially due to the CSR qualities they have attributed 
to CbC data, or alternatively, too difficult to implement given the “short-term” nature 
of IFRS-GAAP convergence efforts. From a stakeholder theory perspective, this 
thesis questions the IASB’s stance on the objective of financial statements and the 
associated exclusion of CbC reporting requirements. In accordance with stakeholder 
theory, information being a fundamental good capable of influencing decisions, 
should be distributed amongst all legitimate stakeholders, whereby a stakeholder is 
defined as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement 
of the organisation’s objectives” (Freeman et al. 2010, p. 209). Whilst providers of 
capital evidently fit within this definition, so do many other financial statement user 
groups such as customers, suppliers, regulators and the local host country 
community. Therefore, it is suggested CbC information be designed for and 
distributed to all of these relevant stakeholder groups. The IASB’s limited 
recognition of legitimate stakeholders is further highlighted by the fact that its parent 
body, the IFRS Foundation, suggests the development of financial reporting should 
be in the public interest and specifically recognises and supports the claims of 
investors and other users of financial information. Not only does the UK’s 
Accounting Standards Steering Committee’s Corporate Report similarly 
acknowledge the broad group of stakeholders mentioned above, but it further 
suggests that the financial statements of an entity should enable these stakeholders to 
assess the following items: 
 The performance of the entity 
 The economic stability of the entity 
 The liquidity of the entity 
 The capacity of the entity to make future reallocations of its resources for 
either economic or social purposes of both 
 The entity’s future estimated prospects 
 The performance of individual companies within a group 
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 The economic function and performance of the entity in relation to society 
and the national interest, and the social costs and benefits attributable to the 
entity 
 The entity’s compliance with taxation regulations, company law, contractual 
and other legal obligations and requirements 
 The entity’s business and products 
 The ownership and control of the entity 
(Accounting Standards Steering Committee, 1975) 
 
The IASB’s implicit suggestion that the needs, such as those identified above, of a 
broader stakeholder network should not be considered in the development of IFRS 
may be to oversimplify the purpose and potential of accounting information to 
inform users’ decisions, whereby users are determined in accordance with 
stakeholder theory and are equivalent to those identified by the IFRS Foundation and 
UK Accounting Standards Steering Committee. Although the suggestion made in 
2006 by the IASB that CbC proposals be addressed by other international bodies has 
been realised in the form of the OECD’s CbC template, it disregards the accounting 
nature of the disclosures to be made under CbC reporting requirements. Alternatively 
stated, it would appear reasonable for an international accounting standard setting 
body, such as the IASB, to oversee the development and implementation of a 
reporting proposal concerning the disaggregation of multinational entities’ 
accounting performance figures on a per country basis. This notion appears to be 
supported by a statement made by Murphy, being “there is no other way to supply 
country-by-country reporting data but by including it in the general purpose financial 
reports of multinational corporations” (Murphy, 2012a, p. 49). Murphy’s opinion is 
founded on the basis that data generated for CbC reporting is accounting information 
that meets the needs of regulating bodies that use financial statements (Murphy, 
2012a). Following the above discussion that identifies the stakeholders that should be 
recognised in the development and use of IFRS, it is now considered how locating 
CbC reporting within IFRS may benefit these stakeholders. 
 
The widespread use of IFRS for the preparation of financial reports is indicative of 
the Framework being an efficient means to distribute information to the public. 
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Although the convergence of IFRS with U.S GAAP is an ongoing project likely to 
extend into the foreseeable future, the substantial similarities between IFRS 8 
Segment Reporting and ASC 280 Segment Reporting may enable comparable 
standards to be created following an efficient amendment process to include CbC 
requirements. This would enhance the comparability of the financial statements of 
multinational entities subject to U.S GAAP, which would encompass numerous 
economically significant corporate groups. 
 
The fundamental qualities the IASB’s conceptual framework highlights for financial 
information to be deemed useful is that it must be relevant and faithfully represent 
what it purports to represent, whereby this usefulness may be further enhanced if 
information is comparable, verifiable, timely and understandable (IASB, 2010).  
 
As already discussed throughout this study, CbC reporting is expected to enable a 
broad stakeholder user group to make more informed decisions regarding their 
relationship (existing or potential) with a multinational entity. Therefore, CbC 
reporting may be considered relevant information as it possesses the potential to 
influence the opinions or decisions of users. In accordance with the relevance and 
materiality quality characteristics proposed by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (2008), CbC data may be considered relevant as it is likely 
to facilitate users’ assessments of past, present or future events and may assist to 
confirm or amend prior assessments. 
 
Faithful representation is associated with the reliability of information. For CbC 
reports to be deemed a reliable tool to assess a multinational entity’s corporate 
responsibility the reports should be free from material misstatement and bias; contain 
complete, balanced and relevant information; and should facilitate internal and 
external verification (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2008). 
The presence of these characteristics within multinational entities’ financial reports 
can generally be assured via independent and external auditors that utilise a 
framework of generally accepted auditing standards. IFRS 8 essentially applies to 
entities with publicly traded securities, which are also commonly required to submit 
their financial statements for external audit prior to publication. For example, in 
accordance with the Australian Corporations Act 2001, public interest entities 
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including disclosing entities, public companies and registered schemes, are required 
to prepare financial reports (s292(1)) and these reports must be audited (s301(1)) by 
a Registered Company Auditor (s324BA). Therefore, CbC reporting arguably is 
relevant information that is capable of being reliable and verifiable should it be 
included within IFRS and subjected to the individual audit requirements of the 
numerous participating countries. Consideration is now given to the remaining 
qualities that enhance information usefulness, including comparability, timeliness, 
and understandability. 
 
The OECD’s Discussion Draft request for specific comments on whether the CbC 
reporting template should ideally be compiled using “bottom-up” reporting from 
local statutory accounts or a “top-down” allocation of country group reporting 
figures was met with numerous requests for multinational entities to be provided 
with flexibility to choose either option (i.e. approximately 61% of total comments in 
the sample). Flexible data source options were generally requested to reduce the 
compliance burdens that multinational entities would face due to variations in data 
compilation methods that result in different information being readily available. 
Fixed data source options were generally dismissed on the basis that the unique 
nature of multinational entities would result in unavailable data, unreasonable costs 
and insignificant benefits: 
 
The variety among businesses is significant and there is no ‘one size fits all’ 
approach that will manage the compliance costs for business. 
(Deloitte Transfer Pricing Unit, vol. 2, p. 17) 
 
We don’t see any advantage by compelling all concerned companies to use 
one unified data basis. 
(BASF The Chemical Company, MNE, vol. 1, p. 221) 
 
It would appear logical that multinational entities and their advisors would exhibit a 
general preference towards a flexible data source due to the lower associated 
compliance costs and effort, as IT systems and data collection processes would 
require minimal alterations. However, these potential reduced compliance costs 
would come at a cost to the comparability of CbC reports. The perceived objective of 
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the OECD’s CbC template was identified by approximately 63% of respondents as 
being a transfer pricing risk assessment tool, whilst 26% identified the potential for 
CbC reporting to facilitate broader risk assessments and evaluations extending 
beyond transfer pricing3. Approximately 87.50% of sampled respondents who 
identified transfer pricing risk assessment as the sole function of CbC reporting 
suggested the scope of information requirements currently proposed was inconsistent 
with a transfer pricing risk assessment function. The perception of CbC reporting as 
a transfer pricing risk assessment tool aligns with respondents identifying CbC 
reports as facilitating inter-firm comparisons, for example: 
 
The intention of CbCR is not to allow for comparison across multinationals, 
but within these companies. 
(International Chamber of Commerce, vol. 2, p. 307) 
 
We do not consider it necessary for there to be a comparability across 
different MNEs, and as a result, there can and should be an optionality 
regarding the reporting source data for preparing the template. 
(The 100 Group, Industry Representative, vol. 1, p. 226) 
 
In contrast, to achieve corporate accountability under a comprehensive form of CbC 
reporting, users must be able to evaluate and assess a multinational entity’s 
performance from year-to-year, in relation to its competitors (e.g. for investment 
purposes), and against other multinational entities operating in an individual country 
(e.g. to determine impacts on the host country’s local communities and economy). 
This internal and external comparison of information is facilitated by the structured 
nature of accounting information disclosures. As noted by the BEPS Monitoring 
Group in their response to the OECD Discussion Draft:  
 
It should be recalled in any consideration of country-by-country reporting 
data that this is accounting information. Accounting information only has 
                                                 
 
3 The remaining 11% (approximately) did not make a specific comment on the objective of CbC 
reporting (see Appendix A) 
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value in comparison. It is in the analysis of differences that accounting data 
can both answer and pose questions for its user. 
(vol. 1, p. 167) 
 
In further support of the notion that CbC data is accounting data and therefore 
appropriate to disclose under IFRS 8, comparability of financial information is a 
characteristic evident in both the IASB’s conceptual framework and the IFRS 
Foundation’s constitution, as per the excerpts below: 
  
The usefulness of financial information is enhanced if it is comparable, 
verifiable, timely and understandable. 
(IASB, 2010, para. QC4) 
 
These standards should require high quality, transparent and comparable 
information in financial statements… 
(IFRS Foundation, 2013, p. 5) 
 
In summary, this chapter commenced with an evaluation of the inclusion of CbC 
reporting requirements within Articles 7 and 9 of the Model Tax Convention, which 
revealed potential due to an alignment of tax related principles. However, due to the 
Convention’s primary application to international treaties, public disclosure of CbC 
data could not be ensured and was thus deemed to be an insufficient location to 
included CbC reporting requirements. This was followed by an analysis of IFRS as a 
potential location to insert CbC disclosure requirements. As past lobbying efforts 
have tried and failed to achieve the inclusion of CbC reporting within IFRS, this 
section evaluated the IASB’s standard setting processes as evaluated from a 
stakeholder theory perspective. Following an identification of the stakeholders that 
utilise financial reports, this section concluded with an evaluation of how the 
inclusion of CbC reporting requirements within IFRS may result in the provision of 
high quality CbC information disclosures to these stakeholders. 
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5.7 Conclusion and Statement of Findings 
Through an evaluation of dissemination options of CbC reports (i.e. public or 
confidential disclosures to tax administrations) and the potential location of CbC 
reporting requirements, this chapter addressed RQ2, which asked: how should a 
standardised CbC reporting model be implemented? 
 
It was found that the public dissemination of CbC information satisfies the needs of 
the stakeholders identified within the theoretical framework whilst concurrently 
ensuring efficient access to information by developing countries. IFRS was 
determined to be the implementation mechanism that sufficiently ensured useful CbC 
disclosures could be made available to the public. As determined by the extant 
academic research evaluated in chapter three, the current accounting standards on 
geographical disclosure requirements, being IFRS 8 and ASC 280, enable the 
aggregation of broad geographical areas (such as continents, hemispheres, and “rest 
of the world” groupings) which have been suggested by the literature to reduce the 
usefulness of information for users. CbC reporting is found to be a suitable tool to 
address the issues within the current accounting standards. In its accounting standard 
setting role, the IASB recognises the primary users of financial statements to be 
those engaged in capital markets with the interests of the general public disregarded. 
However, the user group identified by the IASB differs to the broad user groups 
recognised by the IFRS Foundation and the UK Accounting Standards Steering 
Committee, both of which align with the users identified under stakeholder theory.  
 
It was found this broad group of financial statement users might benefit on multiple 
fronts from the inclusion of CbC reporting within IFRS. The structured, principles-
based nature of IFRS would require CbC information to be presented in an 
understandable and consistent manner. Understandability is a quality characteristic 
evident in both the IASB’s conceptual framework and the UN’s corporate 
responsibility indicators. The inclusion of CbC data requirements within IFRS 8 
would ensure the use of a suitable and structured design that focuses on financial 
data coupled with succinct supporting notes where relevant to aid understanding, 
thereby reducing a multinational entity’s ability to obscure economic realities 
through heavily worded and favourably-biased qualitative descriptions. As financial 
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reports are generally published on an annual basis at minimum, stakeholders would 
receive timely access to information regarding the global operations of a 
multinational entity. Furthermore, the independent and external assurance generally 
provided on financial statements prepared by multinational entities would enhance 
the reliability of CbC disclosures. 
 
As revealed by an analysis of the coded comment letters, CbC disclosure as a transfer 
pricing risk assessment tool suggestively warrants internal comparability. In contrast, 
a comprehensive version of CbC reporting requires internal and external 
comparability to assess firm performance year-to-year, in relation to competitors and 
in relation to other economic contributors to the host country. This internal and 
external comparability may be facilitated by the inclusion of CbC reporting within 
IFRS due to its structured nature and widespread global adoption, as aforementioned, 
in addition to the comparability characteristics discussed within the constitutions of 
the IASB and the IFRS Foundation. Overall, in response to RQ2, IFRS appear to be 
an appropriate location to include a form of comprehensive CbC reporting 
requirements, in particular through a revision of IFRS 8 Operating Segments. The 
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Chapter 6: Analysis of Structure 
6.1 Introduction 
The analysis presented in chapter five established that CbC reporting requirements 
should be contained within an international financial reporting standard, preferably 
IFRS 8, to ensure CbC data is available to the public. This chapter further develops a 
standardised CbC reporting framework through an examination of what multinational 
entities would be required to disclose in order to be compliant with the proposed 
standardised framework. Line item disclosures required under the TJN and OECD 
proposals are initially examined and their suitability for inclusion within the 
standardised model is determined in accordance with stakeholder theory and 
pragmatic considerations. Subsequently, the theoretical impact of the standardised 
CbC reporting framework is assessed in three illustrative applications to real world 
multinational entities. 
 
6.2 Information Disclosure Comparison 
The following three subsections detail the line items for which multinational entities 
would be required to report on in accordance with a comprehensive CbC reporting 
approach as proposed by the TJN (section 6.2.1 below), in addition to the TJN’s 
extractive industry CbC proposal (section 6.2.2) and finally, the OECD’s CbC 
template (section 6.2.3). 
 
6.2.1 TJN: All Industries 
The information to be disclosed under the TJN’s CbC reporting framework, as 
applicable to all industries is listed below: 
 The names of all countries with business operations, whereby a country is 
defined as any jurisdiction with a permanent establishment for taxation 
purposes 
 The names of all companies operating in each country 
 Financial performance figures for each country, including: 
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o Sales (third party and intra-firm) 
o Hedging transactions (third party and intra-firm) 
o Purchases (third party and intra-firm) 
o Labour expenses and employee numbers 
o Financing expenses (third party costs and intra-firm) 
o Pre-tax profits 
 Tax charges for each country, split as follows: 
o tax charge for the year apportioned between current and deferred tax;  
o actual tax paid to the government of the country in the period; 
o liabilities (and assets if applicable) owing for tax and associated 
charges at the beginning and end of each accounting period;  
o deferred tax liabilities for the country at the beginning and end of each 
accounting period. 
 Cost and net book value of physical fixed assets located in each country 
 Total gross and net asset values on a per country basis. 
 
(Murphy, 2009, p. 8) 
 
To clarify the source and destination of a multinational entity’s sales, an additional 
sales analysis is suggested if sales made from a jurisdiction differ by more than 10% 
from the sales made to that jurisdiction (Murphy, 2009). This additional analysis 
would require disclosure of source and destination sales data for a multinational 
entity’s operations in a particular jurisdiction that exceed the quantitative threshold.  
 
6.2.2 TJN: Extractive Industry 
Current estimates place approximately 3.5 billion people as living in countries rich in 
oil, gas or minerals, meaning the global importance of the extractive industries 
extends beyond merely meeting the energy and transportation needs of the world’s 
population (World Bank, 2014). Despite the extractive industry generating millions 
in government revenues for over 50 developing countries around the world, 
extractive activities commonly result in increased poverty, corruption, volatility and 
economic decline (World Bank, 2014). The social and economic importance of the 
extractive industry cannot be understated, considering finite, non-renewable 
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resources serve a vital part in 81 countries, collectively accounting for approximately 
25% of world GDP, directly impacting half of the world’s population and almost 
70% of those living in extreme poverty (World Bank, 2014).  
 
Due to the significance of the industry, the TJN stresses two additional goals of CbC 
reporting that are specifically relevant to multinational entities operating within the 
extractive industry. First, CbC reporting aims to provide data to assist the most 
effective allocation of revenue streams for those who live in a host country (Murphy, 
2012a). Second, CbC reporting aims to provide information to other stakeholders, 
external to the host country, who rely on cost effective, sustainable and reliable 
access to extracted resources, and therefore want information on how the industry is 
being managed (Murphy, 2012a). Due to the unique nature and high importance 
associated with the extractive industry, the TJN has suggested corporations operating 
in the upstream extractive industries would be required to disclose the following 
information for jurisdictions where upstream activities occur, in addition to the 
disclosures items detailed above in section 6.2.1: 
 
 Accounting provisions made by location for the payment of the following: 
o Signature fees and bonus payments due on the signing of Mineral 
Development Agreements  
o Annual rental fees and similar obligations 
o Royalties 
o Import and export duties 
o Sales taxes 
o Employment taxes due 
o Taxes due on dividends 
o Withholding taxes 
o Local government taxes due 
o Other taxes owed 
o If a method other than cash is used in settling the above sums, this 
should also be disclosed. 
 The total amount of taxes paid during the course of the year, including 
opening and closing liabilities balances 
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 Individual disclosure of all futures, derivative and forward contract sales, 
with separate disclosure of purchases of alike financial instruments (with no 
netting off).  
 Collective disclosure on a yearly and per country basis of: 
o Provisions made for taxes from the commencement of CbC reporting 
o Total tax paid since the commencement of CbC reporting 
 Reserves data estimated based on physical volume and current market value 
realisation at the start and end of each year, coupled with a reconciliation of 
these sums displaying: 
o Opening balance 
o Additions during the year 
o Estimated write downs during the year 
o Volume extracted during the year available for sale 
o Closing balance 
(Murphy, 2012a, p. 9) 
 
Under the proposal, the disclosure of subsidiary names and the country/ countries in 
which they operate is required of all entities subject to the consolidation process. 
However, reduced disclosure on other reportable items under CbC reporting has been 
suggested by the TJN (Murphy, 2012a, p. 19-20) in accordance with the following 
materiality thresholds: 
 Limited country-by-country financial statements is permitted should either of 
the following be satisfied: 
o turnover plus hedging, derivatives and financial income in a 
jurisdiction is more than U.S. $1 million in a reportable period, but no 
more than US $5 million; 
o the increase in the net value of tangible fixed assets in a country is in 
excess of U.S. $1 million, but no more than U.S. $5 million in a 
reportable period; 
o turnover plus financial income in the country does not exceed 5% of 
the total consolidated turnover plus financial income of the reporting 
entity for the reporting period 
o the jurisdiction is not used for upstream extractive activities. 
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 Only a trading presence is required to be disclosed and no financial 
information under CbC reporting if either: 
o turnover plus hedging, derivative and financial income in a country is 
below U.S. $1 million for a reporting period; or 
o the increase in net value of tangible fixed assets is below U.S. $1 
million for a reporting period 
 
6.2.3 OECD CbC Template 
The OECD’s CbC reporting template is part of a three-tiered structure of transfer 
pricing documentation that also includes a master file and local file reporting 
requirement. Although primary focus is placed on an analysis of the CbC template, 
due consideration must be given to the information to be disclosed under the 
remaining two tiers. 
 
The objective of the master file is to provide taxation administrations with a high-
level overview of the multinational entity’s worldwide business activities and 
policies through the provision of information that is deemed important if its omission 
would impact the reliability of the transfer pricing outcomes (OECD, 2014c). 
 
The OECD’s discussion draft specifically requested comments on whether the CbC 
reporting template, discussed further below, should form part of the master file or be 
presented in a completely separate document (OECD, 2014c). Following the public 
commentary period, the CbC report was determined to be more appropriate as a 
stand-alone report. The remaining disclosure requirements for the most recent 
version of the master file are summarised in Table 6.1 below. Notably, a 
multinational entity is required to disclose the geographic location of operating 
entities and the markets in which they trade. Furthermore, multinational entities 
should disclose intangible asset ownership details and intergroup financing 
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Table 6.1 
OECD Master File Information Disclosures 
Organisational structure 
 chart that details the legal and ownership structure of the multinational entity 
and the geographical location of all operating entities. 
Description of business(es) 
 General description of the group’s business, including: 
o Significant drivers of profit 
o Details of the supply chain, including main geographic markets, for the 
group’s largest products and/or services as measured by turnover, in 
addition to other products and/or services that exceed 5 percent of group 
turnover. May be a diagrammatical description. 
o Significant service arrangements between members of the corporate 
group, excluding research and development services, should be listed and 
briefly described, in addition to the capabilities of the principal locations 
providing important services and transfer pricing policies for allocating 
services costs and determining prices paid for intra-firm services. 
o A summary of the functional analysis detailing the key contributions to 
value creation by individual entities within the corporate group. 
o Details of any significant restructurings, acquisitions and divestitures that 
occurred during the financial year. 
Intangibles  
 General descriptions for the multinational entity’s overall strategy for the 
development, ownership and utilisation of intangibles. 
 Lists of intangibles or groups of intangibles that are important from a transfer 
pricing perspective and details of the entities that legally own them. 
 Lists of significant agreements between associated entities in relation to 
intangibles. 
 General details of the transfer pricing policies for research and development 
and intangibles. 
 Details, including entities, countries and the compensation received for any 
significant transfers of interests in intangibles between associated enterprises. 
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Intercompany financial activities 
 General details concerning how the corporate group is financed. 
 Identification of any entities that play a key role in intra-group financing, and 
the country under which they are organised and effectively managed. 
 General details of the transfer pricing policies related to intra-firm financing 
arrangements. 
Financial and taxation positions 
 The annual consolidated financial statement for the particular financial year, 
if otherwise prepared for the purpose of financial reporting, taxation, 
management, etc. 
 The group’s extant unilateral advance pricing agreements and other taxation 
rulings concerning the geographical allocation of income should be listed and 
briefly described. 
 
The local file is intended to supplement the master file through the provision of more 
specific details on intergroup transactions and thereby attempts to ensure the filing 
group has complied with the arm’s length principle (OECD, 2014c). The information 
required to be disclosed in the local file focuses on transactions between a local 
country affiliate and associated enterprises operating in different countries. These 
information disclosures have been summarised in Table 6.2 below. 
 
Table 6.2 
OECD Local File Disclosures 
Information Disclosures 
Local entity 
 An organisational chart and managerial structure should be detailed, plus the 
individuals to which local management report and the countries where 
principal offices are located. 
 The local entity’s business and its strategy should be sufficiently described, 
including details on any restructurings or transfers of intangibles in the 
current or immediately preceding year. 
 Primary competitors. 
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Controlled transactions 
The following should be disclosed for each material category of controlled 
transactions: 
 A description of the material controlled transactions and the context in which 
they occur. 
 The amount of intra-firm payments and receipts for each category of 
controlled transactions concerning the local entity segregated by tax 
jurisdiction of the foreign payor or recipient. 
 Identification of associated enterprises involved in each category of 
controlled transactions, and the interrelationships. 
 Duplicates of all material intercompany agreements concluded by the local 
entity. 
 Detailed comparability and functional analysis of the taxpayer and associated 
enterprises for each documented category of controlled transactions. 
 An indication of the most appropriate transfer pricing method for the category 
of transaction and the reasons for its selection. 
 The associated enterprise that is chosen as the tested party, if applicable, and 
an explanation for its selection. 
 An overview of the main assumptions applied in the transfer pricing 
methodology. 
 If applicable, the reasons for conducting a multi-year analysis. 
 Selected comparable uncontrolled transactions (internal/ external) should be 
listed and information on financial indicators for independent enterprises 
utilised in the transfer pricing analysis should be described. 
 Any comparability adjustments performed should be listed. 
 The reasons for determining that relevant transactions were priced on an 
arm’s length basis based on the application of the selected transfer pricing 
method. 
 Summarised financial information used in applying the transfer pricing 
methodology. 
 Duplicates of existing unilateral and bi/multilateral advance pricing 
agreements and other tax rulings to which the local tax jurisdiction is not a 
 132 Chapter 6: Analysis of Structure 
part and which are related to controlled transactions as described above. 
Financial information 
 Annual local entity financial accounts for the specific financial year. 
 Information and allocation schedules displaying how the financial data used 
in applying the transfer pricing method may be linked to the annual financial 
statements. 
 Summary schedules of relevant financial information for comparables utilised 
in the analysis and the source of the data. 
 
The OECD’s model template for the CbC report is contained within Annex III to 
Chapter V of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines and a reproduction has been included 
within Appendix B of this thesis. The model template consists of three tables, as 
follows: 
 Table 1: Overview of allocation of income, taxes and business activities by 
tax jurisdiction 
 Table 2: List of all the Constituent Entities of the MNE group included in 
each aggregation per tax jurisdiction 
 Table 3: Additional Information 
 
The data used to populate the OECD’s CbC template may be sourced from a 
multinational entity’s consolidated financial statement reporting package, individual 
statutory financial statements, regulatory financial statements or internal 
management accounts as long as the data source is applied consistently across the 
group and from year to year (OECD, 2014a). The data source should be briefly 
mentioned in Table 3 of the CbC reporting template, and if applicable, the reasons 
for any required changes in the data source used from the prior year (OECD, 2014a). 
In addition to the model template, the OECD details specific instructions for Annex 
III, which are discussed in detail below. 
 
Within Table 1 of the model template, the reporting multinational entity (i.e. the 
ultimate parent entity of the group) is expected to disclose all the tax jurisdictions in 
which Constituent Entities of the group are resident for taxation purposes. Where 
multiple residencies occur, the relevant tax treaty tiebreaker or place of effective 
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management if the former is not applicable, should be applied to determine the 
jurisdiction of residence (OECD, 2014a).  A Constituent Entity of a corporate group 
is defined as any separate business entity that is consolidated for financial reporting 
purposes, in addition to entities that are excluded from financial statements due to the 
application of size or materiality thresholds (OECD, 2014a). A separate line should 
also be included for all Constituent Entities that are recognised by the reporting 
entity as not being a resident in any tax jurisdiction for tax purposes (OECD, 2014a). 
 
The second column heading for Table 1 of the OECD’s template is further divided 
into three columns, where multinational entities’ should disclose: (i) the total of all 
Constituent Entities’ intra-group revenues; (ii) the total of all Constituent Entities’ 
revenues generated via transactions with external parties; and (iii) the total of (i) and 
(ii) (OECD, 2014a). Revenues are not considered to include payments deemed to be 
dividends in the payor’s taxation jurisdiction that have been received from other 
Constituent Entities (OECD, 2014a). 
 
Reporting multinational entities’ should disclose the sum of profit (loss) before 
income tax for all Constituent Entities for each jurisdiction in column five of the 
template, with profit (loss) figures inclusive of extraordinary income and expense 
items (OECD, 2014a). In the sixth column, reporting multinational entities’ should 
disclose the total amount of income tax paid on a cash basis by all Constituent 
Entities resident for tax purposes in the particular tax jurisdiction for the relevant 
financial year (OECD, 2014a). For disclosure purposes, taxes paid should include 
those paid by the Constituent Entity to the tax jurisdiction of residence and to all 
other tax jurisdictions and should be inclusive of withholding taxes (OECD, 2014a). 
The total accrued current tax expense on taxable profits (losses) for all the resident 
Constituent Entities of the relevant tax jurisdiction should be reported in column 
seven of the OECD template (OECD, 2014a).  
 
The total stated capital for all Constituent Entities residing in the relevant tax 
jurisdiction should be reported in the eighth column, whilst their total accumulated 
earnings as at the end of the financial year should be disclosed in the ninth column 
(OECD, 2014a). In the tenth column, the total number of employees working for all 
resident Constituent Entities on a full-time equivalent basis should be reported 
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(OECD, 2014a). The OECD instructions offer flexibility in the determination of 
employee numbers, with year-end figures, yearly averages or any other consistently 
applied measure being acceptable in addition to reasonable levels of rounding or 
approximation (OECD, 2014a). In the final column of Table 1, being the eleventh 
column, the total net book values of the tangible assets of all the Constituent Entities 
should be disclosed, with the specific exclusion of cash or cash equivalents, 
intangibles or financial assets (OECD, 2014a). 
 
In the second column of the OECD’s Table 2, the reporting multinational entity 
should list the legal names of all the Constituent Entities of the group that are tax 
residents in the tax jurisdiction reported in the first column of Table 2 (OECD, 
2014a). However, permanent establishments should be listed in accordance with their 
physical location. The third column of Table 2 is only applicable for Constituent 
Entities that are organised or incorporated in a tax jurisdiction that is different from 
the tax jurisdiction of residence (OECD, 2014a). If this occurs, the reporting entity 
should disclose the applicable tax jurisdiction. The fourth column is further divided 
into the following thirteen main business activities, of which the reporting 
multinational entity should select one or more as being applicable to the Constituent 
Entity: 
 Research and Development 
 Holding or managing intellectual property 
 Purchasing or Procurement 
 Manufacturing or Production 
 Sales, Marketing or Distribution 
 Administrative, Management or Support Services 
 Provision of services to unrelated parties 
 Internal group finance 
 Regulated Financial Services 
 Insurance 
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Table 3 of the OECD’s template is utilised to detail the specific nature of a business 
activity should the “other” option listed above be selected by a reporting 
multinational entity as the main (or one of the main) business activity(ies) of a 
Constituent Entity.  
 
Notably, the OECD does not recommend that transfer pricing documentation, 
including the information disclosures discussed within this section, be externally 
audited and also suggests that local laws should determine the language of 
publication for transfer pricing documentation, including CbC reports (OECD, 
2014a). 
 
Following public consultation on the proposed CbC model contained within the 
discussion draft released in January 2014, alterations were made to the CbC reporting 
model and published in the September 2014 deliverable, as described within this 
section. Firstly, the template was separated into three tables, where previously it had 
been two (including the “additional information” section). Disclosures under the 
former template were required on an entity-by-entity basis whereas the updated CbC 
template requires information to be aggregated according to tax jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, the modified template was simplified through the removal of six 
columns of inter-firm transaction information for royalties, interest and service fees. 
Whilst the requirement to disclose the number of employees has remained in the 
updated template, albeit now on a country rather than entity basis, the “total 
employee expense” column has been removed. 
 
6.3 Standardised Model Information Disclosures  
Following the above descriptions of information to be disclosed under the TJN’s 
industry-wide and extractive industry models, in addition to the OECD’s CbC 
template, this section evaluates the suitability of including individual disclosure 
items as part of the standardised model. 
 
Both the TJN (i.e. industry-wide and extractive industry) and OECD models require 
multinational entities to disclose the names of all subsidiary companies and the 
names of all the countries in which they operate. This information must be 
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encompassed within the standardised model to satisfy one of the basic principles of 
CbC reporting – to hold a corporation accountable for its (in)actions, information 
users must be able to identify which corporations are operating and where they are 
operating. In other words, the anonymity facilitated by current reporting standards 
must be removed in order to clearly identify a corporate group structure, its 
geographic spread and its associated geo-political risk and potential associated 
reputational damage. A corporation’s pattern of geographical spread may be 
indicative of diversity or lack thereof, in addition to potential dependencies on 
subsidiaries located in tax havens, the latter of which is further informed through the 
provision of sales data. 
 
Both proposals require the disclosure of third party, infra-firm and total sales on a per 
country basis. This information is also included within the standardised framework in 
order to enable the assessment of the direction of sales flows, the extent of intra-
group sales and whether they have been routed through or relocated to secrecy 
jurisdictions for a reason beyond the economic reality. Tax authorities investigating 
transfer mispricing disputes would have access to information on profit allocations to 
determine if a systematic bias towards low or tax free jurisdictions is evident, in 
addition to information on the volume and flows of intra-group trades which may 
suggest profit allocations are a result of trade mispricing (Murphy, 2009). The 
disaggregation of sales data between third party and intra-firm would theoretically 
enable an investor to more accurately assess the geographic external sales diversity 
and the associated risk of this diversity. For example, if a significant percentage of a 
multinational entity’s sales were identified as originating from a politically unstable 
or generally risky jurisdiction, an investor may question the probability of the income 
stream’s continuance. 
 
Sales data is also relevant in reference to any purchases information to be disclosed. 
Notably, the OECD proposal does not suggest multinational entities disclose any 
purchase data, whilst the TJN proposes both third party and intragroup purchases be 
disclosed. Purchase information, apportioned between third party and intra-firm, is 
included within the standardised model as it may increase the decision usefulness of 
the report without significantly increasing the compliance costs of corporations, as 
purchase transaction information should be readily available and would already be 
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collected for internal management purposes. The inclusion of purchases data may 
enable an assessment of the vulnerability of supply chains such as those that obtain 
products or services from jurisdictions with high political risk. The disclosure of 
intra-group sales and purchases in each location enables an investor to assess the 
level of trade in any country that is dependent upon the corporate group, in addition 
to the potential risk of a transfer price challenge occurring should profit to sales 
ratios be high in low tax jurisdictions, or low in high tax jurisdictions (Global 
Witness, 2005). Furthermore, when compared to external sales, high intra-group 
purchases for a jurisdiction may indicate re-invoicing practices, whilst a comparison 
of intra-group purchases and intra-group sales may enable internal supply chains to 
be determined. 
 
The inclusion of employee related data is suggested to assist information users in 
multiple ways. Originally both the OECD and TJN proposals required employee 
numbers and labour costs to be disclosed on an entity and individual country basis 
respectively. However, following the public consultation period for the Discussion 
Draft the OECD removed requirements for employee costs to be reported. This 
removal was likely founded on objections concerning employee confidentiality and 
compliance efforts, such as the following: 
 
Employee compensation information often is not maintained by all entities in 
a [multinational entity] group in the same manner, valuation of non-cash 
compensation would be difficult, and compensation information could be 
quite sensitive in situations involving only a relatively small number of 
employees in a particular country so that the total could reveal personal 
information. 
(Ernst & Young, accountancy & advisory firm, vol. 2, p. 82) 
 
In contrast, other respondents recognised that employee information disclosure by 
multination entities may be beneficial, such as the following statement by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Global: 
 
We recognise that data on the number of employees may be seen as useful 
information for risk assessment purposes and that employee expense will be 
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generally indicative of value. However, detailed guidance regarding the 
definition of “employee” and the calculation of employee expense will be 
necessary before these items can meaningfully be reported on by taxpayers. 
(vol. 3, p. 137) 
 
The requirement for a clear definition of “employee” and the associated calculation 
of employee expense was also recognised in the development of a standardised 
template within this thesis. The OECD framework provides a sound basis for the 
determination of employee numbers, being either the actual number of staff 
employed on a full-time equivalent basis at the end of the reporting year, or 
alternatively, the average employment levels for the reporting year. The use of a full-
time equivalent basis would also be consistent with EU CRD IV CbC reporting 
requirements. The provision of a choice for multinational entities to report a yearly 
average or actual year-end figure would still result in users receiving useful 
information whilst also potentially reducing the compliance burdens for 
multinational entities. However, corporations should be required to implement a 
consistent approach from year to year. Unlike the OECD model, rounding or 
approximation of employee numbers is not recommended for the standardised 
template as it may provide opportunity to distort the geographical distribution of 
employees and hinder cross company comparisons.  
 
Furthermore, rounding or approximation of the number of employed staff would be 
an unnecessary extra step, as actual or average figures should be readily attainable. 
Distinction should be made between individuals directly employed by the 
multinational entity and individuals who are formally employed by another 
organisation but act under the supervision and management of the multinational 
entity, such as subcontractors. Such a distinction could be communicated through an 
additional note to the financial statements. The primary stakeholders expected to 
benefit from the disclosure of employee related data include investors, employees 
(existing and potential), customers and trade union groups. 
 
By requiring companies to disclose the number of employees and the associated 
costs on a CbC basis, investors are able to determine where a multinational employs 
its staff and whether employees are receiving an average pay when compared to 
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similar undertakings in the geographical area. Despite the obvious benefits to a 
corporation’s profitability, many investors may be disinclined to invest in a company 
that has been identified as subjecting its employees to less than fair working 
conditions, such as remuneration levels below social or regulatory standards or 
norms. A similar statement may be made regarding customers who consciously 
choose to not engage with a corporation due to unfair employment practices. 
Furthermore, CbC data may help inform an employee’s decision to work for a 
particular company and may further assist with employment negotiations. The 
comparative nature of CbC reporting may assist employee’s to determine if a 
corporation deals with employees consistently and fairly. 
 
As would be expected, both the OECD and TJN include requirements for disclosure 
of income tax expense and profit (loss) before income tax. Whilst the OECD’s 
template disaggregates tax expense between income tax paid (cash basis) and income 
tax accrued in the current year, the TJN proposal requires tax information to be 
disclosed on a per country basis in the profit and loss statement and the balance 
sheet. It is recommended that the standardised model follow a similar format to that 
recommended by the TJN as this would be consistent with existing accounting 
standard presentation, yet more detailed. Specifically, IAS 1 Presentation of 
Financial Statements requires tax expense (tax income) to be disclosed in the 
statement of comprehensive income, in addition to requiring the current tax assets 
and liabilities, and deferred tax assets and liabilities, to be disclosed in the statement 
of financial position. Expanding these requirements to include individual country 
presentation of tax expense (income) and tax assets and liabilities, is expected to be 
advantageous to financial statement users due to the consistent use of information 
presentation formatting. Disclosure of tax expense and liabilities/ assets on a current 
and deferred basis would enable the effectiveness of a jurisdiction’s ability to collect 
taxes to be determined by clarifying the amount a multinational entity actually pays 
in taxes to each jurisdiction it has operations in.  
 
Furthermore, the detailed disclosure of tax charges applicable to individual countries 
enables investors to better assess the potential impact of the reversal of deferred taxes 
on future cash flows, in addition to the extent to which deferred taxes are used as a 
source of finance in each jurisdiction. CbC reporting would enable investors to assess 
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the sustainability of tax rates by determining if a corporations’ reported tax rate was 
dependent upon basing activities in secrecy jurisdictions (i.e. tax havens) (Murphy, 
2009). This would also influence an investor’s perception of share value due to the 
use of after tax earnings in common valuation ratios. The disclosure of taxes paid to 
governments, on a cash basis as suggested under both frameworks, is necessary to 
determine multinational entities’ economic contributions to jurisdictions in which 
they operate and to hold the governments themselves accountable. Furthermore, tax 
administrations and other interested stakeholders may detect the presence of tax 
planning arrangements more easily in CbC reports in cases where the cash taxes paid 
are less than the reported liability of the prior year. To facilitate the transparent 
reporting of taxes due and paid, it is suggested that separate line items be disclosed, 
as per the TJN proposal, for current and deferred income tax expense, local 
government taxes due, and other payments due to governments.  
 
Once again, the balance sheet items included in the TJN’s proposal are more detailed 
than the OECD’s proposal, the latter being limited to stated capital and tangible 
assets other than cash and cash equivalents for each tax jurisdiction. The inclusion of 
tangible asset information is beneficial to multiple stakeholder groups. For example, 
the disclosure of balance sheet data such as tangible assets may inform investors on 
the rate of return on capital by jurisdiction, and thereby whether management has 
efficiently allocated resources to the locations where a multinational entity operates.  
 
However, it is suggested that multinational entities should also disclose total 
intangible assets and fixed assets as part of the standardised CbC report. If a 
subsidiary were to employ minimal staff, conduct all of its sales on an intra-group 
basis and only own intangible assets or very minimal physical assets, financial 
statement users could, via the CbC report, question the economic substance of such 
an entity. Additionally, if investors know of the geographical location of corporate 
assets they may then be aware of any potential risk of capital loss for assets located 
in politically unstable areas. Such disclosures by multinational entities would enable 
local suppliers to more accurately assess the level of risk associated with supplying a 
corporation with credit based on the value of physical assets a corporation locates 
within that jurisdiction. For example, if a subsidiary of a multinational entity with a 
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low amount of assets located in a specific country fails financially, the risk of local 
suppliers failing to be paid increases.  
 
Overall, this section examined the information line items suggested under both the 
TJN and OECD framework proposals and how the inclusion of each line item may 
potentially benefit the stakeholder groups previously identified, whilst further 
enabling users to assess whether a multinational entity has satisfied its CSR 
obligations. This analysis primarily addressed RQ3, which questioned how a 
standardised CbC reporting model should be structured. In summary, the 
standardised CbC reporting template should be structured to require disclosure of the 
following information line items: 
 Subsidiary company names and the countries in which they operate 
 Total sales per country disaggregated between third party and intra-firm 
 Total purchases per country disaggregated between third party and intra-firm 
 Number of full-time equivalent employees per country (calculated on a yearly 
average or actual year-end figure basis) 
 Labour costs per country (with employment withholding taxes disclosed 
separately to regular employee payments) 
 Profit (Loss) Before Income Tax  
 Income tax expense disaggregated between current and deferred charges 
 Income tax liabilities disaggregated on a current and deferred basis 
 Income tax paid on a cash basis (as part of the Statement of Cash Flow) 
 Other payments made to governments (as part of the Profit & Loss 
Statement) 
 Other payments due to governments disaggregated on a current and deferred 
basis 
 Total tangible and fixed assets located in each country 
 Total intangible assets located in each country in accordance with the relevant 
subsidiary’s ownership rights. 
 
Further support for the inclusion of the above line items is contained within the 
illustrative examples presented within the following section. Specifically, the 
illustrations for Microsoft Corporation and Merck & Co. Inc., consider how the 
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inclusion of specific CbC information as suggested in the standardised model may 
likely have assisted relevant stakeholders. The third illustration concerning Statoil 
provides a real world example of the ability of a multinational entity to report on a 
CbC basis, however, areas for improved disclosure are identified. 
 
6.4 Illustrative Examples 
 
Within this section, the standardised CbC model as developed in the previous section 
is applied to information disclosed by selected multinational entities that were 
purposively chosen for illustrative purposes. Microsoft Corporation, the first 
multinational entity discussed within this section, has been publicly identified as part 
of a U.S legislative hearing process to be engaging in profit shifting activities. The 
second illustration presented in this section is Merck & Co, which was selected due 
to the corporation’s public commitment to transparency and to offer insight into the 
pharmaceutical industry. The third and final illustration presented within this chapter 
is of the Norwegian mining corporation Statoil, which was selected due to its status 
as an industry-wide leader in CbC reporting disclosures.  
 
6.4.1 Microsoft Corporation 
Microsoft Corporation (hereafter Microsoft) is an innovative information technology 
and software development company that is renowned throughout the world by 
business and individual end-users. The corporation’s products and services impact 
the lives of a significant number of consumers, such as the one and a half billion 
people who use Windows every day, the 250 million plus people who utilise 
OneDrive and the eighty percent of the Fortune 500 companies that are a part of 
Microsoft Cloud (Microsoft, 2014c). To further place Microsoft’s operations in 
perspective, Windows, OneDrive and Microsoft Cloud only represent a portion of the 
products developed and marketed by Microsoft. Based on a composite score of sales, 
profits, assets and market value Microsoft ranked 32 on Forbes’ Global 2000 listing 
for the World’s Biggest Public Companies across all industries and received the 
highest ranking of all companies in the software and programming industry for 2014 
(Forbes, 2014). 
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A review of publicly available data, including Microsoft’s consolidated Profit & 
Loss and Balance Sheet statements for the 2011 fiscal year (contained within 
Appendix C and Appendix D, respectfully) and the accompany notes, in addition to 
corporate social responsibility disclosures, reveals that the following basic questions, 
which CbC reporting directly seeks to address, cannot be answered with the current 
information provided by the company: 
 What are the trading names of all of Microsoft’s subsidiary companies and in 
which countries does each subsidiary operate? 
 What is the extent of operations in each of these countries? 
 Has an amount of tax proportionate to the level of business operations been 
paid to the governments of these host countries? 
 Does the corporate structure utilise tax havens/ secrecy jurisdictions or 
operate in areas with high geo-political risk? 
 
It would be reasonable for numerous stakeholders to pose questions such as those 
listed above during their interaction with a large multinational entity such as 
Microsoft. In fact, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate (hereafter 
“the Subcommittee”) requested the opportunity to discuss Microsoft’s international 
operations in September 2012 as part of a hearing on the shifting of profits offshore 
by U.S multinational entities and the associated impact on the U.S Internal Revenue 
Code. 
 
In cooperation with the Subcommittee’s investigation, Microsoft disclosed that of the 
$51.5 billion in U.S. cash, cash equivalents, and short term investments it held for the 
2011 financial year, 91% were held by non-U.S subsidiaries (Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012). In the 2014 10-K filings, it was revealed that 
this figure had increased to U.S. $85.7 billion, for which approximately 90% is held 
by foreign subsidiaries (i.e. U.S. $77.1 billion) (Microsoft, 2014b). Notably, 
Microsoft’s website discloses the 119 jurisdictions as at September 2014 where 
subsidiaries are located, however, the names of the respective subsidiary companies 
operating in each country and any associated financial position or performance 
figures are not disclosed (Microsoft, 2014a). A search for “subsidiaries” within 
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Microsoft’s website reveals the most recent disclosure of subsidiary names and their 
country of incorporation is contained within the 1998 Annual Report, and includes 
84 subsidiary companies. This information is of reduced and limited relevance for 
information users due to its outdated nature negatively impacting reliability.  
 
A corporation is only required to disclose its “significant” subsidiaries and their 
country of incorporation to the SEC as part of Exhibit 21, which is publicly available 
via the SEC EDGAR database. Despite the large number of subsidiaries disclosed in 
the 1998 Annual Report (84 subsidiaries), which has undoubtedly increased due to 
Microsoft’s operations expanding into 119 jurisdictions, Microsoft has only deemed 
10 to 12 subsidiaries over the period 2011 to 2014 to be significant for reporting 
purposes (2011: 10 subsidiaries; 2012: 11 subsidiaries; 2013: 11 subsidiaries; 2014: 
12 subsidiaries) (Microsoft, 2011b; Microsoft, 2012; Microsoft, 2013; Microsoft, 
2014b). 
 
Due to the minimal disclosures made by Microsoft concerning its foreign 
subsidiaries and their location, further information was requested by the 
Subcommittee and provided by Microsoft, as summarised in Table 6.3 below. 
Importantly, a clear picture of the geographical dispersion of Microsoft’s activities is 
not discernable from any disclosures made by the corporation in its published annual 
consolidated financial reports, CSR reports, information contained on its website or 
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Table 6.3 
Microsoft Foreign Subsidiaries 
Subsidiary 
Name 
Economic Rights to 
Intellectual Property  
Royalties/ funds paid to U.S.
Microsoft entities for Intellectual 




For certain products in 
Europe, Middle East and 
Africa  
Economic rights to intellectual 
property for certain products in Asia 




For certain products in 
Europe, Middle East and 
Africa 
Economic rights to intellectual 
property for certain products in 





For certain products in 
Asia Pacific 
Economic rights to intellectually 
property for certain products in Asia 





For certain products in the 
Americas 
Economic rights to intellectual 
property for certain products in the 
















 Economic rights to intellectual 
property for certain products in 
Europe, Middle East and Africa – Cost 
Share Agreement 
(Adapted from “Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code – Part 1: Microsoft 
and Hewlett-Packard,” by Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012) 
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Microsoft was examined by the Subcommittee for its use of transfer pricing methods 
that substantially shifted profits out of the domestic U.S market. The two primary 
structures investigated concern Microsoft Singapore, Microsoft Ireland and 
Microsoft Puerto Rico. Figure 6.1 below depicts the first situation examined, 
concerning the transfer pricing practices maintained between Microsoft Singapore, 
Microsoft Ireland and the domestic Microsoft company in the U.S. 
 
Figure 6.1. 2011 Singapore & Ireland Transfer Pricing 
 
The structure in Figure 6.1 above details the $4 billion Microsoft Ireland and 
Microsoft Singapore paid to Microsoft U.S. for certain intellectual property rights 
that these same offshore entities received a combined $12B in sales revenue for, 
thereby indicating that Microsoft shifted $8 billion in income offshore (Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012). This practice had been questioned by the 
Subcommittee on the basis that more than 85% of the research and development 
activities were being conducted in the U.S. at the time of investigation. (Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012).  
 
Additionally, the Corporate Vice President for Worldwide Tax at Microsoft stated 
during the Committee hearing that the choice to locate the intellectual property 
holding company in Bermuda (part of the Microsoft Singapore Roc Group) was 
based on a taxation reduction strategy, and that the subsidiary does not have any 











Payments to U.S from Foreign Subsidiaries 
Microsoft Intellectual Property Pool (>85% 
Research and Development in U.S) 
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The Dublin-registered subsidiaries designated as tax residents in Bermuda play an 
integral role in reducing Microsoft’s foreign corporate tax rate to single digits 
(Wood, 2014). Despite this, the Bermuda subsidiaries are not deemed to be 
“significant” for SEC filing purposes and are therefore not disclosed within Exhibit 
21 nor are subsidiary names or financial performance or position figures publicly 
disclosed by Microsoft. Taxation administrations and other stakeholders would have 
been able to come to a similar conclusion through the information disclosures 
required under the standardised CbC reporting framework, specifically, subsidiary 
company names presented on a CbC basis, intra-group sales and purchases, 
employee numbers and labour costs, and detailed tax information apportioned 
between current, deferred and actual tax payments. 
 
Microsoft also utilises its Puerto Rican subsidiary to shift substantial amounts of 
profits out of the U.S. using a transfer pricing agreement. Specifically, the subsidiary 
in Puerto Rico purchased the rights to market Microsoft’s intellectual property in the 
Americas, whilst concurrently, Microsoft U.S. repurchased the distribution rights for 
the United States (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012). As part of the 
distribution agreement, the Puerto Rican subsidiary receives 47% of sales revenue 
from products distributed within the U.S. (Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, 2012). Therefore, under this arrangement, 47 cents of each dollar of 
sales made within the U.S. is not taxable there. 
 
The tax motivation for utilising the Singapore, Irish and Puerto Rican subsidiaries is 
made more apparent through an analysis of employee numbers in relation to profit. 
The consolidated profit and loss in Appendix C reports an earnings before tax (EBT) 
figure of almost $28.1 billion for 2011, of this approximately $15.4 billion is 
attributable to the three aforementioned subsidiaries (Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, 2012). An EBT of almost 55% of total consolidated EBT appears 
disproportionate when it is considered that these three subsidiaries, already displayed 
as receiving tax benefits, employed 1,914 out of Microsoft’s global workforce of 
90,000, which indicates an EBT of more than $8 million per staff member 
(Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012). Through CbC reporting, this 
employee to profit ratio could have been performed by tax administrators without the 
need to request additional information, resulting in a more timely and cost efficient 
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risk assessment method. Notably, an employee headcount for each financial year is 
provided within the “Facts About Microsoft” section of the Microsoft website, with 
128,076 staff being employed as at 30 June 2014 (Microsoft, 2014a). However, 
based on this lump sum figure, tax administrators and other information users would 
not be able to discern the total number of employees working in each of the 
numerous geographic jurisdictions (119 jurisdictions as stated above), thereby 
hindering an informed assessment of the economic reality of operations within each 
country, as illustrated by the Subcommittee hearing. 
 
Microsoft’s 2014 10-K report revealed the effective income tax rates for 2013 and 
2014 to be 19% and 21% respectfully, with justification for the below statutory 
amounts being primarily based on “lower rates in foreign jurisdictions” (Microsoft, 
2014b, p. 50). However, the 10-K report also disclosed that the corporation is 
currently subject to an Internal Revenue Service audit relating to transfer pricing for 
the years 2004 to 2006, which “could have a significant impact on our consolidated 
financial statements if not resolved favorably” (Microsoft, 2014b, p. 51). 
Furthermore, Microsoft disclosed that it remains under Internal Revenue Service 
audit for the financial years 2007 to 2012, in addition to audits by local tax 
authorities in foreign jurisdictions for the financial years 1996 to 2012 (Microsoft, 
2014b), however, the specific focus of these latter audits is not disclosed. In relation 
to the transfer pricing audits currently being conducted by the Internal Revenue 
Service, CbC reporting disclosures would assist investigations in a timely manner 
through the provision of profit allocation information (i.e. the volume and flow of 
intra-group transactions and whether a systematic bias towards tax havens/ secrecy 
jurisdictions is evident). Furthermore, investors, existing and potential, would be 
further informed as to the level of risk associated with the transfer pricing dispute if 
Microsoft had disclosed CbC data for sales and purchases, apportioned between third 
party and intra-firm as per the standardised model.  
 
It would appear that the investigation undertaken by the Subcommittee in 2012 and 
any associated attention from the public did little to improve the information 
disclosure practices of Microsoft, with the software producing giant receiving a CbC 
reporting score of 0% in a report published in November 2014 by international 
coalition group Transparency International (Kowalczyk-Hoyer, 2014). The score is 
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based on a five-point questionnaire that determines the level of individual country 
disclosure for the corporation’s revenues; capital expenditure; pre-tax income; 
income tax; and community contribution (Kowalczyk-Hoyer, 2014). Microsoft’s 
score of 0% in the CbC reporting dimension of Transparency International’s report 
further suggests the importance of this thesis by highlighting the pragmatic 
occurrence of non-transparent disclosures by economically significant multinational 
entities concerning their worldwide allocation of income and resources.  
 
6.4.2 Merck & Co. Inc. 
Merck & Co. Inc. (hereafter referred to as “Merck”) is a global healthcare company 
that markets and develops medicines, vaccines, biologic therapies, and consumer and 
animal health care products (Merck, 2014a). Based on a composite score of sales, 
profits, assets and market value Merck ranked 99 on Forbes’ Global 2000 listing for 
the World’s Biggest Public Companies across all industries and ranked number five 
in the pharmaceutical industry for 2014 (Forbes, 2014). During the analysis period 
for this study, the following statement was present on Merck’s website in relation to 
transparency disclosures: 
 
Merck aspires to be open and transparent about how it operates in order to 
earn and retain the trust and confidence of its customers, employees, 
shareholders and other important stakeholders. We will do this by proactively 
providing nonproprietary information to stakeholders about Merck’s 
business, how we operate, and decisions we take, which will help 
stakeholders make informed decisions about their interactions with the 
company and its products. 
(Merck, 2014b) 
 
Merck’s annual corporate responsibility reports are prepared in accordance with the 
GRI G4 Guidelines and notably, the company conducted surveys and one-on-one 
discussions in 2013 to assess stakeholder perceptions on the company’s corporate 
responsibility efforts and reporting practices (Merck, 2013c). Despite the apparent 
commitment towards achieving corporate transparency through the application of a 
stakeholder oriented approach as communicated by the company via their corporate 
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responsibility reports and other statements, the aforementioned report published by 
Transparency International identified Merck, along with more than 50 other 
corporations (including Microsoft), as receiving 0% in the CbC reporting dimension 
of the study (Kowalczyk-Hoyer, 2014). Such a result may reasonably be expected 
due to the broad geographical groupings facilitated by ASC 280 and utilised by 
Merck in their 10-K form for the fiscal year ending 31 December 2013 as filed with 
the SEC and reproduced in Table 6.4 below: 
 
Table 6.4 
Merck’s 2013 Geographical Earnings  
Location Earning’s Amount ($U.S. M) 
United States of America $18,246  
Europe, Middle East and Africa $13,140 
Japan $4,044 
Asia Pacific $3,845 
Latin America $3,203 
Other $1,555 
(Merck, 2013b, p. 128) 
 
Notably, Merck primarily manages its operations on a products basis, which is 
organised according to four key operating segments: pharmaceutical, animal health, 
consumer care, and alliances, of which only the pharmaceutical segment is reportable 
(Merck, 2013b). As the operating segments are defined on a basis other than 
geographical area, Merck is not required under ASC 280 to disaggregate the 
consolidated revenue on a geographic basis. Although the information contained 
within Table 6.4 above has therefore been provided “voluntarily” by Merck, its 
potential usefulness for information users is limited by the overly broad geographic 
groupings. Exhibit 21 in Merck’s 10-K return lists the names of 461 subsidiaries and 
their country or state of incorporation, of which approximately 144 are located in tax 
havens such as Bermuda, the Netherlands and Ireland (Merck, 2014b; Americans for 
Tax Fairness, 2013).  
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Merck makes reference to the “beneficial impact of foreign earnings” on income 
taxes, with the company experiencing an effective income tax rate of 18.5% in 2013 
(Merck, 2013b, p. 53), which is substantially lower than the U.S. statutory rate of 
35%. Whilst tax planning is within the confines of the law and is therefore a common 
corporate practice, the acceptability of the specific methods and structures utilised by 
corporations may be questioned on the basis of their economic substance. Based on 
the information currently reported by Merck on its website and filed with the SEC, 
the extent and nature of Merck’s operations in each country is impossible to 
determine. If the 10-K form submitted to the SEC by Merck were prepared under an 
amended segment reporting standard that included the standardised CbC reporting 
model as thus far proposed, information users would be able to determine the extent 
of external and internal sales sourced in each country and how much had been 
remitted to each state by way of taxes. Furthermore, users would be able to 
determine the full extent of the geographic distribution of Merck’s subsidiaries, 
rather than merely the “significant” subsidiaries for SEC filing purposes. 
Additionally, disclosure of the geographical distribution of Merck’s 77,000 
employees and the associated labour costs would enable stakeholders to assess in 
which countries value is created and whether employees are treated fairly and 
consistently (Merck, 2013a). 
 
Furthermore, the disclosure of total intangible assets owned on a per country basis is 
likely to highlight a practice commonly utilised by multinational pharmaceutical 
companies, including Merck, of relocating the ownership rights of patents and 
trademarks to subsidiaries in low- or no-tax jurisdictions (Armstrong, 2013), of 
which Merck has many to chose from. 
 
Importantly, the corporate structures and transfer pricing decisions such as those 
made by Microsoft and Merck, and similarly by numerous other multinational 
entities are legal and do not constitute tax evasion. For example, the Corporate Vice 
President for Worldwide Tax at Microsoft stated in his testimony to the 
Subcommittee that “Microsoft complies with the tax rules in each jurisdiction in 
which it operates and pays billions of dollars in U.S. Federal, State, local and foreign 
taxes each year” (Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012, p. 30). The determination 
of whether these “billions of dollars” in taxes should in fact be billions of dollars 
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more is a question that must be addressed in a two-part manner. In his examination 
of the tax structure utilised by Apple, which was also subject to a Subcommittee 
hearing regarding offshore profit shifting, Ting (2014a) noted the need for tax policy 
reform to prevent double non-taxation in addition to the need for a “properly 
designed country-by-country reporting regime, [which] would be a much needed 
weapon for tax authorities which at present suffer from information asymmetry in the 
tax avoidance battle with [multinational entities]” (Ting, 2014, p. 40). Whilst any 
recommendation for specific taxation policy amendments is beyond the scope of this 
paper, this chapter segment has thus far aimed to address the latter need through the 
creation of a standardised CbC model that considers a broad information user group, 
the practical worth of which is assessed through illustrative application. Statoil, being 
the final illustration, depicts the pragmatic ability of multinational entities to prepare 
CbC reports whilst concurrently discrediting the argument that the required data is 
unavailable or overly-costly to obtain. 
 
6.4.3. Statoil 
Statoil is an international energy company headquartered in Norway with operations 
expanding across 36 countries (Statoil, 2014).   According to the Forbes’ Global 
2000 listing for the World’s Biggest Companies, Statoil ranked 51st across all 
industries and 12th in the oil and gas production sector, as based on a composite score 
of sales, profits, assets and market value (Forbes, 2014). In contrast to the previous 
illustrations, Statoil was selected for illustrative purposes within this thesis due to its 
CbC reporting leadership status. Specifically, the aforementioned analysis conducted 
by Transparency International identified Statoil as receiving the highest company 
ranking, being 66%, for the study’s CbC dimension (Kowalczyk-Hoyer, 2014). As 
will be explored in this section, a score of 66% still indicates potential for 
improvement, however it represents a stark contrast to the 0% scored by both 
Microsoft and Merck, in addition to the fact that no companies received a score of 
100%. 
 
Statoil’s 2013 Sustainability Report discloses the investments, revenues, signature 
bonuses (advance payments to governments for exploration activities), indirect and 
direct taxes paid, profit oil in-kind (host governments share of production after oil 
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production cost allocation), community investments, employee pay and social 
benefits and number of employees, on a per country basis (Statoil, 2013b) (see 
Appendix E for reference). 
 
Multiple stakeholders would benefit from the CbC line items disclosed by Statoil, of 
which will now be evaluated. The disclosure of revenues, as based on company 
location, provides information users with a perspective of the scale and direction of 
worldwide revenue flows. However, the inclusion of a separate column for intra-
group revenues (as suggested in the standardised model) would be of further benefit 
for reasons identified throughout this study, primarily being the identification of 
internal supply chain dependencies and potential transfer mispricing practices. 
Although it is noted (see Appendix E) that sales between Statoil companies within 
the same jurisdiction have been eliminated, to the extent of NOK $111,281 million, 
this does not inform readers as to the extent of intra-group sales performed in each 
country, as would be disclosed in the standardised framework. Similarly, whilst the 
disaggregation of purchases amongst individual countries is beneficial to information 
users, this figure should ideally be further apportioned between third party and intra-
firm charges.  
 
The separation of direct and indirect taxes adds to the understandability of the report. 
However, further refinement is required to determine amounts currently owed and 
deferred, in relation to the amounts actually paid during the fiscal year in question. 
For example, as reported in the notes to the Sustainability Report the 2013 direct 
taxes include taxes relating to the 2013 fiscal year and “taxes for earlier fiscal years 
paid in 2013” (Statoil, 2013b, p. 20). Therefore, although the disclosure of direct and 
indirect taxes in combination with signature bonuses and voluntary and social 
contributions is useful to assess Statoil’s contribution to each country’s government, 
figures cannot be associated to revenues applicable to a specific fiscal year, nor can 
they be associated to an operating profit figure for each country, as the latter is not 
provided by Statoil. 
 
The employee payments disclosed within the Sustainability Report on a CbC basis 
are stated to include pension and payroll taxes paid by the company for permanent 
employees. The standardised CbC framework suggests separate disclosure of 
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employee remuneration benefits and withholding taxes to enable an assessment of 
whether employees are remunerated fairly in relation to national standards and 
consistently over time. Further clarification on Statoil’s definition of “employee” 
would also be required under the standardised CbC framework, such as whether staff 
are employed on a full time basis and whether the reported figure includes payments 
to subcontractors under the control and direction of Statoil.  
 
The names of Statoil’s “significant” subsidiaries and associated companies, in 
addition to their country of incorporation, are disclosed within their 2013 Annual 
Report on Form 20-F (see Appendix F for reference). The largest number of 
“significant” subsidiary companies are located in the headquarter country of Norway 
(36 subsidiaries), whilst single significant subsidiaries are located in Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Brazil, Ireland, Switzerland, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
(Statoil, 2013a). Notably, individual country figures are not disclosed for Switzerland 
as part of the CbC disclosures despite a significant subsidiary being incorporated 
there. Furthermore, the inclusion of the broad geographical groupings of “Rest of 
Europe” and “Rest of the World” distorts the clarity of Statoil’s worldwide 
performance, especially when it is considered that 2,012 million of purchases are 
included within the “Rest of Europe” category despite nil sales (Statoil, 2013b). If 
Statoil had been reporting in accordance with the standardised framework figures 
would not have been grouped into broad geographical groupings, but rather financial 
performance and position figures would have been required for every individual 
country, irrespective of materiality levels. 
 
Finally, although Statoil’s Sustainability Report does provide information regarding 
development projects occurring in the United States, Canada, Brazil, Angola, 
Algeria, Azerbaijan, the United Kingdom and Ireland, information regarding 
tangible, fixed or intangible assets is not reported on a per country basis. The 
inclusion of tangible and fixed asset information would further inform users as to the 
extent of Statoil’s mining presence within an individual country, and would provide 
further clarity regarding countries that have been reported to receive nil revenue and 
employ no staff, such as Australia. The 2013 Annual Report primarily attributes the 
increase in cash flows used in investing activities between 2011 and 2012 to “higher 
additions to [property, plant and equipment] and intangible assets of NOK 19.9 
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billion” (Statoil, 2013a, p. 83). Under the standardised CbC reporting template, such 
an increase in property, plant and equipment and intangible assets would be apparent 
from a year-to-year country comparison, which would prove informative to investors 
in the assessment of management’s resource allocation decisions and for 
stakeholders in general in an evaluation of the economic reality of Statoil’s 
operations. 
 
In summary, the CbC disclosures contained within the Sustainability Report of 
Statoil represent significant progress towards the attainment of transparent, 
geographic financial performance disclosures. However, as discussed within this 
section, deficiencies are evident, such as disclosure for most but not all jurisdictions, 
a lack of refinement into third party and intra-group sales and purchases, detailed tax 
information, detailed asset information, and all subsidiary names and countries of 
operation. These deficiencies could be addressed if Statoil were to disclose CbC data 
within their audited financial statements in accordance with the amended segment 
reporting standard as suggested within this thesis.  
 
6.5 Conclusion and Statement of Findings 
In conclusion, this chapter developed a standardised CbC reporting model for 
inclusion within IFRS, in particular IFRS 8 Operating Segments, which in response 
to RQ2 was found to be the most sufficient implementation mechanism. The 
standardised model was developed in this section through an evaluation of the 
suitability of line item disclosures proposed by the industry wide CbC reporting 
models currently proposed by the TJN and OECD. The additional disclosure 
requirements suggested to be applicable to the extractive industry due to its unique 
nature and economic importance are introduced in section 6.2.2, but as they are 
intended to be in addition to the CbC model proposed by the TJN for all industries, 
the specific line items are not evaluated in the development of a comprehensive 
standardised CbC model. 
 
The findings of this chapter address RQ3, which considered how a standardised CbC 
reporting model should be structured. Specifically, the analysis presented in section 
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6.3 found the standardised CbC reporting template should be structured to require 
disclosure of the following information line items: 
 Subsidiary company names and the countries in which they operate 
 Total sales per country disaggregated between third party and intra-firm 
 Total purchases per country disaggregated between third party and intra-firm 
 Number of full-time equivalent employees per country (calculated on a yearly 
average or actual year-end figure basis) 
 Labour costs per country (with employment withholding taxes disclosed 
separately to regular employee payments) 
 Profit (Loss) Before Income Tax  
 Income tax expense disaggregated between current and deferred charges 
 Income tax liabilities disaggregated on a current and deferred basis 
 Income tax paid on a cash basis (as part of the Statement of Cash Flow) 
 Other payments made to governments (as part of the Profit & Loss 
Statement) 
 Other payments due to governments disaggregated on a current and deferred 
basis 
 Total tangible and fixed assets located in each country 
 Total intangible assets located in each country in accordance with the relevant 
subsidiary’s ownership rights. 
 
The pragmatic significance of the standardised CbC reporting model was displayed 
through an evaluation of the circumstances of three economically significant 
multinational entities that influence the lives of a significant number of stakeholders 
throughout the world. It was found that the disclosure of CbC data as suggested by 
the standardised CbC reporting framework developed within this chapter would 
likely have improved the financial transparency of the disclosures made publicly 
available by Microsoft, Merck and Statoil, being the illustrative examples examined 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
Industrial conditions have changed. Industries are becoming colossal. The 
local market is a thing of the past…The [socialisation] of the industrial 
process has, in large measure, destroyed the private character of business 
enterprises, and that…the power which it generates is a public power, which, 
like all public powers, should be administered under conditions of strict 
accountability. 
(Adams, 1902, p. 57) 
 
The need to hold multinational entities accountable for their global actions is as 
relevant in today’s world as it was more than a century ago, as implied by the above 
statement. The recent rise of corporate tax avoidance scandals has fuelled public 
demand for corporations to be held accountable for how much taxation revenue they 
contribute to the host countries in which they operate. The OECD’s BEPS Project 
targets the substantive tax laws that enable multinational entities to shift profits to 
low or no-tax jurisdictions to avoid paying corporate taxes. Furthermore, the OECD 
also focuses on disclosure requirements that promote the transparency necessary to 
identify tax risks and instances of profit shifting. One such disclosure requirement is 
for CbC reporting by multinational entities and is contained in Action 13 of the 
OECD Action Plan (which forms part of the wider BEPS Project). Whilst the OECD 
views CbC reporting as a transfer pricing risk assessment tool to assist tax 
administrations, civil society suggests CbC reporting should serve a broader purpose 
for the benefit of a diverse stakeholder group.  
 
The pragmatic and theoretical confusion surrounding the notion of CbC reporting 
formed the basis of investigation for this thesis. In particular, this thesis aimed to 
determine the suitability of CbC reporting as a transparency disclosure requirement, 
in addition to developing a standardised CbC reporting model based on a critical 
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evaluation of the differences in information disclosures, structural requirements and 
implementation mechanisms that are evident in the current primary CbC reporting 
frameworks, being the OECD’s template and the TJN’s model. This investigation 
was further informed by CSR reporting frameworks that contain requirements for 
certain information to be disclosed on an individual country basis. This chapter 
summarises the findings of this thesis in section 7.2 and discusses the significance of 
these findings to the associated literature in section 7.3. Subsequently, section 7.4 
presents the limitations of this thesis, whilst section 7.5 concludes the chapter with a 
discussion of potential avenues for future researchers to consider. 
 
7.2 Discussion of Findings 
This thesis first set out to examine whether CbC reporting is an appropriate inclusion 
within a corporate reporting system (RQ1)? To address this research question a 
review was conducted on the extant literature on geographical disclosure 
requirements within accounting standards in addition to studies on CbC reporting. 
The theoretical findings within the literature were further supported by an evaluation 
of real world CbC reporting developments and existing industry-specific 
implementation efforts. 
 
It was identified that due to the “single economic entity” approach utilised as part of 
IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial Statements and ASC 810 Consolidation, the extent 
and impact of operations in individual countries is generally difficult to discern from 
consolidated financial statements. A review of academic studies that evaluate 
geographical disclosures required by accounting standards found that multinational 
entities were utilising high-level country aggregations under IFRS 8 and ASC 280. In 
particular, the literature suggests the use of the management approach in IFRS 8 and 
ASC 280 enables companies that define their operating segments on a geographical 
basis to aggregate segments that meet certain criteria on a continental or multi-
continental basis. Furthermore, as materiality is not defined in the enterprise wide 
disclosure requirements under IFRS 8 and ASC 280, entities may choose to disclose 
revenues from external customers on an aggregated foreign country basis, the 
occurrence of which was evident in the academic studies reviewed.  
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Overall, a review of the literature on the relevant accounting standards suggestively 
warrants amended requirements for geographical disclosures to be disaggregated into 
data for individual countries, which has been identified in multiple studies as 
decision-useful information. CbC reporting has been suggested as a tool to provide 
decision-useful geographical information, however, the academic studies reviewed 
within this thesis lacked consensus regarding the objective of CbC reporting, its 
potential benefits and costs, and the location for CbC information to be disclosed. 
Irrespective of the various academic findings concerning CbC reporting, which 
further highlight the importance of conducting this research, this thesis found the 
answer to RQ1 to be in the affirmative. This finding is based on the need for 
amended geographical disclosure requirements identified by a review of the 
accounting and CSR literature, in addition to the feasibility of implementing CbC 
reporting as illustrated by the pragmatic adoption of industry-specific CbC reporting 
frameworks in the extractive and finance sectors, as explored in chapter two. 
  
The second research question (RQ2) considered the potential implementation 
mechanisms for CbC reporting. The first stage of the analysis for RQ2 compared the 
dissemination options contained in the TJN and OECD proposals and further 
investigated the comments regarding dissemination that were identified in OECD 
respondent letters during the qualitative content analysis coding process (i.e. public 
or confidential disclosures to tax administrations). Frequency counts of individual 
respondent’s opinions found the majority of letters identified CbC information as 
being of a commercially sensitive nature requiring confidential treatment, and 
consequently these respondents did not support its public disclosure. A majority was 
also revealed via a frequency count for the request of direct disclosure to tax 
administrations in the parent company’s jurisdiction with information to be shared 
via information exchange agreements and networks.  
 
The dissemination options for CbC data were then examined in accordance with the 
theoretical framework, whereby it was conceptualised that multinational entities have 
obligations that extend beyond the mere operation of the law that are enforced 
through societal expectations and norms. Stakeholder theory was utilised as a 
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necessary process in the operationalisation of CSR and facilitated the identification 
of the stakeholders whose needs should be satisfied through the provision of CbC 
data, as a form of organisational distribution. The conclusion that CbC information 
should be publicly disclosed was based on the prevention of issues associated with 
sharing information between tax administrations and pragmatic issues faced by 
developing countries. Additionally, public disclosure was found to be necessary to 
ensure the information needs of a broad stakeholder group are satisfied, including 
capital providers; employees; customers; suppliers; local communities; regulators; 
taxation administrations; trade unions; and civil society organisations. Therefore the 
objective of CbC reporting was found to extend beyond solely informing tax 
administrations, as restricting CbC reporting to a transfer pricing risk assessment tool 
seemingly disregards the needs of the other aforementioned stakeholders.  
 
Subsequent to finding CbC information should be made available to the public, two 
potential locations to introduce CbC reporting requirements were evaluated in 
section 5.6, including the OECD Model Tax Convention and international 
accounting standards on segment reporting (i.e. IFRS 8 Operating Segments). It was 
found within this thesis that the addition of CbC reporting requirements is a 
theoretically ideal amendment to IFRS due to the structured design of the standards 
prescribing the provision of informative, relevant, reliable, comparable and 
externally verifiable CbC information that has the potential to benefit all stakeholder 
groups. In summary and in response to RQ2, this thesis found from a stakeholder 
theory perspective that CbC reporting should be implemented as part of IFRS, and 
specifically as an amendment to the existing segment reporting standard, being IFRS 
8 Operating Segments. 
 
The structural inclusions of a standardised model were developed in response to RQ3 
through an evaluation of the suitability, from a stakeholder theory approach, of line 
item disclosures proposed by the industry wide CbC reporting models of the TJN and 
OECD, which are compared in section 6.2. The analysis presented in section 6.3 
utilises respondents’ comments on the advantages and disadvantages of certain 
structural inclusions and potential issues that were identified during the qualitative 
content analysis coding process. The results of this analysis for RQ3 found the 
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standardised CbC reporting template should be structured to require disclosure of 
subsidiary company names and countries of operation; sales and purchases data per 
country (disaggregated between third party and intra firm); number of full time 
employees (calculated on a yearly average or actual year-end basis); labour costs per 
country; profit (loss) before income tax; income tax details (including amounts on a 
cash, current and deferred basis); and fixed and intangible asset information. 
 
In summary, the findings in relation to the three research questions posed within this 
thesis addressed the specified research purpose of determining the suitability of CbC 
reporting as a transparency disclosure requirement, in addition to developing a 
standardised CbC reporting model. 
 
7.3 Contributions 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature on segment reporting accounting 
standards. Whilst the extant literature on segment reporting identifies that insufficient 
geographical disclosure requirements within accounting standards facilitate broad 
and uninformative geographical groupings, these studies do not identify or evaluate 
CbC reporting. 
 
The primary contribution of this thesis is to the limited literature on CbC reporting. 
Whilst previous academic studies have primarily focused on a political economy 
perspective and corporate practice reports have utilised cost-benefit analysis 
techniques, this thesis offers a unique theoretical contribution through the application 
of normative stakeholder theory as an operationalisation of CSR theory. This thesis 
utilises numerous contemporary information resources and encompasses multiple 
stakeholder perspectives through the application of a qualitative content analysis 
method. The research questions considered within this thesis specifically examine 
issues that lack consensus within the CbC reporting literature. 
 
In addition to the unique theoretical approach and method, this thesis contributes to 
the literature through its development of a standardised CbC model, a process yet to 
be undertaken for academic research purposes. In contrast to the extant CbC 
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reporting literature, this thesis also identifies and discusses CbC disclosure 
requirements contained within CSR frameworks that are not specifically recognised 
within the boundaries of CbC reporting. The three illustrative applications of the 
standardised model provide unique insight as to the real-world potential of a 
comprehensive CbC reporting requirement. 
 
This research may provide insight to ongoing deliberations and associated studies of 
the OECD CbC reporting template. Finally, this study not only provides new 
knowledge concerning CbC reporting, but also further questions the objective of 
financial reporting and the users that should benefit from the financial disclosures of 
multinational entities.  
 
7.4 Limitations 
Like all theoretical research, this thesis is subject to limitations, which are discussed 
within this section. 
 
The data analysed to address the research questions contains limitations. First, the 
analysis of accounting standards and the associated literature is limited to IFRS and 
U.S GAAP, despite the existence of other regional accounting standard setting 
bodies. However, the justification for the selection of IFRS and U.S GAAP is 
discussed within the thesis and encompasses the widespread global adoption of the 
former, and ongoing convergence efforts between the two. Second, the primary 
analyses in chapters five and six is limited to an evaluation of two CbC reporting 
proposals (i.e. the TJN and OECD). However, the identification and lower level 
reviews of other industry specific CbC frameworks and CSR frameworks may reduce 
the implications of this limitation. Third, response letters to the OECD’s Discussion 
Draft on CbC reporting were purposively selected to obtain the perspectives of 
various stakeholder groups and consequently the quantity selected was based on the 
identification of key concepts. Therefore, associated frequency counts, where 
conducted, do not suggest statistical significance. Fourth, the importance of 
additional CbC disclosure requirements for the extractive industry is discussed, 
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however, the scope of this thesis is limited to the development of a standardised 
model for applications in all industries. Fifth, specific reporting requirements or 
exemptions that may be need to be tailored to small and medium sized multinational 
entities were considered to be outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
This study is also subject to more general limitations. Specifically, as non-transparent 
financial reports merely contribute to BEPS, any form of reporting framework aimed 
at enhancing corporate transparency must be recognised as only part of a potential 
solution that must be viewed in combination with complimentary tax policy reforms. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to consider any tax policy reform options to 
address the substantive problem of BEPS.  
 
Furthermore, whilst the implementation of a CbC reporting framework may result in 
improvements in the financial transparency and accountability of multinational 
entities, a causal link cannot be implied to any improvement in the BEPS problem. A 
reduction in base erosion or the profit shifting activities of multinational entities 
could be a result of CbC reporting, the introduction of new or amended legislation or 
disclosure requirements, or some form of combination. Finally, the OECD’s 
timeframe for development of a CbC reporting template extends beyond the 
completion of this study, and therefore any future alterations to the CbC reporting 
template would not be accounted for.  
 
7.5 Future Research 
CbC reporting currently represents a globally influential and evolving field and may 
offer worthwhile additional future research. Potential future research directions are 
summarised within this section.  
 
Future research may track the development of the OECD CbC template and seek to 
explore the roles played by contributing actors such as multinational entities, 
accountants, and civil society professionals. Following the implementation of CbC 
reporting, future academics could examine the effectiveness of the reporting 
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requirements through comparative studies of multinational entities’ financial 
disclosures pre- and post-CbC reporting.  
 
Future academic studies could also focus on an analysis of the various CbC reporting 
requirements currently implemented and proposed for the extractive industry. Such 
research may also seek to develop a standardised CbC model for the extractive 
industry. Additionally, future researchers may wish to conduct further studies into 
specific exemptions and disclosure requirements that may be necessary for small and 
medium sized multinational enterprises. 
 
Finally, it may be worthwhile for future research to consider upcoming developments 
in CbC reporting and to conduct the associated analyses using different research 
methods and methodologies. For example, researchers could conduct qualitative 
interviews to capture the views of all stakeholders on CbC reporting issues, or 
qualitative coding could be applied to different forms of documentary data. 
Alternatively, quantitative researchers may offer unique theoretical contributions, 
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Loyens and Loeff, Mouvement des Entreprises de France, Pearson, PricewaterhouseCoopers Global, 
Rio Tinto, SabMiller, Swiss Holdings, TD Banking Group, The 100 Group,  
Information is not 
sensitive (5) 
BEPS Monitoring Group, Christian Aid, Eurodad, Oxfam, Trade Union Advisory Committee 
No comment (7) Antony Ting, BaseFirma, British Sky Broadcasting Group, Global Financial Integrity, International 
Air Transport Association, Plateforme Paradis Fiscaux et Judiciares, RSM International 
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Data Source Flexibility (23) AWV Working Group, BaseFirma, BASF The Chemical Company, BDO, Business and Industry 
Advisory Committee, British Sky Broadcasting Group PLC, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu – Tax LLP, 
Deloitte – Transfer Pricing Unit, Ernst & Young, Ibec, International Air Transport Association, 
Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia, Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales, International Chamber of Commerce, Swiss Holdings, TD Banking Group, The 100 Group, 
The International Underwriting Association of London, Mouvement des Entreprises de France, 
Pearson, PricewaterhouseCoopers Global, Rio Tinto, RSM International,  
 Bottom-up approach 
(2) 
Brookfield, SabMiller 
 Top-down approach (2) BEPS Monitoring Group, Trade Union Advisory Committee 
 Other approach (3) Canadian Bankers Association, DFK International, Plateforme Paradis Fiscaux et Judiciares, 
 No comment (8) Antony Ting, BDI, Christian Aid, Eurodad, Global Financial Integrity, Grant Thornton International, 
Loyens and Loeff, Oxfam, 
Comparability Internal (8) Business and Industry Advisory Committee, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu – Tax LLP, Deloitte – 
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Transfer Pricing Unit, Ernst & Young, International Chamber of Commerce, Pearson, The 100 
Group, Christian Aid, 
 External (1) BEPS Monitoring Group 
 No comment (29) Antony Ting, AWV Working Group, BaseFirma, BASF The Chemical Company, BDI, BDO, 
Brookfield, British Sky Broadcasting Group, Canadian Bankers Association, DFK International, 
Eurodad, Global Financial Integrity, Grant Thornton International, International Air Transport 
Association, Ibec, Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia, Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales, The International Underwriting Association of London, Loyens and Loeff, 
Mouvement des Entreprises de France, Oxfam, Plateforme Paradis Fiscaux et Judiciares, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Global, Rio Tinto, RSM International, SabMiller, Swiss Holdings, TD 
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Appendix B 
OECD CbC Reporting Template 
Table 1. Overview of Allocation of income, taxes and business activities by tax jurisdiction 
Name of the MNE group: 
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Table 2. List of all the Constituent Entities of the MNE group included in each aggregation per tax jurisdiction 
Name of the MNE group: 














































































































































































































































































































































































 1.               
2.               
3.               
 1.               
2.               
3.               
2 Please specify the nature of the activity of the Constituent Entity in the “Additional Information” section 
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Table 3. Additional Information 
Name of the MNE group: 
Fiscal year concerned: 
Please include any further brief information or explanation you consider necessary or that would facilitate the understanding of the compulsory 
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Appendix C 
Microsoft Corporation 2011 Profit & Loss Statement 
 
Year Ended June 30, 2011  2010  
Revenue $      69,943  $      62,484  
Operating expenses:       
Cost of revenue         15,577          12,395  
Research and development           9,043            8,714  
Sales and marketing         13,940          13,214  
General and administrative           4,222            4,063  
Total operating expenses         42,782          38,386  
Operating income         27,161          24,098  
Other income (expense)              910               915  
Income before income taxes         28,071          25,013  
Provision for income taxes           4,921            6,253  
Net income $      23,150  $      18,760  
Earnings per share:       
Basic $          2.73  $          2.13  
Diluted $          2.69  $          2.10  
Weighted average shares outstanding:       
Basic           8,490            8,813  
Diluted           8,593            8,927  
Cash dividends declared per common share $          0.64  $          0.52  
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Appendix D 
Microsoft Corporation 2011 Balance Sheet 
 
(In millions)      
June 30, 2011  2010
Assets      
Current assets:      
Cash and cash equivalents $         9,610  $         5,505 
Short-term investments (including securities loaned of $1,181 and $62)          43,162           31,283 
Total cash, cash equivalents, and short-term investments          52,772           36,788 
Accounts receivable, net of allowance for doubtful accounts of $333 and $375          14,987           13,014 
Inventories            1,372                740 
Deferred income taxes            2,467             2,184 
Other            3,320             2,950 
Total current assets          74,918           55,676 
Property and equipment, net of accumulated depreciation of $9,829 and $8,629            8,162             7,630 
Equity and other investments          10,865             7,754 
Goodwill          12,581           12,394 
Intangible assets, net               744             1,158 
Other long-term assets            1,434             1,501 
Total assets $      108,704  $       86,113 
Liabilities and stockholders’ equity      
Current liabilities:      
Accounts payable $         4,197  $         4,025 
Short-term debt                  0             1,000 
Accrued compensation            3,575             3,283 
Income taxes               580             1,074 
Short-term unearned revenue          15,722           13,652 
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Securities lending payable            1,208                182 
Other            3,492             2,931 
Total current liabilities          28,774           26,147 
Long-term debt          11,921             4,939 
Long-term unearned revenue            1,398             1,178 
Deferred income taxes            1,456                229 
Other long-term liabilities            8,072             7,445 
Total liabilities          51,621           39,938 
Commitments and contingencies      
Stockholders’ equity:      
Common stock and paid-in capital – shares authorised 24,000; outstanding 8,376 and 8,668          63,415           62,856 
Retained deficit, including accumulated other comprehensive income of $1,863 and $1,055           (6,332)          (16,681)
Total stockholders’ equity          57,083           46,175 
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Appendix E 
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Appendix F 
Statoil’s Significant Subsidiaries 
 
